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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-81869: OpenTelemetry-Go: UTF-8 replacement rune bypasses attribute length truncation

mediumCVSS 4.0 5.1GHSA-p9f8-wvj8-2fg8

Summary The OpenTelemetry Go SDK trace package can fail to enforce AttributeValueLengthLimit for string attributes containing the valid Unicode replacement character U+FFFD. An oversized attacker-controlled attribute value that includes U+FFFD is returned untruncated, bypassing the configured memory/DoS protection and allowing increased per-span memory usage.

Published Sep 29, 2026

Affected packages

go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 1.10.0, < 1.33.0
Fixed in
1.33.0
Check
go list -m go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The OpenTelemetry Go SDK trace package can fail to enforce AttributeValueLengthLimit for string attributes containing the valid Unicode replacement character U+FFFD. An oversized attacker-controlled attribute value that includes U+FFFD is returned untruncated, bypassing the configured memory/DoS protection and allowing increased per-span memory usage. The finding is low severity because it requires a deployment with attribute value length limits enabled and attacker-controlled data being recorded into span attributes.

Introduced in commit 49a6536

Details

String and string-slice span attributes are truncated through safeTruncate when AttributeValueLengthLimit is non-negative. The finding evidence identifies this enforcement path in sdk/trace/span.go:303-331, with string attributes passed to safeTruncate at sdk/trace/span.go:309-310 and string-slice entries passed to safeTruncate in the loop beginning at sdk/trace/span.go:312.

safeTruncate first calls safeTruncateValidUTF8; if that returns ok=false, it calls strings.ToValidUTF8(input, "") and retries. The relevant code is identified in sdk/trace/span.go:337-355. safeTruncateValidUTF8 treats any utf8.RuneError from utf8.DecodeRuneInString as invalid UTF-8 and immediately returns the original input with ok=false. However, Go also returns utf8.RuneError for a valid encoded U+FFFD rune. The validation artifact confirms this behavior with output r=U+FFFD size=3 runeError=true.

For an input such as "AAAA" + U+FFFD + strings.Repeat("B", 20) and a limit of 5, the first truncation attempt sees U+FFFD as utf8.RuneError and returns the full input with ok=false. strings.ToValidUTF8 does not remove the valid U+FFFD rune, so the second attempt returns the same full input. As a result, the span attribute value remains 27 bytes long even though the configured limit is 5.

PoC

validation-artifact.zip

The validation artifact contains a package-level Go test at validation-artifact.tar:safe_truncate_bypass/safe_truncate_poc_test.go and supporting output at validation-artifact.tar:safe_truncate_bypass/runecheck_output.txt.

Reproduction configuration:

  • Repository: pellared/opentelemetry-go
  • Commit: 49a6536 from September 12, 2022
  • Package/module path: sdk/trace under the sdk module
  • Attribute value length limit used by the PoC: limit := 5
  • Dependencies must be available through the network or a local module cache/vendor directory.

Commands:

cd /path/to/opentelemetry-go
git checkout 49a6536
tar -xOf /path/to/validation-artifact.tar safe_truncate_bypass/safe_truncate_poc_test.go > sdk/trace/safe_truncate_poc_test.go
cd sdk
go test ./trace -run TestSafeTruncateBypass -count=1 -v

Expected vulnerable output includes a failing test showing that the returned value exceeds the configured limit:

=== RUN   TestSafeTruncateBypass
    safe_truncate_poc_test.go:14: input_len=27 got_len=27 input="AAAA�BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" got="AAAA�BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
    safe_truncate_poc_test.go:16: bypass: got_len 27 > limit 5
--- FAIL: TestSafeTruncateBypass

The artifact also records the standalone UTF-8 behavior needed for the bypass:

tar -xOf /path/to/validation-artifact.tar safe_truncate_bypass/runecheck_output.txt

Expected output:

r=U+FFFD size=3 runeError=true

Impact

This is a Unicode handling and resource-limit bypass that weakens span attribute memory controls. Applications that enable AttributeValueLengthLimit to bound memory usage can still store oversized attacker-controlled attribute values if those values contain U+FFFD. The practical impact is increased memory use and reduced denial-of-service protection in the instrumented process; the finding does not show confidentiality or integrity impact.

Credited to pellared, MrAlias.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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