CVE-2026-73419: Auth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them
Summary Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks (state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier) in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider, because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity (provider id, issuer, client id, or…
Published Jul 23, 2026 · Updated Aug 13, 2026
Affected packages
@auth/core
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 0.41.2
- Fixed in
- 0.41.3
- Check
npm ls @auth/core
next-auth
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 5.0.0-beta.1, <= 5.0.0-beta.31
- Fixed in
- 5.0.0-beta.32
- Check
npm ls next-auth
next-auth
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 4.24.14
- Fixed in
- 4.24.15
- Check
npm ls next-auth
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks (state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier) in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider, because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity (provider id, issuer, client id, or redirect URI). In a multi-provider app that allows account linking while logged in, this provider-confusion / mix-up condition can let an attacker link their account at a second provider to a victim's user.
Am I affected?
You may be affected if all of the following hold:
- You use
next-auth<= 4.24.14or>= 5.0.0-beta.1, <= 5.0.0-beta.31, or@auth/core<= 0.41.2. - You configure multiple OAuth/OIDC providers.
- You allow users to link additional providers while logged in.
- At least one configured provider's authorization request is observable by an attacker, and at least one target provider's callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier (i.e. it relies only on
stateor only onnonce).
You are not affected if you use a single OAuth provider, do not allow logged-in account linking, or all providers enforce PKCE.
Impact
- Account-linking confusion: an attacker can get their account at a target provider linked to the victim's Auth.js user, granting the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account through that linked provider.
- Exploitation requires luring the victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow; it cannot be performed by cross-site request forgery alone, which reduces practical likelihood.
Patched version
The fix binds the OAuth check cookies to the provider/authorization flow that created them, so a callback cannot consume a check value minted for a different provider. Upgrade to the first releases containing this fix (pending; this advisory will be updated with exact patched versions before publication).
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately:
- Enable PKCE (
checks: ["pkce"], in addition tostate/nonce) on every provider that supports it; PKCE blocks the practical code-swap variant because the attacker cannot observe the relying party's verifier. - Avoid offering logged-in account linking across multiple providers where one provider is lower-trust or attacker-observable.
- Treat
events.linkAccountas sensitive: add audit logging, user notification, or out-of-band confirmation so that any unexpected link is visible (defense-in-depth, not a root-cause fix).
Credit
Reported by @Nadav0077. Thank you for the responsible disclosure.
Credited to Nadav0077.
References
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/pull/13469
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/5bca2399a79ba8d116ca5179b4b1ebcd152e7f05
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/9f7a97fade9b1319bb9ac19fc9828d62e0a2a852
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/@auth/[email protected]
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/[email protected]
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/[email protected]
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73419
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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