CVE-2026-88059: Angular: Information Leak via `HttpTransferCache` Bypass When Using `withRequestsMadeViaParent`
A security bypass vulnerability was discovered in @angular/common when Server-Side Rendering (SSR) and hydration are enabled in applications using a hierarchical HttpClient configuration with withRequestsMadeViaParent().
Published Sep 10, 2026
Affected packages
@angular/common
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 22.0.0, < 22.1.1
- Fixed in
- 22.1.1
- Check
npm ls @angular/common
@angular/common
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 21.0.0, < 21.2.20
- Fixed in
- 21.2.20
- Check
npm ls @angular/common
@angular/common
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 20.0.0, < 20.3.28
- Fixed in
- 20.3.28
- Check
npm ls @angular/common
@angular/common
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 19.2.25
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
npm ls @angular/common
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
A security bypass vulnerability was discovered in @angular/common when Server-Side Rendering (SSR) and hydration are enabled in applications using a hierarchical HttpClient configuration with withRequestsMadeViaParent().
The HttpTransferCache utility optimizes hydration by caching outgoing HTTP requests performed during SSR and transferring the cached state to the client-side application via TransferState (serialized as JSON in <script id="ng-state">). Following the remediation of CVE-2026-50170, HttpTransferCache automatically skips caching requests that contain authentication headers or credentials (Authorization, Cookie, withCredentials, etc.).
However, when a child HttpClient delegates to a parent client via withRequestsMadeViaParent(), the child's TransferCache interceptor evaluates whether the request is eligible for caching before delegating to the parent client's interceptor chain.
If an outgoing request originates as anonymous from the child client, the child TransferCache marks the request as cacheable. When the request reaches a parent interceptor that injects sensitive authentication credentials (such as an Authorization header or API token), the parent TransferCache correctly skips caching the authenticated request. However, when the backend returns the private, authenticated response, the child TransferCache still stores the response in TransferState based on its initial pre-delegation evaluation.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows sensitive, user-specific information belonging to an authenticated user to be leaked to unauthenticated or unauthorized users. This occurs when:
- During SSR, a child
HttpClientinitiates an unauthenticated request that is subsequently authenticated by a parent interceptor. - The authenticated response body is cached into the SSR-rendered HTML page (
TransferState). - The rendered HTML page is stored by a shared caching layer (e.g., CDN, edge cache, or reverse proxy) or served across user sessions.
- Subsequent visitors requesting the same page receive the cached HTML containing the previous user's private data.
Attack Preconditions & Vulnerable Configurations
An application is affected only if all of the following conditions are met:
- SSR and Hydration Enabled: The application uses Server-Side Rendering with hydration enabled (e.g., via
provideClientHydration()). - Hierarchical `HttpClient` with Delegation: The application configures a child
HttpClientusingwithRequestsMadeViaParent(). - Parent-Level Authentication Injection: Authentication credentials (such as
Authorizationheaders, session cookies, or custom API tokens filtered viawithHttpTransferCacheOptions) are attached by an interceptor in the parent injector chain rather than on the initial child request. - Shared HTML Caching: The SSR HTML responses are cached by a shared caching layer (CDN, reverse proxy, or application-level HTML cache).
Vulnerable Code Pattern Example
// Parent Injector / Application Config
export const appConfig: ApplicationConfig = {
providers: [
provideHttpClient(
// Parent interceptor attaches sensitive Authorization header
withInterceptors([
(req, next) => next(req.clone({ setHeaders: { Authorization: `Bearer ${getToken()}` } }))
])
),
],
};
// Child Injector / Feature or Component Config
const childClient = createEnvironmentInjector(
[
// Child delegates to parent; TransferCache evaluates req BEFORE parent auth interceptor runs
provideHttpClient(withRequestsMadeViaParent()),
],
parentInjector
).get(HttpClient);
// Request originates without auth headers -> marked cacheable by child TransferCache
childClient.get('/api/user/profile').subscribe();Patches
The issue is resolved by updating @angular/common to run root interceptors in the terminal request chain so that delegated clients leave inherited root interceptors to the parent chain, preventing duplicate execution and ensuring HttpTransferCache evaluates cache eligibility after parent request interceptors run.
22.1.121.2.2020.3.28
Workarounds & Mitigations
For applications that cannot immediately upgrade to a patched version, use one of the following mitigations:
- Attach Credentials Before or Within the Child Client: Ensure authentication headers (e.g.,
Authorization) are attached directly when constructing the request or via an interceptor configured directly on the childHttpClient, rather than relying solely on parent interceptors. - Apply Explicit Cache Filters on the Child Client: Configure
withHttpTransferCacheOptionswith a filter on the child client that explicitly excludes endpoints returning user-specific or sensitive data: ``ts provideClientHydration( withHttpTransferCacheOptions({ filter: (req) => !req.url.includes('/api/private/'), }) )`` - Disable HTTP Transfer Cache for Sensitive Routes: If specific SSR routes handle user-authenticated data, disable transfer caching for those requests or ensure the SSR response sets
Cache-Control: no-store/privateheaders at your edge/CDN layer so personalized HTML is never shared.
Credited to JeanMeche, alan-agius4, SkyZeroZx.
References
- https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-p297-fm68-3q8c
- https://github.com/angular/angular/issues/69777
- https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69778
- https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/c45028e44f5f3c1e0006eaccf86642deca51b2af
- https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/caf616670fd20d528aa69e0131cc17d60f0cc27d
- https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/e4c416c20a1cb222ce73d29c035452b257380c56
- https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v20.3.28
- https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v21.2.20
- https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v22.1.1
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p297-fm68-3q8c
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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