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AI agent vulnerability · vLLM

CVE-2026-73555: vLLM: Unauthenticated Internal Path and Username Disclosure via Validation Error Messages

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.3GHSA-hwrm-c4cx-rf4j

Summary When the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic RequestValidationError. The validationexceptionhandler in vllm/entrypoints/openai/serverutils.py converts this exception to a string via str(exc), which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function.

Published Sep 4, 2026

Affected packages

vllm

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
< 0.26.0
Fixed in
0.26.0
Check
pip show vllm

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

When the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic RequestValidationError. The validation_exception_handler in vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py converts this exception to a string via str(exc), which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing sanitize_message() function in vllm/entrypoints/utils.py strips memory addresses (e.g., 0x7f...) but does not strip File "...", line X patterns. The result is a user-facing HTTP response that leaks internal system information.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can extract the following with a single malformed request:

  • OS username running the vLLM process (e.g., ubuntu)
  • Home directory path (e.g., /home/ubuntu/)
  • Virtual environment path (e.g., vllm-env/)
  • Python version (e.g., 3.12)
  • Internal package structure and line numbers (e.g., vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py)
  • Handler function names per endpoint, enabling precise version fingerprinting

This information aids attackers in constructing targeted exploits: environment paths narrow the attack surface, and handler function names + line numbers enable exact version identification even when the /version endpoint is disabled.

All POST endpoints that accept JSON bodies are affected, including /v1/chat/completions, /v1/completions, /tokenize, and /detokenize.

Workarounds

Deploying vLLM behind a reverse proxy that rewrites error response bodies to strip file paths would mitigate this, though it is fragile.

Remediation Recommendation

Two possible fixes (either suffices):

Option A — Fix `validation_exception_handler`: Construct the error message from exc.errors() (the structured Pydantic error list) rather than str(exc). This avoids the traceback-style string entirely.

Option B — Fix `sanitize_message`: Add a regex to strip File "...", line \d+ patterns, similar to how memory addresses are already stripped:

import re
msg = re.sub(r'File ".*?", line \d+, in \w+', '[internal]', msg)

Option A is preferred as it addresses the root cause rather than filtering symptoms.

Environment Tested

  • vLLM 0.20.1 (pip install, latest stable as of May 2026)
  • Python 3.12
  • Ubuntu 22.04
  • Model: Qwen/Qwen2-0.5B (text-only; bug is model-independent)

This was fixed here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/e87521626f

Credited to biecho, jperezdealgaba.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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