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AI agent vulnerability · Claude Code

CVE-2026-86063: Claude Code: Plugin Hash Pin Bypass Allows Bypass of Hash Pinning

highCVSS 4.0 7.5GHSA-pq7j-f95f-qfcv

Claude Code before 2.1.179 did not check that a plugin's pinned commit SHA was what it actually checked out. A plugin author could publish a branch named like the 40-character SHA, so the install silently took the attacker's code instead of the reviewed commit. Auto-updating installs already have the fix.

Published Oct 15, 2026 · Analysis Oct 28, 2026

What an attacker can do

Marketplaces can pin a plugin to a commit SHA so the code you reviewed is the code you install. The install flow ran git checkout on that SHA but never verified that HEAD ended up at that commit. Git resolves a ref name before it tries a commit hash, so a branch named with the same 40 hex characters wins. The checkout lands on the branch tip.

The attacker controls the plugin's upstream repository and creates that branch. A user then installs the plugin and relies on the pin. They get attacker-controlled plugin code, which can include hooks, commands and MCP servers that run with the user's permissions. The advisory marks this as needing user interaction (the install) and says the plugin source must be on a git host that allows SHA-shaped branch names.

This defeats the main integrity guarantee of pinning (CWE-494). Teams that reviewed a plugin at one SHA and then trusted the pin are the ones exposed.

Who is affected

The npm package @anthropic-ai/claude-code below 2.1.179. The advisory also names Claude Desktop's plugin install flow. You are at risk only if you installed plugins from marketplaces that pin SHAs and whose source repository is hosted where SHA-named branches are allowed.

claude --version

@anthropic-ai/claude-code

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
< 2.1.179
Fixed in
2.1.179
Check
npm ls @anthropic-ai/claude-code

How to fix it

Update to Claude Code 2.1.179 or later. Anthropic says standard auto-update installs already received the fix; manual updaters should update now:

npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code@latest

After updating, review the plugins you installed under a pin before the fix. Remove and reinstall any you cannot verify against the reviewed commit. The advisory lists no workaround.

How to tell if you were hit

For each installed plugin, compare the checked-out commit in the plugin's local git clone (git rev-parse HEAD) with the SHA pinned in the marketplace entry. A mismatch means the pin was bypassed. Also look in the upstream repository for a branch whose name is a 40-character hex string. Beam records agent shell commands and file access, so unexpected activity from a newly installed plugin's hooks shows up there.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

The plugin install flow in Claude Code and Claude Desktop checked out a marketplace's pinned commit SHA using git checkout without verifying that the resulting HEAD matched the pinned SHA. An attacker controlling a plugin's upstream repository could create a branch named identically to the pinned 40-character SHA, causing the checkout to silently resolve to the attacker's branch tip instead of the reviewed commit, resulting in attacker-controlled code being installed bypassing the pinned hash. Exploitation required a user to install a malicious plugin, pin to a safe hash, and for the plugin source to be hosted on a git host that permitted SHA-shaped branch names.

Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.

Thank you to Or Nevo Michrowski of Air Security for reporting this issue.

Questions

Is Claude Code 2.1.179 affected by CVE-2026-86063?

No. 2.1.179 is the patched version. Anything earlier is affected, though standard auto-update users have already received it.

Does the user have to do anything?

Yes. The user must install the malicious plugin and rely on the pinned hash. The attacker must control the plugin's upstream repository.

Does it work on any git host?

Only on hosts that allow branch names shaped like a SHA, according to the advisory.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

Coverage on the Beam blog

More Claude Code vulnerabilities

All Claude Code entries