CVE-2026-61549: Woodpecker: Privilege escalation via unrestricted serviceAccountName in the Kubernetes backend
Impact A privilege escalation vulnerability affects Woodpecker instances using the Kubernetes backend. The pipeline option backendoptions.kubernetes.serviceAccountName was passed directly to the pod spec without any admin gating. Who is impacted: any operator running the Kubernetes backend.
Published Jul 14, 2026
Affected packages
go.woodpecker-ci.org/woodpecker/v3
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 3.16.0
- Fixed in
- 3.16.0
- Check
go list -m go.woodpecker-ci.org/woodpecker/v3
github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 1.0.0, <= 1.0.4
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker
go.woodpecker-ci.org/woodpecker/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.8.3
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m go.woodpecker-ci.org/woodpecker/v2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
A privilege escalation vulnerability affects Woodpecker instances using the Kubernetes backend.
The pipeline option backend_options.kubernetes.serviceAccountName was passed directly to the pod spec without any admin gating.
Who is impacted: any operator running the Kubernetes backend. Any user with Push permission on a connected repository can run pipeline pods under an arbitrary ServiceAccount in the pipeline namespace, gaining that account's RBAC permissions. If a privileged ServiceAccount is reachable in that namespace, this can lead to secret exfiltration (database credentials, API keys, TLS certs) and full cluster takeover.
Patches
https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/pull/6792
Workarounds
Operators who cannot upgrade immediately can mitigate by any of:
- Restrict Push access on repositories connected to the Kubernetes-backed instance to trusted users only.
- Harden the pipeline namespace: ensure no privileged ServiceAccount exists or is bound in the namespace where pipeline pods run; keep the
defaultServiceAccount minimally privileged. - Disable ServiceAccount token automounting for ServiceAccounts that should not be used by pipelines.
- Enforce an admission policy (e.g. OPA/Gatekeeper, Kyverno, or a ValidatingAdmissionPolicy) that rejects pipeline pods setting an unexpected
serviceAccountName. - Use a dedicated, isolated namespace per org/instance with no sensitive RBAC bindings.
Resources
- Vulnerable option introduced in commit
609ba481b5e912f59aaae8ca7bc22b44523c5e37 - Affected versions:
v1.0.0throughv3.15.0 - Source:
pipeline/backend/kubernetes/backend_options.go(fieldServiceAccountName),pipeline/backend/kubernetes/pod.go(assigned to pod spec with no gating)
Credited to AnuragBathani.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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