CVE-2026-88046: rclone: source object names can escape the configured root on upload
Summary Multiple backends, when given a specially crafted object to copy, can escape the backend confinement. Backend Keep/Close Per-backend severity --------- sftp Medium Real filesystem escape, fires under default encoding. smb Low-Medium Escapes to a different SMB share the credential can reach. ftp Low Real, leading-.. overshoot PoC is partly neutralized by encoding; escape bounded to at/below the login base.
Published Sep 10, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/rclone/rclone
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.75.1
- Fixed in
- 1.75.1
- Check
go list -m github.com/rclone/rclone
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Multiple backends, when given a specially crafted object to copy, can escape the backend confinement.
| Backend | Keep/Close | Per-backend severity | | sftp | Medium | Real filesystem escape, fires under default encoding. | | smb | Low-Medium | Escapes to a different SMB share the credential can reach. | | ftp | Low | Real, leading-`..` overshoot PoC is partly neutralized by encoding; escape bounded to at/below the login base. | | webdav | Low | Server-side ACLs are the real boundary. | | b2 | Low | Same-account sibling **bucket** crossing on a flat keyspace. | | swift | Low | Same, container. | | qingstor | Low | Same. | | oracleobjectstorage | Low | Same. | | internetarchive | Low | IA items are owner-writable only; confined to user's own items. | | storj | Low | Can retarget a different bucket in the same access grant. | | filelu | Low | Confined to the user's own account. | | shade | Low | Confined to the user's own drive. | | sia | Low | siad API password already grants full-daemon access. |
Root cause
rclone core does not sanitize .. in a source object's Remote() - verified: nothing in fs/march, fs/sync, fs/list, or fs/operations rejects .. segments before the name reaches the destination backend's Put/Update/Mkdir. Confinement is therefore each backend's responsibility, and these backends join root + remote without a check.
This divides into two classes:
- Bucket based backends -
bucket.Split(path.Join(f.root, rootRelativePath)): backend/b2/b2.go:404,backend/swift/swift.go:464,backend/qingstor/qingstor.go:198,backend/oracleobjectstorage/oracleobjectstorage.go:245,backend/internetarchive/internetarchive.go:1016,backend/smb/smb.go:885,backend/storj/fs.go:289.path.Joincollapses..on the standard (ASCII) form before encoding is applied (e.g.FromStandardPath(path.Join(...))atbackend/b2/b2.go:1641), soEncodeDotnever gets the chance to neutralize the...lib/bucket.Joindoes not clean paths (keeps..as a literal key segment);path.Joindoes.backend/s3,backend/azureblob,backend/googlecloudstoragealready usebucket.Joinand are therefore not affected.
- Path based backends -
path.Join(root, remote)onto a real path: - sftp:
remotePath = path.Join(f.absRoot, f.opt.Enc.FromStandardPath(remote))(backend/sftp/sftp.go:2497). Default encoding isencoder.Display(==Standard), andFromStandardPathshort-circuits to a pass-through in that mode, so..survives;f.absRootis absolute, sopath.Join("/home/user/root", "../../../../etc/passwd")->/etc/passwd. - webdav:
filePathatbackend/webdav/webdav.go:426-432. - ftp:
path.Join(f.root, remote)at ~14 sites (e.g.backend/ftp/ftp.go:1247). - filelu, shade, sia: analogous joins.
Precondition that limits reachability
For any of these to fire, a source must hand rclone a Remote() containing raw ... That is only possible when:
- the source is a flat-keyspace object store (not a filesystem - a local/sftp/smb source cannot represent
../../xas one directory entry), and - the offending key was written with native, non-rclone tooling - rclone's own writer applies
EncodeDotand rewrites a..segment to fullwidth.., so you cannot create such a key *through rclone*.
rclone's source-side listing does pass a natively-planted raw .. key through unchanged (verified for b2: remote := file.Name[len(prefix):] after ToStandardPath, backend/b2/b2.go:858,867). The reports never establish this precondition; it is the same omission across every member of the class.
Example attack
# Step 1 - attacker, using NATIVE S3 tooling (NOT rclone) on a source the victim ingests from:
aws s3api put-object --bucket shared-drop --key '../../victim-backups/pwned.txt' --body evil.txt
# Step 2 - victim's ordinary ingest:
rclone copy s3-drop:shared-drop b2:victim-uploads/incoming
# path.Join("victim-uploads/incoming", "../../victim-backups/pwned.txt") = "victim-backups/pwned.txt"
# -> lands in the victim's victim-backups bucket instead of under incoming/The blast radius is the victim's own account (a bucket/share/path the configured credential already reaches) - integrity misdirection, not a cross-tenant or confidentiality breach. sftp/smb are the exception in *reach* (server filesystem / other share), still bounded by the login's own permissions.
Precedent
This is the same class as the already-fixed local backend advisory [https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-7p4m-qxvv-g567](GHSA-7p4m-qxvv-g567), which added (*Fs).localPath returning errPathEscapes for names resolving outside the root (backend/local/local.go:819-826). That fix was justified because the destination was the operator's own OS filesystem; the same reasoning extends (at lower severity) to sftp/smb.
Credited to iaohkut, ncw.
References
- https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-38xv-hf3p-h7mq
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88046
- https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/57842c5ee4e1407eda06a414a36510cce2db4252
- https://github.com/rclone/rclone/releases/tag/v1.75.1
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-38xv-hf3p-h7mq
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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