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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-59884: pyasn1 BER/CER/DER decoder denial of service via unbounded long-form tag IDs

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-m4p7-r5rc-7g4j

Impact The BER decoder (shared by the CER and DER codecs) parses long-form tags by accumulating continuation octets in a loop with no upper bound on the size of the tag ID. A crafted input can force the decoder to build an arbitrarily large integer, with CPU cost growing quadratically in input size — a ~1 MB input consumes over a minute of CPU.

Published Jul 21, 2026 · Updated Jul 31, 2026

Affected packages

pyasn1

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
< 0.6.4
Fixed in
0.6.4
Check
pip show pyasn1

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Impact

The BER decoder (shared by the CER and DER codecs) parses long-form tags by accumulating continuation octets in a loop with no upper bound on the size of the tag ID. A crafted input can force the decoder to build an arbitrarily large integer, with CPU cost growing quadratically in input size — a ~1 MB input consumes over a minute of CPU. On Python 3.11+, the oversized tag ID can also trigger an unhandled ValueError (integer string conversion limit) while the decoder formats error messages, violating the documented PyAsn1Error contract and potentially bypassing caller error handling.

Any application decoding untrusted BER/CER/DER input is affected.

Affected components

  • pyasn1.codec.ber.decoder — decode() and StreamingDecoder
  • pyasn1.codec.cer.decoder and pyasn1.codec.der.decoder, which inherit the same tag parsing
  • pyasn1.type.tag — Tag/TagSet reprs could raise ValueError when rendering oversized tag IDs (reachable through decoder error paths)

The encoders and the pyasn1.codec.native codec are not affected.

Patches

Fixed in 0.6.4. Long-form tag IDs are now limited to 20 octets (140-bit tag IDs, matching the existing OID arc limit); oversized tags are rejected with PyAsn1Error. Tag ID rendering in reprs and error messages was additionally hardened against the interpreter's integer-to-string conversion limit.

Workarounds

Bound the size of untrusted input passed to decode() before calling it.

Credited to mikeappsec, HsiangNianian, westonsteimel.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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