CVE-2026-82407: Klever-Go: Validator registration accepts an unvalidated BLS public key → consensus liveness DoS
Location: core/kapp/validators/validators.go:201 (Register), (genesis/checking/nodesSetupChecker.go:73). core/consensus/slot/bls/subslotStartSlot.go:165 core/consensus/.../headerSignatureVerify.go:123 (Create(...)). Description Klever uses a BDN (Boneh-Drijvers-Neven) BLS multi-signature over BLS12-381 to finalize blocks (crypto/signing/mcl/multisig/bls.go, herumi/bls-go-binary).
Published Sep 23, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/klever-io/klever-go
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 1.7.19
- Fixed in
- 1.7.20
- Check
go list -m github.com/klever-io/klever-go
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Location: core/kapp/validators/validators.go:201 (Register), (genesis/checking/nodesSetupChecker.go:73). core/consensus/slot/bls/subslotStartSlot.go:165 core/consensus/.../headerSignatureVerify.go:123 (Create(...)).
Description
Klever uses a BDN (Boneh-Drijvers-Neven) BLS multi-signature over BLS12-381 to finalize blocks (crypto/signing/mcl/multisig/bls.go, herumi/bls-go-binary). The library is initialized with only bls.Init(bls.BLS12_381) and no order-verification flags, so Deserialize does not enforce prime-order-subgroup membership subgroup safety relies on explicit IsValidOrder() calls in the wrappers.
Runtime validator registration (validators.Register) stores the submitted 96-byte BLSPublicKey via SetBLSPublicKey with no curve check, no subgroup check, and no proof-of-possession (CreateValidatorContract carries the key but no signature proving key ownership; grep confirms no proofOfPossession/VerifyProof/BLSSignature verification anywhere in core/kapp/validators/). CheckPublicKeyValid — which does IsValid && IsValidOrder && !IsZero — runs only at genesis, not on runtime registration/update.
POC
Attack: (1) stake the minimum to register a validator, submitting a 96-byte BLSPublicKey that is not a valid G2 point (arbitrary bytes). Registration succeeds. (2) Once the validator is eligible and selected into a consensus group, every in-group node including the honest leader (group[0]) calls MultiSigner().Reset(groupPubKeys, selfIndex) at slot start, which deserializes all group keys via PublicKeyFromByteArray → herumi Deserialize deterministically fails on the malformed key → SetSlotCanceled(true). The verify side (Create(consensusPubKeys)) fails identically. No block is produced for that round.
Impact
Every consensus round whose group contains the malformed-key validator is a missed slot. One eligible bad-key validator poisons roughly a groupSize / eligibleSet fraction of rounds → sustained liveness degradation. Where the consensus group equals the eligible set (small or early-stage networks), this is a full chain halt. Cost is the minimum validator stake, permissionless, and repeatable; no fork flag gates the missing validation.
Rated High (Byzantine liveness; Critical on small validator sets). The severity scales down to a fractional missed-slot / throughput-degradation attack on a large validator set where the bad validator is only occasionally in the active group.
Recommendation
Enforce CheckPublicKeyValid (curve + prime-order subgroup + non-zero) on the submitted BLS key at runtime validator registration and config-update, and ideally require a proof-of-possession (a BLS signature over the validator's own key/identity) at registration to prove key ownership and well-formedness. Gate the stricter validation behind an epoch fork flag for reprocessing consistency.
Credited to mabdullah22.
References
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-9wh6-9hq7-9688
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/11606a90ccc289f93d0175994733229b332d9cff
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/642da967893884d635986fed3c43bdc679cbfe8f
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9wh6-9hq7-9688
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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