CVE-2026-71293: Statamic CMS exposes two-factor recovery codes through dynamic Antlers rendering
Statamic CMS's user-augmentation resolver, AugmentedUser::get() in src/Auth/AugmentedUser.php, contains an explicit case for the twofactorrecoverycodes handle that returns the user's raw two-factor recovery codes with no access restriction: if ($handle === 'twofactorrecoverycodes') { return new Value($this-data-get('twofactorrecoverycodes'), ...); }.
Published Aug 5, 2026 · Updated Sep 1, 2026
Affected packages
statamic/cms
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 6.0.0-alpha.1, <= 6.30.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show statamic/cms
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Statamic CMS's user-augmentation resolver, AugmentedUser::get() in src/Auth/AugmentedUser.php, contains an explicit case for the two_factor_recovery_codes handle that returns the user's raw two-factor recovery codes with no access restriction: if ($handle === 'two_factor_recovery_codes') { return new Value($this->data->get('two_factor_recovery_codes'), ...); }. Unlike sensitive fields such as password/password_hash, which are excluded from AugmentedUser entirely, two_factor_recovery_codes is neither excluded from augmentation nor present in Statamic's Antlers variable guard lists (guardedVariablePatterns/guardedContentVariablePatterns in src/Providers/ViewServiceProvider.php, and the runtime GlobalRuntimeState guard paths), which by default only guard config.app.key. On any Antlers template field where raw/dynamic template rendering is enabled for a given field (an admin/developer-configured, blueprint-level field option), a template such as {{ current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}{{ value }}|{{ /current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }} renders the viewing user's own 2FA recovery codes directly into the HTML response, allowing an attacker who can view or capture that response (e.g. via a shared/observable page, or a crafted link causing a victim to render it) to obtain the codes and bypass 2FA. Exploitation requires that dynamic Antlers rendering already be enabled on a field the target user's data flows through, which is a blueprint-configuration privilege rather than a standard content-editing permission.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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