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Open-source package vulnerability · NuGet

CVE-2026-62848: Metalama: Unsafe deserialization over Metalama's Visual Studio inter-process named pipe enables local code execution

highCVSS 3.1 7.3GHSA-h26j-4vp7-x9w2

Metalama's Visual Studio integration deserializes messages from a local named pipe without limiting which .NET types can be created. A process running as the same user can send a crafted message and run code inside the developer's Visual Studio. Fixed in Metalama.Framework 2026.1.19, with backports 2026.0.25 and 2025.1.18 listed in the package data.

Published Nov 3, 2026 · Analysis Nov 3, 2026

What an attacker can do

Metalama's Visual Studio processes talk over a named pipe: the UI process (devenv), the out-of-process Roslyn analysis process and the CodeLens process. The pipe name is predictable: Metalama_{role}_{processId}_{hash(PackageVersion)}. Messages were deserialized with no type allow-list (CWE-502).

There were two eras. In 2023.0 through 2026.0.x the Newtonsoft.Json formatter used TypeNameHandling.All and a binder that resolved any type name, a setting with public gadget chains such as ysoserial.net. In 2026.1.0 through 2026.1.18 the pipe moved to typeless MessagePack (TypelessObjectResolver), which also embeds CLR type names and builds arbitrary types.

The pipe uses the default Windows ACL, so only processes of the same user can write to it. The attacker therefore must already run code as the developer. There is no privilege escalation and no boundary crossed. The advisory calls the practical severity Medium despite a 7.3 base score. The gain is code execution inside the developer's Visual Studio session, useful for persistence or lateral movement, and for hiding in a trusted IDE process that holds source code and signing or cloud credentials. Command-line and MSBuild builds do not use this channel.

Who is affected

Affected, all in the Visual Studio integration on Windows: the NuGet package Metalama.Framework before 2026.1.19 (the data also lists ranges before 2026.0.25 and 2025.1.18), the "Metalama + PostSharp" Visual Studio extension PostSharpTechnologies.PostSharp versions 2024.1 to 2026.1.4, and the retired extensions PostSharpTechnologies.Metalama and PostSharpTechnologies.caravela, all versions. Check the package in a project:

dotnet list package | findstr Metalama

For the extension, check Extensions > Manage Extensions in Visual Studio.

Metalama.Framework

Ecosystem
NuGet
Affected
>= 2026.1.0-preview, < 2026.1.19
Fixed in
2026.1.19
Check
dotnet list package --include-transitive

Metalama.Framework

Ecosystem
NuGet
Affected
< 2025.1.18
Fixed in
2025.1.18
Check
dotnet list package --include-transitive

Metalama.Framework

Ecosystem
NuGet
Affected
>= 2026.0.1-preview, < 2026.0.25
Fixed in
2026.0.25
Check
dotnet list package --include-transitive

How to fix it

Upgrade Metalama.Framework to 2026.1.19 (or 2026.0.25 or 2025.1.18 on those release lines, per the package data; the advisory text says there are no backports, so prefer 2026.1.19):

dotnet add package Metalama.Framework --version 2026.1.19

Update the Visual Studio extension PostSharpTechnologies.PostSharp to 2026.1.5, which bundles Metalama 2026.1.19. Uninstall the retired Metalama and caravela extensions; they will not be fixed, and the advisory says to migrate to PostSharp 2026.1.5 or later. The fix wraps deserialization in RpcContractMessagePackOptions with a [RpcContract] type allow-list and restricts pipe access to the current user.

How to tell if you were hit

The advisory gives no indicators. Because exploitation needs prior same-user code execution, look for unknown processes running as the developer that open handles to named pipes matching Metalama_*, and for unexpected child processes or network connections from devenv.exe or the Roslyn analysis and CodeLens helper processes. Sysmon pipe events (IDs 17 and 18) record pipe creation and connection.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Metalama uses a local named-pipe channel to communicate between its Visual Studio processes — the Visual Studio UI process (devenv), the out-of-process Roslyn code-analysis process, and the CodeLens process. This channel deserialized messages from the pipe without restricting which CLR types could be instantiated. A local process able to write to the pipe can send a crafted message that instantiates arbitrary .NET types — a deserialization primitive in the same class as BinaryFormatter (CWE-502), and a well-known gadget-chain code-execution vector.

