CVE-2026-81723: NLTK: Quadratic CPU Exhaustion in `XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()`
Summary XMLCorpusView.readxmlfragment() reads a corpus file in 1 KiB blocks, appending each block to a growing fragment string, then calls VALIDXMLRE.match(fragment) on the full accumulated buffer every iteration. Because each iteration rescans the entire accumulated fragment, the total amount of work grows quadratically with input size. Commit c9c332284 (CWE-1333) made each match() call linear.
Published Sep 2, 2026
Affected packages
nltk
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 3.10.2
- Fixed in
- 3.10.3
- Check
pip show nltk
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment() reads a corpus file in 1 KiB blocks, appending each block to a growing fragment string, then calls _VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment) on the full accumulated buffer every iteration. Because each iteration rescans the entire accumulated fragment, the total amount of work grows quadratically with input size.
Commit c9c332284 (CWE-1333) made each match() call linear. The quadratic behavior is separate: the loop calls match() once per 1 KiB block, each time on a longer buffer.
On the test system, an 8 MiB malformed XML file consumed approximately 48 CPU-seconds through the public BNCCorpusReader.words() API with no source modification. Absolute timings vary by hardware. _read_xml_fragment() imposes no limit on fragment size or iteration count.
Details
File: nltk/corpus/reader/xmldocs.py Function: XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment(), lines 261–308
The relevant loop:
fragment = ""
while True:
fragment += stream.read(self._BLOCK_SIZE) # grows by 1 KiB per iteration
if self._VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment): # rescans full buffer each time
return fragment
...
last_open_bracket = fragment.rfind("<")
if last_open_bracket > 0: # False for single-'<' payload
if self._VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment[:last_open_bracket]):
return ...
# loop continuesFor a payload of b'<' + b'a' * (N-1):
- For this malformed input,
_VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment)does not succeed because the unterminated tag prevents the expression from matching before EOF. fragment.rfind("<")returns0; the guardlast_open_bracket > 0isFalse, so the backtrack branch is never taken.- The only exit is EOF, after all N bytes are consumed.
Affected readers -> readers that rely on XMLCorpusView, including BNCCorpusReader, NPSChatCorpusReader, SemcorCorpusReader, MTECorpusReader, NKJPCorpusReader, FrameNetCorpusReader, VerbNetCorpusReader, and direct XMLCorpusView instantiation. XMLCorpusReader.xml() is not affected -> it calls defusedxml.safe_parse().
PoC
Requires only pip install nltk. No corpus data needed.
from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
from time import perf_counter
from nltk.corpus.reader.bnc import BNCCorpusReader
SIZES_KIB = (256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192)
results = []
with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
malformed = root / "unterminated.xml"
for kib in SIZES_KIB:
malformed.write_bytes(b"<" + b"a" * (kib * 1024 - 1))
t = perf_counter()
try:
list(BNCCorpusReader(str(root), [malformed.name]).words())
except ValueError as e:
assert "tag not closed" in str(e)
results.append(perf_counter() - t)
print("KiB seconds growth")
for i, (kib, elapsed) in enumerate(zip(SIZES_KIB, results)):
ratio = "-" if i == 0 else f"{elapsed / results[i-1]:.2f}x"
print(f"{kib:5d} {elapsed:9.3f} {ratio}")Runtime should increase by approximately fourfold for each doubling of input size, although absolute timings vary by hardware.
During verification, _VALID_XML_RE.match() was instrumented to record the size of each input. For a 256 KiB malformed file it was invoked 257 times on monotonically increasing buffers (1024, 2048, …, 262144 bytes), with the final call occurring after EOF. This confirms that every iteration rescans the accumulated fragment.
Impact
Applications that process attacker-controlled XML corpus files through an affected reader are vulnerable. The attacker needs only write access to a path the reader will open. No NLTK credentials or special privileges required. Offline tools reading only trusted local corpora are not at risk.
Affected versions: Verified in NLTK 3.9.4, 3.10.0, and the current develop branch. Historical inspection indicates the same loop structure has existed since the introduction of XMLCorpusView (2007), but only the listed versions were experimentally verified. No patch exists in any published release.
This issue results in CPU exhaustion and may allow denial of service in applications that process attacker-controlled XML corpus files.
Suggested Fix
Avoid rescanning the accumulated fragment from the beginning after each 1 KiB read. Incremental parsing, bounded fragment accumulation, or another streaming approach would eliminate the quadratic behavior while preserving existing semantics.
A regression test should verify that BNCCorpusReader.words() raises ValueError within a fixed timeout (e.g. 5 seconds) against a 2 MiB malformed input. The existing test_xmldocs_security.py covers only the prior ReDoS payloads and does not exercise this path.
Credited to ibfavas.
References
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-vp2x-qp44-57v7
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81723
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/7808692d451b962711005d954859bb83aabcf8fa
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.3
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-3.10.3-quadratic-cpu-exhaustion-via-xmlcorpusview
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vp2x-qp44-57v7
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More PyPI vulnerabilities
All PyPI entriesCVE-2026-128135
NLTK: ZIP package extraction follows in-root hardlinks and overwrites files outside the NLTK data root
high7.1Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-128136
NLTK: AllowlistUnpickler does not deny numpy submodule-local file-I/O sinks
medium6.1Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-128137
NLTK corpus-reader view methods bypass the scoped root sandbox via intermediate-directory symlinks
medium5.5Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-128138
NLTK incomplete fix: additional JVM/JAR sandbox bypass through unvalidated launcher tokens in java() command arguments
critical9.8Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-128139
NLTK: XMLCorpusView comment and CDATA parsing permits quadratic CPU denial of service
high7.5Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-128140
NLTK: Downloader cyclic collection indices cause an infinite closure walk
medium6.5Nov 19, 2026
