CVE-2026-65915: NLTK: FileSystemPathPointer.open() sandbox check is dead code — arbitrary file read via file:// protocol
Summary There's a logic bug in FileSystemPathPointer.open() inside nltk/data.py that makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always False — meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a file:// URL to nltk.data.load().
Published Sep 8, 2026
Affected packages
nltk
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 3.9.3
- Fixed in
- 3.10.0
- Check
pip show nltk
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
There's a logic bug in FileSystemPathPointer.open() inside nltk/data.py that makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always False — meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a file:// URL to nltk.data.load().
---
Details
In nltk/data.py, FileSystemPathPointer.open() was patched at some point with a comment saying "SECURITY PATCH ENFORCING SANDBOX", but the check doesn't work:
def open(self, encoding=None):
path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
# Block raw absolute reads such as "/" "C:\\Windows" etc.
if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")path is set to os.path.normpath(self._path) on line 1, then compared against os.path.normpath(self._path) again in the condition. They are always equal. The ValueError never fires.
On top of that, __init__ already calls os.path.abspath() before storing self._path, so it's normalized before open() is even called. Running normpath on it again changes nothing.
The stream = open(self._path, "rb") line is always reached regardless of what path was passed in.
---
PoC
Tested on Python 3.11, NLTK 3.9.1, Ubuntu 22.04.
import nltk
from nltk.data import FileSystemPathPointer
# direct construction
ptr = FileSystemPathPointer("/etc/passwd")
with ptr.open() as f:
print(f.read(300))
# via load() using file:// URL
data = nltk.data.load("file:///etc/passwd", format="raw")
print(data[:300])Both print file contents. No exception is raised.
---
Impact
Any app that lets users influence the string passed to nltk.data.load() or nltk.data.find() is exposed — web APIs, notebook servers, multi-tenant pipelines. An attacker can read any file the process user has access to: /etc/passwd, .env files, private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, etc.
Suggested Fix
File: nltk/data.py — FileSystemPathPointer.open() (lines 378–390)
What's wrong
Line 387 compares normpath(self._path) against itself — always equal, so the ValueError never fires. The check is dead code. __init__ already calls abspath() on construction, so re-running normpath inside open() changes nothing either.
---
Fix
Validate against the actual list of permitted data directories instead:
def open(self, encoding=None):
import nltk.data as _d
allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
if allowed and not any(
os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
):
raise ValueError(
f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}"
)
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
if encoding is not None:
stream = SeekableUnicodeStreamReader(stream, encoding)
return stream---
Why commonpath not startswith
startswith is bypassable by a path that shares a prefix:
/tmp/nltk_data_evil".startswith("/tmp/nltk_data") → True ✗
commonpath(["/tmp/nltk_data_evil", "/tmp/nltk_data"]) → "/tmp" ✓---
Diff
- path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
- if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
- raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
-
+ import nltk.data as _d
+ allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
+ if allowed and not any(
+ os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
+ ):
+ raise ValueError(f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")Credited to ZeroXJacks.
References
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65915
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3522
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/69db9911fdba914ceeaca7aec6e892d1b14586a9
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3731.yaml
- https://huntr.com/bounties/a510de7b-ffaf-4a83-9bf8-fa7e63f4bd2d
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-arbitrary-file-read-via-filesystempathpointer
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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