The flaw is present, via two successive serializers, in every Metalama release from the first public version (2023.0) up to and including 2026.1.18, and is fixed in 2026.1.19.

The pipe name is predictable: Metalama_{role}_{processId}_{hash(PackageVersion)}, derived from the public package version and a locally-enumerable process id. This channel is used by the Visual Studio integration only (Windows named pipes); it is not used for command-line / MSBuild builds.

Mechanisms

JSON era — Metalama 2023.0 through 2026.0.x (Newtonsoft.Json). The pipe formatter enabled polymorphic type embedding:

formatter.JsonSerializer.TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.All;   // ServiceEndpoint.cs (early), later BaseEndpoint.cs

The accompanying SerializationBinder (added later for multi-version assembly support) only remapped assembly names; its BindToType resolved any type name from the wire (assembly.GetType(typeName)) with no type allow-list. TypeNameHandling.All is the canonical unsafe-deserialization setting and has publicly available gadget chains (e.g. ysoserial.net), so this era is at least as exploitable as the later one. (Introduced by commit 0554368737, first shipped in release/2023.0.101-rc.)

MessagePack era — Metalama 2026.1.0 through 2026.1.18. The 2026.1 line migrated the pipe serialization to MessagePack (PR #1299, commit 117b607805, 2026-01-29), using typeless MessagePack (TypelessObjectResolver), which likewise embeds CLR type names on the wire and instantiates arbitrary types on receipt — again with no allow-list.

Both mechanisms share the same channel, the same predictable pipe name, the same impact, and the same access preconditions.

Impact

Potential arbitrary code execution inside the Visual Studio process that hosts the affected component (the UI process, the code-analysis process, or the CodeLens process), with full loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability within that process.

Mitigating factor (limits practical severity to Medium): the pipe is created with the default Windows ACL (no explicit PipeSecurity), which permits only same-user processes to write. All of the Visual Studio processes involved run as the same logged-in developer, so exploitation requires the attacker to already be executing code as that same user. There is no privilege escalation and no crossing of a security boundary; the practical value is code execution inside the developer's Visual Studio session (lateral movement / persistence within an already same-user-compromised context). This is why the practical severity is Medium despite the CVSS base score.

Severity

CVSS v3.1: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 7.3 (High) base score; practical severity Medium, because the attacker gains no privilege beyond what they already had (same user, same Visual Studio session).

CVSS v4.0 cross-check: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N = 7.0 (High). The Subsequent-System metrics are None because no security boundary is crossed.

Affected products and remediation

All affected products are part of the Visual Studio integration.

| Product | Affected | Remediation |
| NuGet `Metalama.Framework` | all `< 2026.1.19` | upgrade to **2026.1.19** (no backports) |
| VS extension `PostSharpTechnologies.PostSharp` ("Metalama + PostSharp", maintained) | **2024.1 - 2026.1.4** | update to **2026.1.5** (bundles Metalama 2026.1.19) |
| VS extension `PostSharpTechnologies.Metalama` (retired) | all versions | uninstall / migrate to PostSharp `>= 2026.1.5` |
| VS extension `PostSharpTechnologies.caravela` (retired) | all versions | uninstall / migrate to PostSharp `>= 2026.1.5` |

The PostSharp extension was a separate, Metalama-free product before the 2024.1 merge (Metalama.Vsx issue #33843), so earlier PostSharp versions are not affected. GitHub has no Visual Studio Marketplace ecosystem, so only the NuGet package appears in the structured "Affected products" list.

Fix

Fixed in Metalama 2026.1.19 (commit d97f52e1b5, PR #1651): the type-name deserialization is wrapped in RpcContractMessagePackOptions, which enforces a [RpcContract] type allow-list on the wire; pipe access is restricted to the current user. The fix reaches the maintained Visual Studio extension in version 2026.1.5. The retired Caravela and Metalama extensions will not be fixed.

Questions

Can another user on the machine exploit CVE-2026-62848?

No. The pipe's default ACL lets only processes of the same user write to it, so the attacker must already run code as the developer.

Are command-line or MSBuild builds affected?

No. The advisory says the pipe channel is used by the Visual Studio integration only, on Windows, and not by command-line or MSBuild builds.

Is the retired Metalama Visual Studio extension fixed?

No. The retired Metalama and caravela extensions will not be fixed. Uninstall them and use PostSharp 2026.1.5 or later.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

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