CVE-2026-65834: Capsule: CapsuleConfiguration NodeMetadata regex fields lack webhook validation, allowing MustCompile panic on all Node admission requests
Summary CapsuleConfiguration.Spec.NodeMetadata.ForbiddenLabels.Regex and ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex are never validated by any admission webhook. A Cluster Admin can persist a malformed regex to etcd without being blocked.
Published Jul 31, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/projectcapsule/capsule
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 0.13.7
- Fixed in
- 0.13.8
- Check
go list -m github.com/projectcapsule/capsule
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
CapsuleConfiguration.Spec.NodeMetadata.ForbiddenLabels.Regex and ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex are never validated by any admission webhook. A Cluster Admin can persist a malformed regex to etcd without being blocked. Once stored, every Node CREATE, UPDATE, or PATCH request triggers regexp.MustCompile() in pkg/api/forbidden_list.go:36, which panics and crashes the node admission webhook — causing a cluster-wide Denial of Service for all Node operations.
Root cause
internal/webhook/tenant/validation/ contains dedicated regex validators for every Tenant regex field (hostname, storageclass, ingressclass, containerregistry, etc.). internal/webhook/cfg/ contains no regex validator at all — only owners.go, serviceaccount.go, and warnings.go.
The downstream consumer internal/webhook/node/user_metadata.go calls:
// line 131
matched = forbiddenLabels.RegexMatch(label)
// line 150
matched = forbiddenAnnotations.RegexMatch(annotation)Which routes to pkg/api/forbidden_list.go:36:
func (in ForbiddenListSpec) RegexMatch(value string) (ok bool) {
if len(in.Regex) > 0 {
ok = regexp.MustCompile(in.Regex).MatchString(value) // ← panics on invalid regex
}
return ok
}Unlike regexp.Compile, regexp.MustCompile panics instead of returning an error. Since no webhook validates the CapsuleConfiguration regex fields before storage, a malformed value reaches MustCompile on every Node admission request.
Comparison with existing CVEs
GHSA-f94q-w3w8-cj67 and GHSA-gxjc-74v5-3vx3 affect individual Tenant fields — their validators existed but checked the wrong field. This issue is different: no validator exists at all for CapsuleConfiguration regex fields, and the blast radius is cluster-wide (all Nodes), not scoped to one tenant.
PoC
package main
import (
"fmt"
"regexp"
)
type ForbiddenListSpec struct{ Regex string }
// Exact copy of pkg/api/forbidden_list.go:34-38
func (in ForbiddenListSpec) RegexMatch(value string) bool {
if len(in.Regex) > 0 {
return regexp.MustCompile(in.Regex).MatchString(value)
}
return false
}
func main() {
// 1. cfg webhook has no validator → invalid regex stored in etcd
// (no webhook in internal/webhook/cfg/ checks regex fields)
// 2. Stored malformed regex loaded from CapsuleConfiguration
forbidden := ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `[invalid-regex(`}
// 3. node/user_metadata.go:131 called on every Node admission request
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
fmt.Printf("PANIC: %v\n", r)
// Output: PANIC: regexp: Compile(`[invalid-regex(`): error parsing regexp: missing closing ]
}
}()
forbidden.RegexMatch("kubernetes.io/hostname")
}Expected output:
PANIC: regexp: Compile(`[invalid-regex(`): error parsing regexp: missing closing ]: `[invalid-regex(`Fix
Add a node_metadata_regex.go handler to internal/webhook/cfg/ following the same pattern as forbidden_annotations_regex.go:
package cfg
import (
"context"
"regexp"
"sigs.k8s.io/controller-runtime/pkg/client"
"sigs.k8s.io/controller-runtime/pkg/webhook/admission"
capsulev1beta2 "github.com/projectcapsule/capsule/api/v1beta2"
ad "github.com/projectcapsule/capsule/pkg/runtime/admission"
"github.com/projectcapsule/capsule/pkg/runtime/events"
"github.com/projectcapsule/capsule/pkg/runtime/handlers"
)
type nodeMetadataRegexHandler struct{}
func NodeMetadataRegexHandler() handlers.TypedHandler[*capsulev1beta2.CapsuleConfiguration] {
