CVE-2026-76219: GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite
Summary IndexFile.fromtree, IndexFile.reset (→ fromtree) and IndexFile.mergetree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allowunsafeoptions parameter, and no -- separator.
Published Aug 7, 2026 · Updated Sep 8, 2026
Affected packages
GitPython
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 3.1.57
- Fixed in
- 3.1.58
- Check
pip show GitPython
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
Credited to manus-use, bhaswanthc.
References
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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