CVE-2026-66064: goshs has ACL Bypass & Path Traversal
Summary sendFile derives the served filename from the raw request path while opening the file from the cleaned path, so appending a trailing slash empties the derived name and defeats both the never-serve rule for the ACL file and the block list.
Published Jul 28, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.1.4
- Fixed in
- 2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091
- Check
go list -m github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2
goshs.de/goshs/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.1.4
- Fixed in
- 2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091
- Check
go list -m goshs.de/goshs/v2
github.com/patrickhener/goshs
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 1.1.4
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/patrickhener/goshs
goshs.de/goshs
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 1.1.4
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m goshs.de/goshs
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
sendFile derives the served filename from the raw request path while opening the file from the cleaned path, so appending a trailing slash empties the derived name and defeats both the never-serve rule for the ACL file and the block list.
Finding (Medium): trailing-slash ACL and hidden-file bypass
httpserver/handler.go, sendFile (lines 789-801) takes the filename from the RAW req.URL.Path while the file itself is opened from the filepath.Clean-ed path. The two disagree, and a trailing slash makes the derived name the empty string. Both protections key on that derived name, so both are defeated: the rule that never serves the .goshs ACL file, and the acl.Block list.
Measured, with negative controls:
GET /blocked/secret.txt -> 404 (control, correctly blocked)
GET /blocked/secret.txt/ -> 200 + contents
GET /blocked/.goshs/ -> 200, returns the ACL file itself,
including the admin:$2a$... bcrypt hashUnauthenticated when the ACL is configured block-only (common usage). Stated precisely: AUTHENTICATION IS NOT BYPASSED. An unauthenticated request against a directory protected by authentication still returns 401 under the same trick; I tested that. The claim is specifically that the block list and the ACL-file protection are bypassed. In-tree evidence that sendFile is the defect: the sibling handlers doDir and bulkDownload both derive the name correctly; sendFile is the lone outlier.
Suggested fixes
- Derive the served filename from the same cleaned path used to open the file, so the authorization decision and the file access cannot disagree.
Tooling
AI assistance was used while investigating. The finding was reproduced against a running server on loopback with negative controls, including the 404-versus-200 pair and the authenticated-directory control that shows authentication is not affected.
Credited to arpitjain099.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-54719
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high7.5No fixJul 28, 2026CVE-2026-62325
goshs SFTP authentication bypass via empty password (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-40884)
critical9.1Jul 28, 2026CVE-2026-64863
goshs --no-delete WebDAV MOVE bypass allows file deletion/overwrite
critical9.1No fixJul 28, 2026CVE-2026-66063
goshs has a Path Traversal issue
medium6.5No fixJul 28, 2026CVE-2026-50138
goshs: WebDAV listener ignores --read-only, --upload-only, and --no-delete mode flags
high8.1Jul 1, 2026CVE-2026-50139
goshs: Share-link ?token=… redemption races past download limit
medium5.9Jul 1, 2026
