CVE-2026-62385: NLTK: Stable FrameNet and NKJP readers parse outside-root XML
Summary Published nltk==3.9.4 still contains several XML-reader entrypoints that build parser paths from caller-controlled selectors or trusted-looking index state without preserving the corpus-root boundary. Details - Vulnerability type: Path traversal and trusted-root bypass - Affected component: FramenetCorpusReader.framebyname, FramenetCorpusReader.doc, FramenetCorpusReader.lu, NKJPCorpusReader.header - Affected…
Published Sep 8, 2026
Affected packages
nltk
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 3.9.4
- Fixed in
- 3.10.0
- Check
pip show nltk
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Published nltk==3.9.4 still contains several XML-reader entrypoints that build parser paths from caller-controlled selectors or trusted-looking index state without preserving the corpus-root boundary.
Details
- Vulnerability type: Path traversal and trusted-root bypass
- Affected component:
FramenetCorpusReader.frame_by_name,FramenetCorpusReader.doc,FramenetCorpusReader.lu,NKJPCorpusReader.header - Affected versions: Published
3.9.4reproduced. Current sourcev3.10.0-rc2acted as a negative control and blocked the same payloads. - Patched versions: Patched in version 3.10.0, which includes the path-safety rejections seen in the release candidate.
- Root cause: Stable reader paths still construct raw XML filenames from unsafe selectors, poisoned index state, or unsafe file identifiers.
I confirmed four public stable entrypoints return parsed outside-root content: a parent-segment traversal frame name, a poisoned fulltext index filename, a poisoned LU id, and an unsafe NKJP header file identifier. Current source rejects the same payloads with explicit path-safety errors, which shows the bug is real but version-scoped to the published stable package.
PoC
Preconditions
- The application exposes FrameNet or NKJP reader APIs while trusting NLTK to keep XML parsing inside a corpus root.
Steps
- Create a minimal FrameNet or NKJP corpus root and place attacker-chosen XML files outside that root.
- Feed unsafe selectors or poisoned index state into the relevant public stable
3.9.4APIs. - Observe
frame_by_name,doc,lu(...).exemplars, orheaderreturn parsed outside-root values. - Run the same payloads against current source and observe explicit path-safety rejections.
Minimal reproducible excerpt
framenet_frame_definition FRAME_LEAK
framenet_doc_text DOC_LEAK
framenet_lu_text LU_LEAK
nkjp_header_title HEADER_LEAKImpact
Applications that process attacker-influenced FrameNet or NKJP corpus selectors or state can be made to parse XML outside the trusted corpus root through normal public reader responses.
Remediation
Keep these reader paths on the same root-confinement model as CorpusReader.open() and nltk.pathsec. Reject unsafe path components before constructing filenames from frame names, document filenames, LU ids, or NKJP file identifiers.
Resources
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1366-L1369
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1456-L1460
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1803-L1810
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py#L96-L103
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py#L251-L256
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1388-L1399
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py#L96-L128
References
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-568f-pv23-39p4
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62385
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3579
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3581
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/7d1389d0789c1eca56bd0ed444089e0a3972e3ed
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/bf3bf32786791394a1008258b4917a7f2d4dbcda
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.0
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3728.yaml
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-path-traversal-via-framenet-and-nkjp-readers
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-568f-pv23-39p4
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More PyPI vulnerabilities
All PyPI entriesCVE-2026-128135
NLTK: ZIP package extraction follows in-root hardlinks and overwrites files outside the NLTK data root
high7.1Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-128136
NLTK: AllowlistUnpickler does not deny numpy submodule-local file-I/O sinks
medium6.1Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-128137
NLTK corpus-reader view methods bypass the scoped root sandbox via intermediate-directory symlinks
medium5.5Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-128138
NLTK incomplete fix: additional JVM/JAR sandbox bypass through unvalidated launcher tokens in java() command arguments
critical9.8Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-128139
NLTK: XMLCorpusView comment and CDATA parsing permits quadratic CPU denial of service
high7.5Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-128140
NLTK: Downloader cyclic collection indices cause an infinite closure walk
medium6.5Nov 19, 2026
