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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-76218: GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary command execution via --template clone hooks

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r

Summary Repo.init() forwards kwargs verbatim to git init with no unsafe-option guard and no allowunsafeoptions parameter. git init --template= copies /hooks/ into the new repo's .git/hooks, so an attacker-controlled template kwarg plants a hook that executes on the next git operation → arbitrary code execution.

Published Aug 7, 2026 · Updated Sep 8, 2026

Affected packages

GitPython

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
<= 3.1.57
Fixed in
3.1.58
Check
pip show GitPython

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Repo.init() forwards **kwargs verbatim to git init with no unsafe-option guard and no allow_unsafe_options parameter. git init --template=<dir> copies <dir>/hooks/* into the new repo's .git/hooks, so an attacker-controlled template kwarg plants a hook that executes on the next git operation → arbitrary code execution. --template is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on unsafe_git_clone_options, and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but Repo.init is a distinct method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.

Root Cause

Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs) is a bare git.init(**kwargs) (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no check_unsafe_options and no allow_unsafe_options.

Impact

Arbitrary code execution (hook fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a template= kwarg (KEY control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at a known path — the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH for the clone path. Default allow_unsafe_options is irrelevant here because Repo.init has no guard at all.

Proof of Concept

# attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable)
from git import Repo
Repo.init(path, template="/evil")
# next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit -> ACE

Attack Chain

  1. Entry: attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable) and gets the app to call Repo.init(path, template='/evil').
  2. Check: NONE on Repo.init. Bypass proof: base.py:1435 is a bare git.init(**kwargs). argv (observed): ['git','init','--template=/evil'].
  3. Sink: git copies /evil/hooks/post-commit → <repo>/.git/hooks/post-commit.
  4. Impact: next commit runs the hook → arbitrary code execution.

Bypass Evidence

Independently reproduced (gate harness): Repo.init(dst, template='<evil>') → argv ['git','init','--template=<evil>'] unguarded; hook copied into .git/hooks/post-commit; after git commit the INIT_ACE marker was created. --separate-git-dir=<path> is a parallel arbitrary-redirect vector through the same unguarded sink (value control only).

Affected Versions

GitPython <= 3.1.57 (unguarded git.init(**kwargs) present verbatim on the latest release tag).

Suggested Fix

Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to Repo.init, consulting a denylist that includes --template and --separate-git-dir (path-taking / hook-installing options).

--- Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Credited to manus-use, BarakSrour.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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