CVE-2026-56074: PraisonAI: Coarse-Grained Tool Approval Cache Bypasses Per-Invocation Consent for Shell Commands
Summary The approval system in PraisonAI Agents caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments. Once a user approves executecommand for any command (e.g., ls -la), all subsequent executecommand calls in that execution context bypass the approval prompt entirely.
Published Apr 10, 2026 · Updated Jun 19, 2026
Affected packages
praisonaiagents
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 4.5.128
- Fixed in
- 4.5.128
- Check
pip show praisonaiagents
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The approval system in PraisonAI Agents caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments. Once a user approves execute_command for any command (e.g., ls -la), all subsequent execute_command calls in that execution context bypass the approval prompt entirely. Combined with os.environ.copy() passing all process environment variables to subprocesses, this allows an LLM agent (potentially via prompt injection) to silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials without further user consent.
Details
The require_approval decorator in src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/approval/__init__.py:176-178 checks approval status by tool name only:
@wraps(func)
def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
if is_already_approved(tool_name): # line 177 — checks only tool_name
return func(*args, **kwargs) # line 178 — bypasses ALL approvalThe mark_approved function in registry.py:144-147 stores only the tool name string:
def mark_approved(self, tool_name: str) -> None:
approved = self._approved_context.get(set())
approved.add(tool_name) # stores "execute_command", not args
self._approved_context.set(approved)The approval context is never cleared during agent execution — clear_approved() exists (registry.py:152) but is never called in the agent's tool execution path (agent/tool_execution.py).
Meanwhile, the ConsoleBackend UI at backends.py:95-96 misleads the user:
return Confirm.ask(
f"Do you want to execute this {request.risk_level} risk tool?",
# "this" implies per-invocation approval
)The UI displays the specific command arguments (lines 81-85), creating a reasonable expectation that the user is approving only that specific invocation.
Additionally, shell_tools.py:77 passes the full process environment to every subprocess:
process_env = os.environ.copy() # includes OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.There is no command filtering, blocklist, or environment variable sanitization in the shell tools module.
PoC
from praisonaiagents import Agent
from praisonaiagents.tools.shell_tools import execute_command
# Step 1: Create agent with shell tool
agent = Agent(
name="worker",
instructions="You are a helpful assistant.",
tools=[execute_command]
)
# Step 2: Agent requests benign command — user sees Rich panel:
# Function: execute_command
# Risk Level: CRITICAL
# Arguments:
# command: ls -la
# "Do you want to execute this critical risk tool?" [y/N]
# User approves → mark_approved("execute_command") is called
# Step 3: All subsequent execute_command calls bypass approval silently:
# execute_command(command="env")
# → returns ALL environment variables (OPENAI_API_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, etc.)
# → NO approval prompt shown
# Step 4: Targeted extraction also bypasses approval:
# execute_command(command="printenv OPENAI_API_KEY")
# → returns the specific API key
# → NO approval prompt shown
# Verification: check the approval cache
from praisonaiagents.approval import is_already_approved
# After approving "ls -la":
# is_already_approved("execute_command") → True
# Any execute_command call now returns immediately at __init__.py:177-178Impact
- Secret exfiltration: An LLM agent (or one subjected to prompt injection) can dump all process environment variables after a single benign command approval. Common secrets include
OPENAI_API_KEY,AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY,DATABASE_URL, and any other credentials passed via environment. - Misleading consent UI: The console prompt displays specific arguments and uses language ("this tool") that implies per-invocation consent, but the system grants session-wide blanket approval.
- No expiration or scope: The approval cache uses a
ContextVarthat persists for the entire agent execution context with no timeout, no command-count limit, and no clearing between tool calls. - No environment filtering:
os.environ.copy()passes every environment variable to subprocesses without filtering sensitive patterns.
Recommended Fix
- Per-invocation approval for critical tools — store a hash of
(tool_name, arguments)instead of justtool_name, or require re-approval for each invocation of critical-risk tools:
# In registry.py — change mark_approved/is_already_approved:
import hashlib, json
def mark_approved(self, tool_name: str, arguments: dict = None) -> None:
approved = self._approved_context.get(set())
risk = self._risk_levels.get(tool_name)
if risk == "critical" and arguments:
key = f"{tool_name}:{hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(arguments, sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest()}"
else:
key = tool_name
approved.add(key)
self._approved_context.set(approved)
def is_already_approved(self, tool_name: str, arguments: dict = None) -> bool:
approved = self._approved_context.get(set())
risk = self._risk_levels.get(tool_name)
if risk == "critical" and arguments:
key = f"{tool_name}:{hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(arguments, sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest()}"
return key in approved
return tool_name in approved- Filter environment variables in
shell_tools.py:
SENSITIVE_PATTERNS = ('_KEY', '_SECRET', '_TOKEN', '_PASSWORD', '_CREDENTIAL')
process_env = {
k: v for k, v in os.environ.items()
if not any(p in k.upper() for p in SENSITIVE_PATTERNS)
}
if env:
process_env.update(env)Credited to offset.
References
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-ffp3-3562-8cv3
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.128
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56074
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-tool-approval-cache-bypass-via-coarse-grained-caching
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ffp3-3562-8cv3
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More PyPI vulnerabilities
All PyPI entriesCVE-2026-60087
PraisonAI: Human-in-the-loop tool approval is cached by tool name and silently reused for all subsequent calls with arbitrary arguments
medium6.1Oct 8, 2026CVE-2026-60089
PraisonAI: Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root
medium6.9Oct 8, 2026CVE-2026-61430
PraisonAI: DNS rebinding bypass in `web_crawl` SSRF protection allows internal response disclosure
high8.5Oct 8, 2026CVE-2026-61432
PraisonAI: FastContext path resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace
medium5.7Oct 8, 2026CVE-2026-61437
PraisonAI: Unsafe Dynamic Module Loading Leads to Arbitrary Code Execution via tools.py in AgentFlow
high7.8Oct 8, 2026CVE-2026-61443
PraisonAI: SkillTools Executes Scripts Without Path Containment Validation
high8.1Oct 8, 2026
