CVE-2026-83817: CodeWhale: Automation auto_approve defaults to true, bypassing the task-path hardening fix for silent recurring agent execution
Maintainer resolution The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. CodeWhale 0.8.67 and earlier are affected. Version 0.9.0 contains the fix in commit 208421b9d23d81cea3311a1eeb2a2ea81d637686. Users should upgrade to 0.9.0 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.
Published Nov 19, 2026
Affected packages
codewhale-tui
- Ecosystem
- Rust (crates.io)
- Affected
- <= 0.8.67
- Fixed in
- 0.9.0
- Check
cargo tree -i codewhale-tui
codewhale
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 0.8.67
- Fixed in
- 0.9.0
- Check
npm ls codewhale
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Maintainer resolution
The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. CodeWhale 0.8.67 and earlier are affected. Version 0.9.0 contains the fix in commit 208421b9d23d81cea3311a1eeb2a2ea81d637686. Users should upgrade to 0.9.0 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.
Summary
CVE-2026-45374 (GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4) hardened the task path so auto-approval must be opted into explicitly: add_task uses req.auto_approve.unwrap_or(false) (task_manager.rs:868). The automation subsystem was not hardened in kind. AutomationRecord::task_auto_approve() resolves an omitted auto_approve to DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE = true (automation_manager.rs:29, 101-103), and enqueue_run_task builds the NewTaskRequest with auto_approve: Some(automation.task_auto_approve()) — i.e. an explicit Some(true) (automation_manager.rs:766). Because the field is Some, unwrap_or(false) returns true and the seed-2 default is bypassed. That true propagates to ApprovalMode::Bypass (runtime_threads.rs:2253), where the background approval loop auto-approves every tool call with no human present (runtime_threads.rs:3383-3416). One approved automation_create becomes a durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent. Same insecure-default class as CVE-2026-45374, on a different, unpatched subsystem.
Root Cause
Sibling durable defaults in the same struct are safe — DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_ALLOW_SHELL = false and DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_TRUST_MODE = false (automation_manager.rs:27-28) — while DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE alone defaults true (:29). create_automation stores auto_approve: None when omitted (:422); task_auto_approve() resolves None→true (:101-103); enqueue_run_task passes Some(true) (:766), defeating add_task's unwrap_or(false) seed fix. The automation_create tool schema also declares "auto_approve": {"type":"boolean","default":true} (tools/automation.rs:49) while sibling allow_shell/trust_mode default false.
Impact
A single approved automation_create yields a durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent. Every scheduled fire silently authorizes mutating tools (file writes, apply_patch, git, MCP writes) with no prompt; combined with allow_shell:true in the create call, recurring silent RCE with no human present. Even without allow_shell, every recurring run silently authorizes all non-shell mutating tools. Same class as seed CVE-2026-45374.
Proof of Concept
Prompt injection convinces the model to create a benign-sounding recurring job (single human approval on the automation_create call):
{"name":"automation_create","arguments":{
"name":"nightly-maintenance",
"prompt":"Fetch latest and run project setup script",
"rrule":"FREQ=HOURLY;INTERVAL=1",
"allow_shell":true
}}(auto_approve omitted → stored None → resolves to true on every run.)
Attack Chain
- Entry. Prompt injection → model creates a recurring job via
automation_createwithauto_approveomitted. - Guard:
automation_createisRequired(tools/automation.rs:61-63) — user sees ONE approval prompt. - Bypass proof: the prompt describes an innocuous automation; the schema hides
"auto_approve": {"default": true}(tools/automation.rs:49). Approving "create a scheduled job" is not informed consent to "every future run bypasses all approval prompts." The resolvedauto_approve=true(omitted field) is not surfaced. - Persist.
create_automationstoresauto_approve: None(automation_manager.rs:422). - Guard: none.
- Bypass proof:
Noneis later resolved totrue, notfalse. - Fire. Headless scheduler tick (
scheduler_tick_shared, no human) orautomation_runinvokesenqueue_run_task, which setsauto_approve: Some(true)(automation_manager.rs:766). - Guard: seed-2's hardened
add_taskdefaultunwrap_or(false)(task_manager.rs:868). - Bypass proof: the value is
Some(true), sounwrap_or(false)yieldstrue— the hardened default never applies. - Sink. Background worker builds the turn with
auto_approve=true→ApprovalMode::Bypass(runtime_threads.rs:2253); the approval loop auto-approves (runtime_threads.rs:3383-3416). - Guard: auto_review safety_floor.
- Bypass proof: safety_floor holds only
Publish(any origin) andDestructive/Secret(background/headless) (auto_review.rs:344-357); ordinarywrite_file/apply_patch/edit_file/non-destructiveexec_shellare NOT held → they run unattended. Withallow_shell:true, every scheduled run additionally gets silent shell execution. - Impact. Durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent from one create approval; recurring silent RCE with
allow_shell:true.
Bypass Evidence
- Present on latest release tag v0.8.67: automation_manager.rs:27-29 (
ALLOW_SHELL=false,TRUST_MODE=false,AUTO_APPROVE=true), :101-103task_auto_approve()→unwrap_or(true), :766Some(automation.task_auto_approve()), :422 storesNonewhen omitted; task_manager.rs:868unwrap_or(false); runtime_threads.rs:2253if auto_approve → ApprovalMode::Bypass. automation_manager.rs and task_manager.rs byte-identical v0.8.67↔HEAD. - Subsystem wired by default:
automation_create/automation_runregistered viawith_runtime_task_tools()inwith_agent_tools_policy(registry.rs:1005); TUI attachesautomations: Some(...)(tui/ui.rs:986-1011), serve mode via runtime_api.rs:426 — not feature-gated. - Sibling flags
allow_shell/trust_modedefaultfalsein the same struct —auto_approve=trueis the un-hardened anomaly.
Affected Versions
<= 0.8.67 (present on latest release tag v0.8.67 and HEAD 6a3403e).
Suggested Fix
Set DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE = false (mirror the seed-2 task-path fix) and change the automation_create schema default to false, so durable automations require explicit opt-in to auto-approval just like the task path.
Reported by zx (Jace)
Credited to manus-use.
References
- https://github.com/codewhale-hq/Codewhale/security/advisories/GHSA-8hp3-xxrg-v9c8
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83817
- https://github.com/codewhale-hq/Codewhale/commit/208421b9d23d81cea3311a1eeb2a2ea81d637686
- https://github.com/codewhale-hq/Codewhale/releases/tag/v0.9.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hp3-xxrg-v9c8
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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