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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-61549: Woodpecker: Privilege escalation via unrestricted serviceAccountName in the Kubernetes backend

highCVSS 4.0 8.2GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8

Impact A privilege escalation vulnerability affects Woodpecker instances using the Kubernetes backend. The pipeline option backendoptions.kubernetes.serviceAccountName was passed directly to the pod spec without any admin gating. Who is impacted: any operator running the Kubernetes backend.

Published Jul 14, 2026

Affected packages

go.woodpecker-ci.org/woodpecker/v3

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 3.16.0
Fixed in
3.16.0
Check
go list -m go.woodpecker-ci.org/woodpecker/v3

github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 1.0.0, <= 1.0.4
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
go list -m github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker

go.woodpecker-ci.org/woodpecker/v2

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 2.8.3
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
go list -m go.woodpecker-ci.org/woodpecker/v2

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Impact

A privilege escalation vulnerability affects Woodpecker instances using the Kubernetes backend.

The pipeline option backend_options.kubernetes.serviceAccountName was passed directly to the pod spec without any admin gating.

Who is impacted: any operator running the Kubernetes backend. Any user with Push permission on a connected repository can run pipeline pods under an arbitrary ServiceAccount in the pipeline namespace, gaining that account's RBAC permissions. If a privileged ServiceAccount is reachable in that namespace, this can lead to secret exfiltration (database credentials, API keys, TLS certs) and full cluster takeover.

Patches

https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/pull/6792

Workarounds

Operators who cannot upgrade immediately can mitigate by any of:

  • Restrict Push access on repositories connected to the Kubernetes-backed instance to trusted users only.
  • Harden the pipeline namespace: ensure no privileged ServiceAccount exists or is bound in the namespace where pipeline pods run; keep the default ServiceAccount minimally privileged.
  • Disable ServiceAccount token automounting for ServiceAccounts that should not be used by pipelines.
  • Enforce an admission policy (e.g. OPA/Gatekeeper, Kyverno, or a ValidatingAdmissionPolicy) that rejects pipeline pods setting an unexpected serviceAccountName.
  • Use a dedicated, isolated namespace per org/instance with no sensitive RBAC bindings.

Resources

  • Vulnerable option introduced in commit 609ba481b5e912f59aaae8ca7bc22b44523c5e37
  • Affected versions: v1.0.0 through v3.15.0
  • Source: pipeline/backend/kubernetes/backend_options.go (field ServiceAccountName), pipeline/backend/kubernetes/pod.go (assigned to pod spec with no gating)

Credited to AnuragBathani.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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