CVE-2026-55677: Echo: Encoded slash (%2F) bypasses route-level protection and exposes static files
Summary Echo's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving %2F as-is), while StaticDirectoryHandler unescapes %2F to / before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.
Published Aug 25, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/labstack/echo/v5
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 5.2.0
- Fixed in
- 5.2.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/labstack/echo/v5
github.com/labstack/echo/v4
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 4.15.3
- Fixed in
- 4.15.3
- Check
go list -m github.com/labstack/echo/v4
github.com/labstack/echo
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 3.3.10
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/labstack/echo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Echo's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving %2F as-is), while StaticDirectoryHandler unescapes %2F to / before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.
Details
Root cause 1 — `router.go` lines 798-802: The router uses req.URL.RawPath for route matching when useEscapedPathForRouting is false (the default). This means /admin%2Fsecret.txt is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the /admin/* route pattern.
if !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != "" {
path = req.URL.RawPath
}Root cause 2 — `echo.go` lines 559-568: StaticDirectoryHandler calls url.PathUnescape() on the path parameter before opening files. This converts %2F back to /, resolving admin/secret.txt on disk.
if !disablePathUnescaping {
tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)
p = tmpPath
}
name := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/")))PoC (Screenshot)
Sample:
403:
Bypass with encoded slash:
Impact
Unauthorized static file disclosure. Applications that protect route prefixes with authentication middleware while also serving static files from a broader root are vulnerable. An attacker only needs to encode the slash (/ → %2F) in the URL to bypass all route-level protection.
Common affected pattern:
adminGroup := e.Group("/admin", authMiddleware)
e.StaticFS("/", os.DirFS("public"))Credited to a-tt-om, oran-gugu, Iscaraca.
References
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55677
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/pull/3009
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/pull/3011
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/8d1ae9d3360a71672418856d58753af25f2c3986
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/c3fa2a27ff92b2b8db360de614f999ef1da24725
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.15.3
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.2.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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