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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-84314: Nginx UI: Account Takeover via Missing `RequireSecureSession` on User Management Endpoint

highCVSS 4.0 8.7GHSA-2gc7-j998-5xx6

Summary POST /api/users/:id allows any authenticated user to change any other user's password without RequireSecureSession (2FA verification). In contrast, the self password change endpoint POST /api/user/password correctly requires RequireSecureSession. This inconsistency enables any authenticated user to take over the initial admin account (user ID 1) by simply changing its password.

Published Oct 15, 2026 · Updated Nov 9, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
Fixed in
1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
Check
go list -m github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

POST /api/users/:id allows any authenticated user to change any other user's password without RequireSecureSession (2FA verification). In contrast, the self password change endpoint POST /api/user/password correctly requires RequireSecureSession. This inconsistency enables any authenticated user to take over the initial admin account (user ID 1) by simply changing its password.

Details

nginx-ui enforces RequireSecureSession middleware on sensitive operations such as self password change (api/user/router.go:55), self profile update (api/user/router.go:54), settings modification (api/settings/router.go:12), and config file deletion/rename (api/config/router.go:16-21).

However, the user management endpoint registered in InitManageUserRouter (api/user/user.go:31-68) is mounted on the g router group (router/routers.go:92) which only applies middleware.AuthRequired() and middleware.Proxy() — no `RequireSecureSession()`.

As a result, POST /api/users/:id with a password field in the JSON body updates the target user's password with only basic JWT authentication. No 2FA or secure session verification is performed, even if the target user has 2FA enabled.

The attack flow:

  1. Attacker authenticates as any user (e.g., user ID 2).
  2. Attacker sends POST /api/users/1 with {"password": "attacker-chosen"}.
  3. Admin (user ID 1) password is changed. All existing admin tokens are invalidated (api/user/user.go:48-49).
  4. Attacker logs in as admin with the new password.
  5. Admin is locked out.

PoC

poc.zip

Please extract the uploaded compressed file before proceeding

  1. docker compose up -d
  2. python3 poc.py

Impact

  • Any authenticated user can change any other user's password, including the initial admin (user ID 1).
  • Full account takeover of the admin account.

Credited to wooseokdotkim.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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