CVE-2026-57120: PraisonAI: execute_code sandbox bypass: str.format C-level attribute access reads every blocklisted dunder
Summary The executecode tool's subprocess sandbox advertises a three-layer defense (AST validation, text-pattern blocklist, restricted builtins). In sandbox mode (the default) only two layers are active — the text-pattern blocklist is skipped — and both remaining layers are bypassed by combining two CPython semantics: 1. Runtime string assembly.
Published Jun 18, 2026 · Updated Jul 20, 2026
Affected packages
praisonaiagents
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 1.6.59
- Fixed in
- 1.6.59
- Check
pip show praisonaiagents
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The execute_code tool's subprocess sandbox advertises a three-layer defense (AST validation, text-pattern blocklist, restricted __builtins__). In sandbox mode (the default) only two layers are active — the text-pattern blocklist is skipped — and both remaining layers are bypassed by combining two CPython semantics:
- Runtime string assembly. The AST validator (
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py:75) enumerates blocked dunder names againstast.Attribute.attr,ast.Call.func.id, andast.Constantstring-substring. Names assembled at runtime (e.g."_"*2 + "class" + "_"*2) appear in the AST as multiple shortast.Constantnodes, none containing a blocked substring, so the static check passes. - C-level attribute access via format-spec.
str.format/str.format_mapresolve dotted field references through CPython's internalPyObject_GetAttr(do_string_format→get_field). This C path never consults the Python-levelgetattrbinding. The sandbox's_safe_getattrwrapper (python_tools.py:221) is installed only as thegetattrname insafe_builtins, so any C-level attribute access — including format-spec field resolution — sidesteps it.format/format_mapare also absent from_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS(python_tools.py:56).
Combined, this yields an arbitrary read primitive over every blocklisted attribute (__class__, __qualname__, __bases__, __base__, function __globals__, __dict__, …).
Affected code
| File | Lines | Symbol | Role | | `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 39–54 | `_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_ATTRS` | The blocklist the bypass renders unreachable | | `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 56–60 | `_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS` | Missing entries: `format`, `format_map` | | `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 75–102 | `_validate_code_ast` | Static check, blind to runtime string assembly | | `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 221–226 | `_safe_getattr` | Wraps Python-level `getattr` only; C-level access bypasses | | `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 352 | `execute_code` | Entry point; gated by `@require_approval(risk_level="critical")` |
Reproducer
import os
os.environ["PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE"] = "true"
from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code
payload = '''
und = "_" * 2 # "__" assembled at runtime
key1 = und + "class" + und # "__class__"
key2 = und + "qualname" + und # "__qualname__"
fmt_class = "{0." + key1 + "}"
fmt_qual2 = "{0." + key1 + "." + key2 + "}"
print("LEAK_CLASS=" + fmt_class.format(()))
print("LEAK_QUAL2=" + fmt_qual2.format(()))
'''
print(execute_code(payload, sandbox_mode="sandbox", timeout=15))Observed: stdout = LEAK_CLASS=<class 'tuple'> / LEAK_QUAL2=tuple, success: true, no security error. Both __class__ (one hop) and __class__.__qualname__ (two hops) — all blocklisted — are read.
Trust boundary
The @require_approval(risk_level="critical") gate is bypassed when PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE is set (verified: require_approval short-circuits on is_env_auto_approve()). That variable is set by the project's FULL_AUTO autonomy mode, the bots-CLI launchers, and the project's own issue-triage CI workflow — postures where the agent reaches execute_code with no human approval. The payload then arrives via any LLM-visible surface (user message, retrieved document, tool/web/MCP output) and the tool-call machinery passes it as the code argument.
Relationship to GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh
The code's own comment at python_tools.py:46 cites GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh, which added __self__ to the blocklist to stop C-builtins leaking builtins via func.__self__. This finding does not bypass that single entry — it bypasses the entire blocklist, because format-spec attribute resolution never consults the blocklist or _safe_getattr. "{0.__self__}".format(print) would leak __self__ regardless of the blocklist. Same defense surface, different mechanism; the GHSA-4mr5 fix does not mitigate this.
Scope (read primitive only)
This reports the read primitive. Turning the read into in-process execution requires a callable bridge; the obvious one (string.Formatter().get_field() returning the live object) is not directly reachable because import string is blocked at the AST layer (no ast.Import). Other bridges may exist; a full execution chain is not claimed here. If one is found, severity rises to ~8.8 (the subprocess has no seccomp/setrlimit/syscall filtering).
Suggested fix
- Add
format,format_mapto_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS(blocks the calls at the AST layer; cost: also blocks benignstr.format). - Or replace
strinsafe_builtinswith a subclass whoseformat/format_mapreject dotted fields resolving to leading-underscore attributes (preserves benign formatting). - Or drop sandbox-mode's in-process security claim and document that real isolation requires external sandboxing (gVisor/firejail/container/microVM) — which matches what the subprocess provides today.
The text-pattern blocklist present in the direct path (python_tools.py:487-502) is absent from the sandbox path; even if added, the runtime-assembly trick defeats it, so (1) or (2) is required.
Reporter: Kai Aizen / SnailSploit — [email protected] — PGP on request. Coordinated disclosure; no public posting.
Credited to SnailSploit.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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