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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-55677: Echo: Encoded slash (%2F) bypasses route-level protection and exposes static files

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq

Summary Echo's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving %2F as-is), while StaticDirectoryHandler unescapes %2F to / before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.

Published Aug 25, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/labstack/echo/v5

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 5.2.0
Fixed in
5.2.0
Check
go list -m github.com/labstack/echo/v5

github.com/labstack/echo/v4

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 4.15.3
Fixed in
4.15.3
Check
go list -m github.com/labstack/echo/v4

github.com/labstack/echo

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 3.3.10
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
go list -m github.com/labstack/echo

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Echo's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving %2F as-is), while StaticDirectoryHandler unescapes %2F to / before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.

Details

Root cause 1 — `router.go` lines 798-802: The router uses req.URL.RawPath for route matching when useEscapedPathForRouting is false (the default). This means /admin%2Fsecret.txt is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the /admin/* route pattern.

if !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != "" {
    path = req.URL.RawPath
}

Root cause 2 — `echo.go` lines 559-568: StaticDirectoryHandler calls url.PathUnescape() on the path parameter before opening files. This converts %2F back to /, resolving admin/secret.txt on disk.

if !disablePathUnescaping {
    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)
    p = tmpPath
}
name := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/")))

PoC (Screenshot)

Sample:

403:

Bypass with encoded slash:

Impact

Unauthorized static file disclosure. Applications that protect route prefixes with authentication middleware while also serving static files from a broader root are vulnerable. An attacker only needs to encode the slash (/ → %2F) in the URL to bypass all route-level protection.

Common affected pattern:

adminGroup := e.Group("/admin", authMiddleware)
e.StaticFS("/", os.DirFS("public"))

Credited to a-tt-om, oran-gugu, Iscaraca.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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