CVE-2026-84298: Hatchet: Cross-tenant durable callback payload disclosure in Hatchet V1 Dispatcher
Summary The V1 DurableTask stream handler registers worker-supplied durable task external IDs in an in-memory callback routing map before verifying that the authenticated tenant owns the task. If the tenant-scoped ownership check fails, the handler logs the error and continues, but the map entry persists until the stream closes.
Published Sep 22, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.95.3
- Fixed in
- 0.95.3
- Check
go list -m github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The V1 DurableTask stream handler registers worker-supplied durable task external IDs in an in-memory callback routing map before verifying that the authenticated tenant owns the task. If the tenant-scoped ownership check fails, the handler logs the error and continues, but the map entry persists until the stream closes.
Durable callback delivery resolves the destination stream by task_external_id only, without checking tenant identity. As a result, a tenant A worker that knows a tenant B durable task external UUID can hold its stream open and receive tenant B's durable callback result payload when the callback is delivered on the same dispatcher process.
Impact
This advisory requires an attacker to successfully guess a durable task external UUID belonging to another tenant. Durable task external IDs are generated with uuid.New() (UUIDv4) and are not enumerable across tenants, so exploitation requires prior knowledge of a target task UUID through an out-of-band channel. Thus, while the following environments are impacted, there is an extremely low probability it would be exploited.
Who is impacted. Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance:
- Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS)
- Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance
- Any deployment where a single tenant's API token can be obtained by an attacker
Single-tenant self-hosted deployments are unaffected in practice (the "victim" and "attacker" tenants would be the same).
Credited to Phaxma.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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