CVE-2026-68927: MobSF has SSRF port restriction bypass in assetlinks_check
Summary MobSF's Android App Link assetlinks checker validates only the manifest android:host value with validhost(), but then appends the separate android:port value into the URL used for the server-side request. This bypasses the current port restriction in validhost() and lets a crafted APK cause MobSF to fetch http://host: /.well-known/assetlinks.json or https://host: /.well-known/assetlinks.json.
Published Aug 18, 2026
Affected packages
mobsf
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 4.5.1
- Fixed in
- 4.5.1
- Check
pip show mobsf
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
MobSF's Android App Link assetlinks checker validates only the manifest android:host value with valid_host(), but then appends the separate android:port value into the URL used for the server-side request. This bypasses the current port restriction in valid_host() and lets a crafted APK cause MobSF to fetch http://host:<attacker-port>/.well-known/assetlinks.json or https://host:<attacker-port>/.well-known/assetlinks.json.
Impact
An authenticated user who can upload or trigger analysis of a crafted APK can cause the MobSF server to make an outbound request to an attacker-selected port during Android manifest analysis. When the host is controlled by the attacker and uses DNS rebinding, the validation lookup can resolve to a public IP while the later HTTP client lookup resolves to an internal address, allowing SSRF to internal services on non-80/443 ports.
This is not arbitrary URL SSRF. The path remains fixed to /.well-known/assetlinks.json, and redirects are disabled. The bypass is that the final fetched URL is assembled after the host-only validation, so the current port guard is not applied to the actual URL.
Root cause
valid_host() rejects ports other than 80 and 443 when a port is included in the string being validated:
port = parsed.port
...
if port and port not in (80, 443):
return FalseIn get_browsable_activities(), only the host attribute is passed to valid_host():
host = data.getAttribute(f'{ns}:host')
port = data.getAttribute(f'{ns}:port')
...
if not valid_host(host):
logger.warning('Invalid Host: %s', host)
continue
shost = f'{scheme}://{host}'
if port and is_number(port):
c_url = f'{shost}:{port}{WELL_KNOWN_PATH}'
else:
c_url = f'{shost}{WELL_KNOWN_PATH}'
well_known[c_url] = shost_check_url() then fetches the assembled URL after checking only path, query, and params:
purl = urlparse(url)
if (purl.path != WELL_KNOWN_PATH
or len(purl.query) > 0
or len(purl.params) > 0):
logger.warning('Invalid Assetlinks URL: %s', url)
continue
r = requests.get(url,
timeout=5,
allow_redirects=False,
proxies=proxies,
verify=verify)Reproduction
Use an Android manifest with a browsable App Link data tag that has a benign-looking host and a restricted port:
<activity android:name=".DeepLink" android:exported="true">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
<data android:scheme="http" android:host="rebind.example" android:port="22" />
</intent-filter>
</activity>A safe local proof with DNS and HTTP monkeypatching shows that MobSF validates only rebind.example, then fetches a URL that preserves the unchecked port:
well_known map: {'http://rebind.example:22/.well-known/assetlinks.json': 'http://rebind.example'}
requests.get calls: [('http://rebind.example:22/.well-known/assetlinks.json', {'timeout': 5, 'allow_redirects': False, 'proxies': None, 'verify': True})]
findings: [{'url': 'http://rebind.example:22/.well-known/assetlinks.json', 'host': 'http://rebind.example', 'status_code': 200, 'status': True}]
VULNERABLE: valid_host validated only rebind.example, but assetlinks_check fetched unchecked port 22 via http://rebind.example:22/.well-known/assetlinks.jsonThe same code pattern is present in latest release v4.4.6 and current main.
Remediation
Validate the final URL after all manifest components have been applied. In particular:
- Build
c_url, then run validation on the full URL, including scheme, hostname, port, path, query, and params. - Reject
android:portvalues other than 80 and 443 before appending them to the URL. - Prevent DNS rebinding by pinning the validated DNS result to the outbound connection or otherwise ensuring the actual HTTP request cannot resolve to a different address than the validation step.
- Keep
allow_redirects=Falsefor the existing redirect mitigation.
Credited to DavidCarliez.
References
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-95px-34x5-p37h
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/pull/2627
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/62563ca429a75b3e5d47a13b958e1d2e7d5e2bbf
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/releases/tag/v4.5.1
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-95px-34x5-p37h
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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