return &nodeMetadataRegexHandler{}
}
func (h *nodeMetadataRegexHandler) OnCreate(
_ client.Client,
_ client.Reader,
cfg *capsulev1beta2.CapsuleConfiguration,
_ admission.Decoder,
_ events.EventRecorder,
) handlers.Func {
return func(_ context.Context, req admission.Request) *admission.Response {
return h.validate(cfg, req)
}
}
func (h *nodeMetadataRegexHandler) OnDelete(
client.Client,
client.Reader,
*capsulev1beta2.CapsuleConfiguration,
admission.Decoder,
events.EventRecorder,
) handlers.Func {
return func(context.Context, admission.Request) *admission.Response {
return nil
}
}
func (h *nodeMetadataRegexHandler) OnUpdate(
_ client.Client,
_ client.Reader,
cfg *capsulev1beta2.CapsuleConfiguration,
_ *capsulev1beta2.CapsuleConfiguration,
_ admission.Decoder,
_ events.EventRecorder,
) handlers.Func {
return func(_ context.Context, req admission.Request) *admission.Response {
return h.validate(cfg, req)
}
}
func (h *nodeMetadataRegexHandler) validate(cfg *capsulev1beta2.CapsuleConfiguration, req admission.Request) *admission.Response {
if cfg.Spec.NodeMetadata == nil {
return nil
}
expressions := map[string]string{
"labels": cfg.Spec.NodeMetadata.ForbiddenLabels.Regex,
"annotations": cfg.Spec.NodeMetadata.ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex,
}
for scope, expression := range expressions {
if expression == "" {
continue
}
if _, err := regexp.Compile(expression); err != nil {
return ad.Denyf(
"unable to compile regex %q for forbidden %s: %v",
expression,
scope,
err,
)
}
}
return nil
}
Step 2: Register the handler in cmd/controller/main.go:
route.ConfigValidation(
cfgvalidation.Handler(cfg,
cfgvalidation.WarningHandler(),
cfgvalidation.ServiceAccountHandler(),
cfgvalidation.OwnerHandler(),
cfgvalidation.NodeMetadataRegexHandler(), // ← ADD THIS LINE
),
),Impact
A Cluster Admin (or compromised admin account) can update CapsuleConfiguration with a malformed NodeMetadata regex (e.g., [invalid-regex(). The update is accepted without validation and persisted to etcd. Once stored, every subsequent Node admission request triggers regexp.MustCompile() with the invalid pattern, causing the Capsule node webhook to panic.
Affected operations (cluster-wide):
- Node labeling, annotations, and taints (
kubectl label/annotate/taint node) - Cluster autoscaler operations (cannot register or remove nodes)
- Cloud provider node lifecycle management (metadata sync, status updates)
- Node maintenance workflows (cordon, drain, uncordon)
Severity: This is a cluster-wide Denial of Service affecting all Node infrastructure operations. Unlike tenant-scoped CVEs (GHSA-f94q-w3w8-cj67, GHSA-gxjc-74v5-3vx3) that impact only Ingress or Namespace operations within a single tenant, this vulnerability blocks the entire cluster's ability to manage nodes.
The cluster cannot scale, perform maintenance, or process any node metadata changes until a Cluster Admin manually corrects the CapsuleConfiguration—requiring direct kubectl access with valid YAML.
Credited to PhucQuan.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-61672
Capsule: Tenant owner bypasses Capsule's forbidden namespace/service/node label and annotation enforcement
high7.1Sep 18, 2026CVE-2026-61794
Capsule: Malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex can bypass Tenant validation and trigger namespace admission panic
medium4.9Sep 18, 2026CVE-2026-61795
Capsule: hostnameRegexHandler.OnUpdate validates stale (old) Tenant regex, allowing invalid AllowedHostnames regex to bypass webhook validation
medium6.8Sep 18, 2026CVE-2026-65835
Capsule has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-22872: TenantResource RawItems and Generators still allow cluster-scoped resource creation (cross-tenant privilege escalation)
medium6.6Jul 31, 2026CVE-2026-55636
Capsule: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-30963: singular/plural typo leaves namespaces/finalize unprotected
medium5.7Jun 17, 2026CVE-2026-22872
Capsule TenantResource RawItems Cluster-Scoped Resource Creation Vulnerability
medium6.9May 28, 2026
