CVE-2026-58511: Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API
Summary The ToHook() function in services/webhook/general.go decrypts the webhook's HeaderAuthorizationEncrypted field and returns the plaintext authorization header in the API response. Any repository admin can read the full plaintext value of webhook authorization headers (Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, API keys) set by other admins.
Published Jul 21, 2026
Affected packages
code.gitea.io/gitea
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.27.0
- Fixed in
- 1.27.0
- Check
go list -m code.gitea.io/gitea
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The ToHook() function in services/webhook/general.go decrypts the webhook's HeaderAuthorizationEncrypted field and returns the plaintext authorization header in the API response. Any repository admin can read the full plaintext value of webhook authorization headers (Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, API keys) set by other admins.
The authorization header is stored encrypted in the database using the server's SecretKey, but ToHook() decrypts it before serializing it into the API response — converting a write-only secret into a readable credential.
Vulnerable Code
File: services/webhook/general.go:407-420
func ToHook(repoLink string, w *webhook_model.Webhook) (*api.Hook, error) {
// ...
authorizationHeader, err := w.HeaderAuthorization() // DECRYPTS from DB
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &api.Hook{
// ...
AuthorizationHeader: authorizationHeader, // PLAINTEXT in response
// ...
}, nil
}Decryption function: models/webhook/webhook.go:209-216
func (w Webhook) HeaderAuthorization() (string, error) {
if w.HeaderAuthorizationEncrypted == "" {
return "", nil
}
return secret.DecryptSecret(setting.SecretKey, w.HeaderAuthorizationEncrypted)
}Affected Endpoints
All call ToHook():
GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks(requires repo admin)GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks/{id}(requires repo admin)GET /api/v1/admin/hooks(requires site admin)GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/hooks(requires org admin)GET /api/v1/user/hooks(requires authenticated user)
Steps to Reproduce
- Admin A creates a webhook with a sensitive authorization header.
- Admin B (different repo admin) lists webhooks via
GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks. - The API response includes the full plaintext authorization header set by Admin A.
Impact
- Cross-admin secret exposure on shared repositories
- Credential harvesting if a repo admin's Gitea token is stolen
- External service compromise via leaked Bearer tokens and API keys
- Undermines the intentional encryption-at-rest protection
Suggested Fix
The authorization header should be write-only. Return a masked/redacted version or a boolean has_authorization_header flag instead.
References
- Vulnerable function:
services/webhook/general.go:392-425 - Decryption function:
models/webhook/webhook.go:209-216 - Verified against commit 19f0169
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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